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MUSONIUS RUFUS
"THE ROMAN SOCRATES"



CORA E. LUTZ

MUSONIUS RUFUS

“THE ROMAN SOCRATES”

ACCORDING to Philostratus,¹ writing a century and a half after the event, once when Musonius was lying chained in the prison of Nero, his friend the notorious Apollonius of Tyana secretly communicated with him, inquiring what he might do to help release him. Musonius' reply was a brief acknowledgment of Apollonius' thoughtfulness and a polite but firm refusal of assistance. Thereupon Apollonius answered in one terse sentence, “Socrates the Athenian refused to be released by his friends, and consequently went to trial and was put to death.” To which Musonius answered, “Socrates was put to death because he did not take the trouble to defend himself, but I intend to make my defence. Farewell.” A generation later, Origen, in his apology for Christianity, the treatise *Contra Celsum*,² named the two men who in the judgment of some people stood out as models of the highest type of life, the two saints, as it were, of the pagan world, Socrates and Musonius. In the fourth century, the emperor Julian wrote a letter³ to commend the high-priest Theodorus for his meretorious behaviour when he was insolently abused by the governor of Greece. Among other compliments, he said that Theodorus' complete lack of resentment was comparable to Socrates' equanimity under an unjust condemnation, while his desire to aid the city where he had suffered could be compared to Musonius' generous efforts in behalf of Gyara where he had been exiled.

¹ *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana* IV, 46. Hense includes in his edition of Musonius (C. Musonius Rufus, *Reliquiae* pp. 142 f.) the four letters found in Philostratus; they are also published by R. Hercher in *Epistolographi Graeci*, Paris, 1873, pp. 127 f. There is no reason to consider the letters genuine. Cf. Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der Griechischen Litteratur*, Munich, 1920, VII, II, 1, p. 357.

² III, 66 (P. Koetschau, *Origenes Werk* I, p. 259, ll. 19-24 in *Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller*, Leipzig, 1899). εἰς γὰρ καὶ κατὰ πᾶσαν φιλοσοφίας αἵρεσιν καὶ κατὰ τὸν θεῖον λόγον οἱ τοσούτων μεταβληθέναι ἱστοροῦμενοι, ὥστε αὐτοὺς ἐγκεῖσθαι παράδειγμα τοῦ ἀρίστου βίου. καὶ φέρουσι τινες ἡρώων μὲν τὸν Ἡρακλέα καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσεά, τῶν δ' ὕστερον τὸν Σωκράτην, τῶν δὲ χθὲς καὶ πρῶην γεγονότων τὸν Μουσώνιον.

³ “Letter to the High-priest Theodorus” 16 (W. C. Wright, *The Works of the Emperor Julian*, London, 1923, III, p. 38). The authenticity of this letter, dated about 362, has not been completely established. Cf. *op. cit.* III, p. lxii.

In these three instances, the names of the Greek and the Roman philosophers are linked together as preeminent examples of men who professed the highest ethical standards and lived lives in harmony with their teachings. From these implied comparisons, given simply, without any explanatory material to lend them persuasive force, one may suspect that the comparison was not at all strained, but was in fact one which was current and familiar. And now, centuries later, when much of the material which might have made the comparison more obvious has been lost, a modern scholar does not hesitate to call Musonius "the Roman Socrates."⁴

To us who might find it difficult to name a point in our lives when the name Socrates was new to us, and who have only a vague recollection of Musonius as one of the Stoic martyrs in the pages of Tacitus, the juxtaposition of the names may seem extravagant. The obscurity which has dimmed the name and reputation of Musonius is one of the unfortunate accidents of historical record, for even the extant testimonia of ancient writers, meagre as they are, lead us to the conclusion that Musonius was a much more compelling personage than his surviving works permit us to suspect, in fact one of the most significant figures of his age. Although a professor of Stoic doctrine,⁵ Musonius was by no means restricted by sectarian boundaries; his teachings were his own humanitarian interpretation of the fundamental principles regulating human conduct, truly the fruit of a good life and the expression of a great personality.⁶ In the mere fact of standing forth as the spiritual and ethical leader and "apostle of moral liberty"⁷ to his own and succeeding generations, Musonius is rightly compared to Socrates. But the exactness of the comparison becomes vivid and impressive when one notes how numerous are the points of similarity suggested by a consideration of the life of Musonius, his aims and methods, and the content and temper of his teachings.

⁴ R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, Leipzig, 1895, II, p. 239. "In einer solchen Umgebung nach solchen Vorgängern wird uns das Auftreten des römischen Sokrates verständlich. Denn so dürfen wir wohl den Musonius Rufus nennen." Cf. O. Halbauer, *De Diatribis Epicteti*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 27, note 2: "Quo iure Hirzel Musonium Socratem Romanum appellat."; also C. P. Parker, "Musonius the Etruscan," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* VII (1896), p. 129: "The man who had lived the life revealed in the Stobaeus extracts might well be set alongside of Socrates."

⁵ Tacitus first labels Musonius a Stoic. Cf. *Hist.* III, 81.

⁶ The distinctively individual character of Socrates' doctrine and the fact that, to an unprecedented degree, his own personality and his teachings were bound together are emphasized too frequently to require repetition.

⁷ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, N. Y., 1943, II, p. 13.

Perhaps the least significant, if the most definite, point of similarity is that, though both men spent their lives teaching, they were so indifferent to preserving their thoughts that they made little effort to commit them to writing.⁸ There is a legend of some γράμματα⁹ of Musonius, but it is almost as unfounded as the tale of Socrates' writings.¹⁰ Apparently some contemporary

⁸ Hense (*Musonius* p. ix) expresses the generally accepted opinion of modern scholarship when he says, "Ipse autem Musonius libros, quantum scimus, non composuit." Cf. H. von Arnim (*Dio von Prusa*, Berlin, 1898, p. 176): "Auch Musonius . . . hat, soviel wir wissen, eigene Schriften nicht verfasst."; Schmid-Stählin (*Gesch. der Griech. Lit.*, VII, II, 1, p. 357): "Geschrieben hat er nichts."; K. von Fritz ("Musonius" in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie*, Stuttgart, 1933, XXXI, p. 894): "Von Schriften des M., die dieser selbst verfasst und herausgegeben hätte, hat sich keinerlei Nachricht erhalten."

Professor G. L. Hendrickson, however, has called to my attention some important evidence, hitherto unobserved, which immediately necessitates a qualification of the dogmatic affirmations of Hense and his followers. The ninth treatise on the popular theme *περὶ φυγῆς* is introduced in the same way as the spoken discourses (*φυγάδος δὲ τινος ὀδυρομένου ὅτι φεύγει*), but the entire body of the work seems to represent a letter which was written by Musonius to a friend who was living in exile. Even though the original letter has been incorporated by Lucius into an essay, one can still see certain epistolary formulae which he neglected to alter. So, for example, at 74, 8 he says, *σὺ δ' εἰπέ μοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε* and at 74, 21, *πρὸς σέ εἰποιμι ἂν* and at 76, 2, *πρὸς σέ λέγω νῦν*, all addressed to one individual instead of to a general audience. Therefore, one is obliged to concede that there was at least one letter written by Musonius included in the *Corpus Musonianum* of Lucius. Since this does represent an original letter from the hand of Musonius, it is of unusual importance, for we may consider it a more direct expression of Musonius' feelings than the other discourses. It also raises the question whether others of the discourses may not be derived from a written source. See note 22.

⁹ The ancient tradition for writings by Musonius springs from a statement in Suidas under *Μουσώνιος* (1305): *λόγοι διάφοροι φιλοσοφίας ἐχόμενοι, καὶ ἐπιστολαί*; from a passage in Eunapius' *Lives of the Sophists* (454) where γράμματα are attributed to Demetrius, Menippus, and Musonius, though this may be a later Musonius; and from the *ἐπιστολαί* quoted by Philostratus (*Apollonius* IV, 46). The letters in Philostratus were identified by A. Westermann (*De Epistolarum Scriptoribus Graecis Commentationis*, Leipzig, 1854, pp. 6 f.) with the *ἐπιστολαί* mentioned by Suidas. There is also a long letter reputed to have been written by Musonius to Pancratides on the subject of the education of his sons. (Cf. Hense, *Musonius* pp. 137-142 and R. Hercher, *Epistolographi Graeci* pp. 401-404). It also is considered spurious. Cf. Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. der Griech. Lit.*, VII, II, 1, p. 357.

P. Wendland (*Quaestiones Musonianae*, Berlin, 1886, pp. 34 f.) originally insisted upon the existence of the *λόγοι* of Musonius, but eventually retracted his position and accepted the general conclusion that there were no written works. (*Philo und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*, Berlin, 1895, p. 72).

¹⁰ Cf. Epictetus, *Disc.* II, 1, 32 (*ed.* W. A. Oldfather, London, 1926, I, p. 222, note 1). Cf. W. Jaeger, *Paideia* II, p. 16: "Socrates, who was so absorbed in the task set him by his own age that he did not deign to leave a single line of writing to posterity."

record of his teachings was made, but the manner and instrument of that original recording and the subsequent transmission of his words is far from clear. The fragments which we have were preserved among the works of other authors and were not collected until 1822 when they were first brought together by the Dutch scholar,¹¹ I. V. Peerlkamp. This small collection of discourses and sayings may be divided into two groups. The first group, representing the bulk of the work, consists of twenty-one moral discourses,¹² conversations, or *διατριβαί*,¹³ which are

¹¹ *C. Musonii Rufi Philosophi Stoici Reliquiae et Apophthegmata*, Haarlem, 1822. This edition contains one essay, "Quid vacuum doloris faciat" (II, 3, pp. 185-188), which is no longer included in the works of Musonius. In his edition of Stobaeus (Basle, 1549, p. 18) Gesner was not able to identify the author, but he made the conjecture that it might be Musonius. This essay is rejected by Hense in his edition of Musonius. Although the subject matter and general treatment make it comparable to the works of Musonius, the elliptical style cannot be mistaken for his. W. E. H. Lecky (*History of European Morals*, N. Y., 1925, I, pp. 220 f.) quotes a passage on suicide from it and wrongly attributes it to Musonius. Two fragments from Gesner's *Stobaeus* (p. 31), included in Peerlkamp (pp. 254 f.), are no longer accepted. Meineke (*Stobaeus, Florilegium* I, pp. 65 f.) gives Theodorus as the source of one and *ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστολῆς περὶ φίλων* of the other.

¹² Three discourses, XIII, XV, and XVIII, are divided each into two sections, A and B, which may represent disjoined halves of the same conversation, for we do not know what the originals were like before Stobaeus quarried from them. However, a recently discovered papyrus (*The Rendel Harris Papyri*, ed. J. Enoch Powell, Cambridge, 1936, I) throws some light upon the way the original compositions were used by Stobaeus. The fragment contains the text of the whole essay XVA of Hense as preserved in Stobaeus, but the introductory words in the fragment indicate that it did not stand at the beginning of the essay. These words, *οὐς μάλι[στα πρέπει]τε οἱ νομοθέται* have been altered by Stobaeus to read *οἱ δὲ νομοθέται* which transform them into a suitable opening sentence. Furthermore, the papyrus text continues on after the end of XVA and furnishes eighteen lines of text hitherto unknown which fill in the gap between XVA and XVB. This papyrus, written in the third century, must have been a part of the complete *Corpus Musonianum* from which Stobaeus, two centuries later, took excerpts. For the literature on this important find, the only text of Musonius found in any papyrus, cf. J. E. Powell, "Musonius Rufus: *Εἰ πάντα τὰ γινόμενα τέκνα θρεπτέον*," *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* XII (1937), pp. 175-178; B. Snell, "The Rendel Harris Papyri," *Gnomon* XIII (1937), p. 578; W. G. Waddell, review of *The Rendel Harris Papyri* in *Classical Review* LI (1937), p. 70; A. Körte, "Literarische Texte," *Archiv für Papyr.* XIII (1939), p. 112.

T. Pflieger (*Musonius bei Stobaeus*, Freiburg, 1897, pp. 16, 20) notes that fifteen of the treatises are reasonably complete, with introduction, development of thesis, and conclusion, and are probably very much as Lucius wrote them, but that the rest seem to have been altered in some way by Stobaeus.

¹³ A good analysis of this type of discourse is given by O. Halbauer (*De Diatribis Epicteti*), though he places undue emphasis upon the diatribe as a

preserved only in the anthologies of Stobaeus. For all those discourses except one,¹⁴ Stobaeus gives the title Μουσωνίου ἐκ τοῦ . . . , but the fifth discourse differs in having the title Δουκίου¹⁵ ἐκ τῶν Μουσωνίου. . . . Yet the oneness of style and spirit, and the fact that all are assigned to Musonius have led scholars to consider all twenty-one essays as reports of his discourses made by one Lucius.¹⁶ The frequent recurrence of phrases like, "Such were the opinions Musonius expressed at that time" make it evident that this Lucius was a pupil of Musonius, and one specific reference in which Musonius speaks as an exile to an exile reveals that Lucius too suffered during his teacher's first banish-

specific literary type, whereas the term covered any form of discussion that went on in the philosopher's school (cf. *Musonius* 54.32). Cf. R. Bultmann, *Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe*, Göttingen, 1910, pp. 10-64; A. Oltramare, *Les Origines de la Diatribe romaine*, Lausanne, 1926, pp. 1-31.

¹⁴ V. The title of XXI is simply ἐκ τοῦ περὶ κουρᾶς without the name of the author, though some of the manuscripts do read Μουσωνίου and one τοῦ αὐτοῦ. Cf. Hense, *Musonius* p. 114, l. 10 *app. crit.*

¹⁵ Hense (*Musonius*, p. x) quotes Elter (*De Ioannis Stobaei cod. Phot. p. 46*) to prove that the Δουκίου should be Δουκίου, and that formerly it occurred twice in Stobaeus. Cf. also P. Wendland, *Philō und die kynisch-stoische Diatribe* p. 68 and T. Pflieger, *Musonius bei Stobaeus* p. 3.

¹⁶ From the time of Nieuwland on, scholars have noticed that there seemed to be some slight difference between this one discourse and the others. P. Nieuwland (*Dissertatio de Musonio Rufo philosopho Stoico* pp. 63 f. originally published separately in 1783, but reprinted by Peerkamp in his edition of *Musonius Rufus* in 1822) says, "Haec igitur a reliquis nonnihil diversa videtur. In omnibus enim iis, de quibus dixi, Dissertationibus, Musonius ipse a sua persona, non interrupta oratione, loquitur, nec nisi subinde in initio et in fine pauca occurrunt alterius verba, quibus occasio sermonis significetur; in hac vero Lucius ille, quisquis tandem fuerit, e sua persona colloquium refert: ut narret, quid ad propositam quaestionem dixerit Musonius, quid alter ei responderit, quid iterum reposuerit, interjectis passim verbis τῷ Μουσωνίῳ ἐδόκει . . . ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο . . . πάλιν ὁ Μουσώνιος . . . ὁ Μουσώνιος συνάπτων τοῖς προειρημένοις et similibus." Cf. also Hirzel, *Der Dialog* II, p. 244, note 2; D. G. H. Moser, *Vier, bisher ungedruckte, Fragmente des stoischen Philosophen Musonius in Studien von Daub und Creuzer*, Heidelberg, 1811, VI, p. 81. Yet Nieuwland concludes (p. 64), "Argumentum vero ejusque tractatio nostro Musonio omnino convenit." Cf. also Moser, *op. cit.* p. 124, note 103; Wytttenbach's note on Δουκίου in Peerkamp's edition, p. 381; T. Gaisford in his edition of Stobaeus *Florilegium*, Leipzig, 1824, IV, p. 385, note k. Pflieger (*Musonius bei Stobaeus, passim*) deals with the question in detail and shows by an abundance of examples that all of the discourses must be the work of one and the same editor. He does not consider the fact that the name occurs only once damaging to his theory. Hense (*Teletis reliquiae*, Tübingen, 1909, p. xvi) describes Stobaeus' erratic habits with regard to lemmata, and Wytttenbach (*loc. cit.*) calls attention to the fact that the name Theodorus is found in only one place in the excerpts of Teles. Cf. also Hense, *Musonius* p. xi, and Wendland, *Philō* p. 68.

ment.¹⁷ Other than that it has been impossible to identify Lucius¹⁸ beyond saying that he was not the Lucius of Apuleius or Lucian¹⁹ or the commentator on the *Categories* of Aristotle from whom Simplicius²⁰ freely borrowed. All of the discourses were probably published some time after Musonius' death.²¹

The second group of Musonius' works is made up of a series of thirty-two short apothegms, precepts, and anecdotes preserved in Stobaeus, Epictetus, Aulus Gellius, and Aelius Aristides. These fragments fall rather naturally into several classes. Those preserved by Stobaeus are divided into two sets. The first set bear the heading *Μουσωνίου* and are in the form of aphorisms, precepts, and maxims, all of which might be called the *dicta* or memorable sayings of Musonius. The other five fragments given by Stobaeus are entitled *Πούφου ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου περὶ φιλίας*. They are not found in Arrian's discourses of Epictetus, though they

¹⁷ Cf. IX (74, 13-19). Presumably Musonius' letter was addressed to Lucius.

¹⁸ No other writings of Lucius seem to have survived except one sentence which is preserved in the Appendix Vaticana (*Cod. Vat. Gra. 1144*) of the *Gnomologia* (L. Sternbach, "Appendix Vaticana" in *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności Wydział Filologiczny*, Cracow, 1894, II, 5, p. 214, n. 108) which is referred to by Hense (*Musonius* p. 105, *app. crit.*): Λούκιος ἔφη· ὥσπερ ἄλειμμα οὐ τὸ ἡδὺν καλόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, οὕτως καὶ τροφή οὐχὶ ἡ ἡδεῖα καλή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὑγίαν ἢ ποριζομένην. This undoubtedly should be referred to Musonius rather than to Lucius. The source found it *apud Lucium* and so cites it by his name just as Epictetus is cited as Arrianus by modern scholars.

Another Lucius who has been confused with this one is considered below in note 85.

¹⁹ Cf. E. Rohde, *Ueber Lucians Schrift Δούκιος ἢ ὄνος*, Leipzig, 1869, pp. 26 f.

²⁰ In his *Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle* (ed. C. Kalbfleish, Berlin, 1907, VIII), Simplicius in numerous places (*e.g.* p. 1, l. 19; p. 48, l. 1; p. 62, l. 28; p. 64, l. 18; p. 73, l. 28; p. 125, l. 16; p. 127, l. 30; p. 156, l. 17) mentions a Δούκιος as a predecessor of Nicostratus in commenting upon Aristotle. This may be the Lucius referred to by Philostratus as a friend of Herodes Atticus (*Lives of the Sophists*, ed. W. C. Wright, II, 1, pp. 556-558), though the question is a troubled one. At all events his Academic attitude prevents our identifying him with the Lucius of Musonius who remained essentially Stoic. Cf. K. Praechter, "Nikostratus der Platoniker," *Hermes* LVII (1922), pp. 481-517.

²¹ In VIII (60, 5) Lucius is reporting a conversation of Musonius with a king from Syria and he says, by way of parenthesis, that there were still kings in Syria at that time, vassals of the Romans. Since the last dynasty of Syrian kings was dethroned in 106 A.D., he must have been writing some time after that. Cf. E. Rohde, *Ueber Lucians Schrift* p. 26, and Hense, *Musonius* pp. xiv f. Lucius, in this essay as in the others, speaks of Musonius as if he were no longer living. His acquaintance with the philosopher must have been of very long standing for he mentions Musonius' exile (IX) as if he were present and speaks of Spartiacus the Lacedaemonian as a contemporary. Cf. F. Buecheler, "Spartiacus," *Rh. Mus.* LIII (1898), pp. 166 f.

report rather long quotations made from Musonius by Epictetus in a discourse on friendship.²² The two fragments preserved by Plutarch are short anecdotes which might be termed *facta* or remarkable doings of Musonius. Three excerpts from Aulus Gellius preserve memorable sayings²³ and a fourth is long enough to represent a résumé of a whole discourse.²⁴ There is one anecdote in Aelius Aristides. Epictetus relates half a dozen incidents about his teacher, Musonius. With the exception of these stories told by Epictetus, which have a freshness and unconventionality to stamp them as purely personal recollections, the fragments from *περὶ φιλίας*, and the long passage in Aulus Gellius, all these comparatively short fragments,²⁵ being in the nature of *facta* and *dicta* of Musonius, might well have come from a collection of memorable sayings and deeds of the type commonly known as *ἀπομνημονεύματα*.²⁶

As it happens, there is some evidence of the existence at one

²² W. A. Oldfather prints them among the fragments of Epictetus in his edition (*Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus* II, pp. 444-449), and explains the title in this way: "The natural way to take this and the next few titles is to assume that Epictetus had quoted with approval a fairly long passage from his revered teacher Musonius Rufus." The subject matter of these fragments (XXXVIII-XLII) differs widely from the others in that it deals with more specifically doctrinal questions and metaphysical problems. It is also of no inconsiderable interest that they seem to have come from a *written* treatise of Musonius.

²³ Aulus Gellius bears witness to the fact that Musonius' *dicta* were used as copy-book material in his youth. Cf. *Noct. Att.* XVI, 1, 1 (Musonius, fr. LI). Fragment LII (Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* XVIII, 2, 1) is also quoted by Macrobius, *Sat.* I, 5, 12, and fragment LI is paraphrased by Hierocles, *In Aureum Pythagoreorum Carmen Commentarius*, ed. F. G. A. Mullach, Berlin, 1853, XV, 30-31, pp. 104, ll. 4-9.

²⁴ This passage (fragment XLIX) is a puzzle for two reasons. In the first place, one wonders if it represents the work of Lucius, an essay which Stobaeus did not choose to include in his selection of works. In the second place, one asks if the fragment XLVIII from Epictetus (III, 23, 29) is taken from it and under what circumstances. H. Schenkl in his edition of Epictetus (Leipzig, 1894, p. 285) calls attention to the similarity and cites *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 9 and 135 (L. Sternbach, "De Gnomologio Vaticano inedito," *Wiener Studien* IX (1887), p. 182 and X (1888), p. 27.

²⁵ Actually the word fragment is a misnomer, for these little pieces are complete units in themselves. The fact that they are not in the nature of excerpts torn from a larger work is of real significance. The contrast between these short, epigrammatic fragments and the long discourses which do not lend themselves easily to quotation makes me incline to the theory that they came from a different edition of the works of Musonius from that of Lucius.

²⁶ Cf. the discussion of the term given by C. E. Finckh in "E. Köpke, *Über die Gattung der 'Απομνημονεύματα in der griechischen Litteratur*," *Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik* LXXIX (1859), pp. 10-15, 436, and R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I, pp. 144-147.

time of such a book of reminiscences of Musonius. Among the literary works of Asinius Pollio, Suidas names *Ἀπομνημονεύματα Μουσωνίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου*.²⁷ Obviously Suidas confused two people of the name Pollio, for the well-known Asinius of the Augustan Age could not have lived long enough to be the author of reminiscences of Musonius. The majority of modern scholars are agreed that Valerius Pollio, a grammarian living in the time of Hadrian, was the person who made the collection,²⁸ but the theory that it was Annii Pollio²⁹ seems more plausible, since he belonged to a family which was close to Musonius. Annii was the husband of Servilia, daughter of Barea Soranus, and he was exiled at the time of the Pisonian conspiracy. Musonius' loyal devotion to the family was demonstrated when he instigated proceedings against Egnatius Celer for his dastardly action in bearing false witness against Barea and so causing his condemnation. This man, being a contemporary of Musonius, would have been in a position to make notes of the talks of the philosopher. Then too, Annii would have a debt of gratitude to Musonius which he might well have been glad to repay by perpetuating his words in this way. Finally, the names Annii and Asinius could have become confused before Suidas' time. This confusion

²⁷ Suidas 2165 Πωλλίων ὁ Ἀσίνιος. In the eleventh century Eudocia Augusta copied this account in her *Violarium* 799 (ed. J. Flach, Leipzig, 1880, p. 592).

²⁸ As early as 1659 Ioannes Ionsius (*De Scriptoribus Historiae Philosophicae*, ed. I. C. Dornius, Jena, 1716, III, 7, 9) pointed out the error of Suidas and suggested that Valerius Pollio Alexandrinus who is described by Suidas (2166) as a philosopher and grammarian, father of Diodorus the philosopher, must be the editor of Musonius' *dicta* and *facta memorabilia*. Another conjecture of Ionsius that Pollio might be Claudius Pollio who is mentioned by Pliny (*Ep.* VII, 31) in connection with a Musonius Bassus has been completely discredited by the general acceptance of the reading *Anni Bassi* in place of *Musonii* in the Pliny manuscripts. The first conjecture won the support of H. Peter who worked out a reasonable revision of the material given in Suidas under the two Pollios, Asinius and Valerius, so that the *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* are ascribed to Valerius. Cf. "Über einige Schriftsteller des Namens Pollio," *Jahrbücher für Philol. und Paedag.* CXIX (1879), pp. 420-424. The latest editor of Suidas (A. Adler, *Suidae Lexicon*, Leipzig, 1928-1938) does not follow the revision though Peter's suggestion is indicated in a note. F. G. Welcker (*Kleine Schriften*, Bonn, 1845, II, pp. 566 f.), Rohde (*Ueber Lucians Schrift* p. 27), Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen* 4th ed., Leipzig, 1909, III, 1, p. 756), Hense (*Musonius* p. xii), and Köpke (*op. cit.* p. 15) are satisfied with the explanation that Valerius Pollio is the compiler.

²⁹ Cf. K. von Fritz, "Musonius" in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie* XXXI, p. 896. C. P. Parker ("Musonius the Etruscan," *Harvard Studies* VII (1896), p. 137) is also inclined to this view. The sources for our knowledge of Annii Pollio are Tacitus, *Ann.* VI, 9; XV, 56, 71; XVI, 30. He went into exile at the same time as Musonius and probably returned under Galba.

seems easier to grant than that of Asinius with Valerius. Whoever the compiler³⁰ may have been, only fragments of his work remain.³¹

It would seem, then, that there were two compilations of the work of Musonius, one by Lucius and preserved in part in the

³⁰ A third conjecture, originally made by D. A. Wyttenbach and printed in Peerlkamp's edition (p. 381) and taken up by T. Gaisford in his edition of the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus (IV, p. 385), Moser (*Studien von Daub und Creuzer* VI, p. 124, note 103), and Baltzer (*Musonius*, Nordhausen, 1871, p. 26, note 2), that Lucius and Pollio may have been the same person is not now seriously entertained by any scholar. Cf. Hense, *Musonius* p. xiii, Rohde, *Ueber Lucians Schrift* p. 27, and Wendland, *Philo* p. 69. It was only proposed as an attempt to explain the existence of two collections of reported sayings of Musonius. Hense (*Musonius* p. xii) says that there is no need to try to explain away one of them, and he cites the case of two compilations of the works of Demonax. One need only recall the difficulty which the two diverse accounts of Socrates by Plato and Xenophon have given scholars in their effort to discover the historical Socrates.

³¹ Though scholars are willing to concede that there once existed a work of Pollio, they are divided in their opinion as to whether or not any of it is still extant. Zeller (*Die Philos. der Griech.* III, 1, p. 756) says, "Seine Aufzeichnungen scheinen verloren zu sein." Wendland (review of Hense's edition of Musonius in *Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift* XXVI [1906], p. 198) says, "Aber mit Sicherheit lässt sich auch von den uns erhaltenen kürzeren Stücken nichts auf diese Memoiren zurückführen." Hense (*Musonius* p. xiii) remarks, "Nisi igitur ex minoris ambitus fragmentis vel apophthegmatis sola Musonii nota signatis unum vel alterum ad Pollionis apomnemoneumata revocare licebit (cf. e. gr. fragm. XXXVII, XLIX, L), vereor ne totum Pollionis opus hodie perierit." This would mean that he considers all the Stobaeian fragments (fourteen in number) and one from Plutarch and two from Aulus Gellius as having the possibility of being the work of Pollio. Since this opinion is necessarily a subjective one, for nowhere in the works which have been preserved does the name Pollio appear as that of Lucius does, it is particularly regrettable that Hense does not give his reasons for excluding the other fragments preserved in Aulus Gellius and in Plutarch. My own feeling is that *all* of the fragments (always with the exception of those recorded by Epictetus, both the personal reminiscences and the extracts from a long treatise *περὶ φιλίας*, and the long passage, probably the abridgment of a discourse, preserved by Aulus Gellius) are akin in being short, complete anecdotes or maxims as opposed to the long discourses. They differ, too, and this significantly, in being or containing direct statements of Musonius (the heading *Μουσώνιος ἔλεγεν* of XXV may be an interpolation), in contrast to the discourses of Lucius in which Musonius' conversations are summarized rather than quoted. Further, several are expressed in imperatives (XXVII, XXVIII, XXXII), one in a verbal (XXXIII), and a few in the first person (XXIII, XXXIV), along with the impersonal expression of commonplace sentiments, and in this they differ from the discourses. T. Colardeau (*Étude sur Épictète*, Paris 1903, p. 297) seems to agree with my opinion about the fragments. "Les mots isolés, transmis directement sous son nom par Plutarque et Épictète lui-même, par Aulu-Gelle et Stobée, attestent peut-être, à eux seuls, plus de vivacité et plus de goût du pittoresque que l'ensemble des extraits qui paraissent provenir de la rédaction de Lucius."

discourses in Stobaeus,³² and the other by Pollio, the remains of which we have in the fragments collected from several sources and grouped together in the edition of Hense. There is a very remarkable difference in the pictures that these two early editors have succeeded in producing of the same man. Lucius is very consciously playing the role of Xenophon³³ to his Socrates and so consistently transforming what must have been scenes of vivid discussion full of the rapid give and take of debate into rather conventionalized essays on ethical questions that the portrait of Musonius loses sharpness and vigor. Another factor which may be responsible for the diluted form in which we have Musonius' conversations is the fact that they were written down many years after the event, so that they must have lost their original freshness in Lucius' mind and Lucius himself had grown old and less vigorous.³⁴ As a result, we get the impression of Musonius as a man who was good, to be sure, but mild and tolerant, and, in contrast with his pupil Epictetus, quite lacking in spirit.³⁵ On the

³² C. P. Parker ("Musonius the Etruscan," *Harvard Studies* VII, p. 129) feels that there is such a difference between the two sets of records that they cannot even have been written about the same man. He considers the person described in the Stobaeus excerpts comparable to Socrates.

³³ Nieuwland (*Dissertatio*, p. 9) remarks, "Musonius has disputationis virtutes Socratica plane elegantia et Xenophontea suavitate temperavit." Perhaps more strictly speaking, it is the style of Lucius rather than that of Musonius which is represented in the discourses, though it is impossible to determine to what extent Lucius reproduced the vocabulary, phrasing, and rhetorical devices of his master. A study of the style of the discourses shows a conscious imitation of the mannerisms and vocabulary of Xenophon, but with more calculated rhetoric, the product of a later time. Cf. C. Schmich, *De arte rhetorica in Musonii Diatribis conspicua*, Freiburg, 1902. A few instances of verbal similarities may be noted.

58, 28 τὰ ἀγαθὰ πόνῳ πάντα κτώμεθα.

Mem. II, 1, 20 τῶν πόνων πωλοῦσιν ἡμῖν πάντα τ' ἀγαθ' οἱ θεοί.

82, 36 ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἱκανὰ κατατρίβειν βίον ἀνθρώπου ἐστὶ.

Mem. IV, 7, 5 ταῦτα ἱκανὰ εἶναι κατατρίβειν ἀνθρώπου βίον.

84, 21-22 quotation from Theognis 35 as in *Mem.* I, 2, 20.

100, 5-6 καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ (χρήματα) δεῖται βοηθείας· οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ βοηθοὶ εἰσι κράτιστοι.

Mem. II, 3, 1 καὶ τῶν μὲν (χρημάτων) βοηθείας δεομένων, τοῦ (ἀδελφοῦ) δὲ βοηθεῖν δυναμένου.

Cf. P. Wendland, *Quaestiones Musonianae* p. 11 observes, "Nec pauca debet Xenophontis commentariis quos antiquitus praecipuo studio Stoico amplectebantur."

³⁴ IX represents Musonius speaking during his exile in 65, and VIII reports a conversation with a king of Syria which was told some time later when there were no longer kings in Syria, that is after 106.

³⁵ Colardeau (*Épictète*, p. 297) remarks that in spite of Lucius' unfortunate

other hand, when one considers the fragments of Pollio, even from these *disiecta membra* a strong personality stands forth, kindly but sharp, vivid and determined, a figure to admire and to follow.

Fortunately there is enough evidence relating to the life and accomplishments of Musonius to furnish a check against our deductions from his reported sayings, more than enough to make us discard Lucius' gentle teacher for Pollio's man of spirit and vigor.³⁶ If we can trust Philostratus, there once existed a biography of Musonius which was, however, so carelessly done that Philostratus refrained from relating as much as he wished about Musonius lest he should seem to gloat over the careless author.³⁷ In the absence of any real biographical record, the incomplete tale of Musonius' life must be pieced together from heterogeneous sources of varying reliability.³⁸ The main and important facts are too well authenticated to demand full discussion here. Briefly they are the following.

editing, one still sees glimpses of the real Musonius in his reported conversations. "On saisit assez souvent la trace de discussions, réelles ou fictives, engagées avec les auditeurs: derrière les tournures un peu froides qui introduisent les objections à réfuter, on devine le dialogue, et, dans la seconde partie du *περὶ σκέπης* en particulier, apparaissent des interrogations passionnées qui laissent entrevoir ce que pouvait être le ton primitif." M. P. Charlesworth (*Five Men*, Cambridge, 1936, p. 53), after summarizing the essay on kings and philosophy, remarks, "All this is familiar Stoic doctrine. Rather to our surprise, we learn that the king was delighted by this sermon, and in his enthusiasm cried, 'Ask for whatever present you like; I can't refuse you anything.'" This seems to bear out my contention that Musonius was such a vivid and compelling personality that even the simple old doctrines were given an urgency which we do not suspect in the diluted versions of Lucius.

³⁶ Epictetus is represented as deploring the fact that most philosophers are men of words with which their lives and daily conduct do not agree. Cf. Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.* XVII, 19, 1: "Favorinum ego audivi dicere Epictetum philosophum dixisse plerosque istos qui philosophari viderentur philosophos esse eiusmodi *ἀνευ τοῦ πράττειν μέχρι τοῦ λέγειν*, id significat 'factis procul, verbis tenus.'" This attitude he undoubtedly derived from his teacher, Musonius.

³⁷ *Apollonius of Tyana* V. 19: καὶ ἐάσθω τὰ Μουσωνίου πλείω ὄντα καὶ θαυμασιώτερα, ὥς μὴ δοκοῖν θρασύνεσθαι πρὸς τὸν ἀμελῶς αὐτὰ εἰπόντα.

³⁸ Cf. Suidas 1305 Μουσώνιος; Eudocia Augusta, *Violarium* 669 (ed. Flach, p. 495); H. Dessau, *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*, Berlin, 1897, II, p. 393; O. Hense, *Musonius* pp. xxvi-xxxv; K. von Fritz, "Musonius" in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie* XXXI, pp. 893-897. A charming general account appears in Charlesworth, *Five Men* pp. 33-62. Notable among the older accounts are: M. de Burigny, "Sur le Philosophe Musonius," *Histoire de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* XXXI, Paris, 1768, pp. 131-138; P. Nieuwland, *Dissertatio de Musonio Rufo Philosopho Stoico*, originally written in 1783 and reprinted in Peerkamp's edition of Musonius, pp. 7-137; M. Lenain de Tillemont, *Histoire des Empereurs*, Venice, 1732, I, pp. 306 f.; I. Ionsius, *De Scriptoribus Historiae Philosophicae*, Jena, 1716, III, pp. 38-41.

Caius Musonius Rufus,³⁹ the son of Capito,⁴⁰ was born of an Etruscan family⁴¹ in the town of Volsinii,⁴² probably sometime before 30 A. D.⁴³ A member of the equestrian order and teacher of Stoic philosophy,⁴⁴ he was at the height of his influence in the time of Nero.⁴⁵ He must have followed Rubellius Plautus when he was exiled to Syria in 62, for two years later when Nero ordered Rubellius' execution, Musonius was with him and encouraged him to meet death bravely rather than to attempt resistance.⁴⁶ Thus he identified himself with Nero's political victims, and three years later, after the Pisonian conspiracy, he was himself banished by the emperor⁴⁷ to the desolate, waterless island of Gyara⁴⁸ in the Cyclades. This bleak spot not only failed to dishearten Musonius⁴⁹ but it became at once the goal of a large group of young men who were attracted to the

³⁹ Pliny (*Ep.* III, 11) is the sole witness for the *praenomen*. For the most part he is known simply as Musonius (*Μουσώνιος*), but as Musonius Rufus by Tacitus, the scholiast of Juvenal, and Jerome, as Rufus Musonius by Cassius Dio, and simply as *Ῥούφος* by Epictetus, his scholiast, and Photius. By Philostratus, Themistius, Favorinus, and Suidas, he is called *Μουσώνιος ὁ Τυρρηνός*. Two rather puzzling epithets, *ὁ Τύριος* and *ὁ Βαβυλώνιος* given by Philostratus are considered below in note 85.

⁴⁰ Cf. Suidas, *ibid.*

⁴¹ Cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* XIV, 59.

⁴² Cf. Suidas, *ibid.*

⁴³ There seems to be general agreement among scholars on this conjecture.

⁴⁴ Cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* III, 81.

⁴⁵ Cf. Jerome 2084 and Suidas, *ibid.*

⁴⁶ Cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* XIV, 59. Musonius may have been among the *familiares* who accompanied Rubellius into exile. Musonius' attitude toward taking one's own life is revealed in fragments XXVIII, XXXV, XLIII.

⁴⁷ Cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* XV, 71; Cassius Dio, *Ep.* LXII, 27, 4; J. Antiochenus 755, 84 (Boiss.); Themistius, *Orationes* (ed. W. Dindorf, Leipzig, 1832) VI, *φιλάδελφοι* 72d, p. 86.

Suidas (*ibid.*) preserves a tradition that Nero had Musonius put to death (*ὕπὸ Νέρωνος ἀναίρεται*, and under Κορνοῦτος 2098 *ἀναίρεθεις σὺν τῷ Μουσωνίῳ*), but he contradicts himself when he also says that Nero banished him. Suidas may have taken his first statement from Justin Martyr, *II Apology* 8. Cf. Hense, *Musonius* p. xxix.

⁴⁸ Cf. Philostratus, *Apollonius of Tyana* VII, 16; Julian, *Letter to Theodorus* 16 (ed. Wright, III, p. 38). Epictetus (II, 6, 22-23; I, 25, 19-23) speaks of banishment to Gyara as the ultimate degree of punishment.

⁴⁹ Many authors testify to Musonius' courage and dauntless spirit (of which Musonius himself speaks in IX) during this trying experience. Cf. Favorinus, *περὶ φυχῆς* I, 32-38 (M. Norsa e G. Vitelli, *Studi e Testi* LIII [1931], "II Papiro Vaticano Greco 11"); Julian, *Letter to Themistius* (ed. F. C. Hertlein, Leipzig, 1875, p. 343, l. 22.)

philosopher's circle from all parts of the civilized world.⁵⁰ In addition to his philosophical teaching, he proved a practical benefactor to the island by discovering a spring there.⁵¹ After the death of Nero he returned to Rome, presumably recalled by Galba.⁵² In that same trying year, in the last desperate days of Vitellius, when the armies of Vespasian under Antonius Primus and Petillius Cerealis, after having madly devastated Cremona, were raging to destroy Rome itself, Vitellius sent an embassy to each army to try to arrange a truce. Although Arulenus Rusticus who had been sent to Petillius' army had been wounded, Musonius joined the envoys to Antonius' men and tried to talk reasonableness and peace to the frenzied soldiers, but almost lost his life for his pains.⁵³ The following year, when Vespasian, established

⁵⁰ Of his renown which actually increased in exile, cf. Lucian, *De morte Peregrini* 18; Philostratus, *Apollonius of Tyana* VII, 16.

⁵¹ Cf. Philostratus, *ibid.* and Julian, *Letter to Theodorus*, 16. One phrase in this last, ὁ δὲ ἐπεμέλετο ἑνάρων was carelessly copied and incorporated into the text as ἐπεμέλετο βαρῶν (βάρεων ed. Hertlein, p. 608, l. 20) and in that form taken over by Suidas, to which he added by way of explanation τοῦτέστι τοιχῶν. This poor reading led to a great deal of speculation as to the meaning of the phrase. Cf. E. Egger, "Conjectures sur le nom et les attributions d'une magistrature romaine à propos de la biographie du philosophe Musonius Rufus," *Journal des Savants* LXIX (1884), pp. 346-349; F. Buecheler, "Coniectanea," *Rh. Mus.* XLI (1886), p. 1. These ingenious conjectures were necessarily abandoned when a new manuscript of the letter of Julian was discovered in which the correct reading occurs. Cf. A. Papadopoulos Kerameus, "Neue Briefe von Julianus Apostata," *Rh. Mus.* XLII (1887), pp. 15-27, and S. Reinach, "Sur un témoignage de Suidas relatif à Musonius Rufus," *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres* XIII (1886), pp. 339-345.

⁵² Galba's general pardon of exiles and prisoners is attested by Zonaras' epitome of Cassius Dio, LXIV, 3. An incident told by Epictetus (III, 15, 14) concerning Musonius' reaction at the death of Galba (frag. XLVII) seems to mean that as Galba's kindness in recalling Musonius did not constitute for him a proof of the existence of Providence, so Galba's murder did not constitute a refutation of it. But I suspect that the remark held a wider implication. After the horrors of the last years of the reign of Nero, there is reason to believe that the more responsible Romans looked upon the accession of Galba as truly providential.

⁵³ Cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* III, 81 and Cassius Dio, *Ep.* LXV, 18, 19. Tacitus gives his cue as to the construction he would put upon the story in his use of the words *intempestivam sapientiam*. Since his day, writers have been sometimes more and sometimes less kindly disposed toward the unusual action of Musonius. To cite a few cases, R. D. Hicks (*Stoic and Epicurean*, N. Y., 1910, p. 142) and E. V. Arnold (*Roman Stoicism*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 117f) see in it an act of courage, while Charlesworth (*Five Men*, p. 33) considers it quixotic in the extreme. The fact that even the Vestal Virgins were sent out to try to arrange some kind of parley indicates the extreme danger with which the city

as emperor, was making an effort to restore the state, Musonius initiated legal proceedings against Publius Egnatius Celer for his false and treacherous accusation of the Stoic Barea Soranus⁵⁴ whom Nero put to death in an effort, Tacitus says,⁵⁵ to extinguish virtue itself. Celer was defended by Demetrius the Cynic,⁵⁶ but lost his case and was executed. When Vespasian, at the instigation of Mucianus, banished all the philosophers in 71, Musonius was especially exempted by the emperor.⁵⁷ Later, however, he was exiled under circumstances unknown to us and eventually was recalled by Titus⁵⁸ who is said to have been his friend. Probably it was during this second banishment that Pliny met him in Syria where he was spending his year as military tribune. Pliny mentions the fact that Musonius might have chosen any one of a large group of admirers from all social classes for his

was faced. A man with the influence and following, not to mention the persuasiveness, of Musonius would be bound to see his duty in the course of action which Musonius determined upon. Martha (*Les Moralistes sous l'Empire Romain*, Paris, 1872, p. 3) recalls an incident told by Philostratus in the life of Dio Chrysostom (*Lives of the Sophists* I, 7) which is roughly parallel. At the time of the murder of Domitian, the news of the accession of Nerva caused an open revolt of the soldiers at Viminacium. Dio saw his duty. Slipping off the disguise he had assumed, he leaped upon an altar and made a speech in which he condemned Domitian as a tyrant and praised Nerva and commended him to their allegiance. Apparently the success of the venture served to label it courageous and not quixotic. Cf. also A. Croiset, *Histoire de la Littérature grecque*, Paris, 1896, V, p. 471 and H. von Arnim, *Dio von Prusa* p. 309.

⁵⁴ Cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* XVI, 21, 23, 30-33; *Hist.* IV, 10, 40; Cassius Dio, *Ep.* LXII, 26; scholia to Juvenal, *Sat.* I, l. 33. The episode became famous as an example of supreme treachery. Cf. Juvenal, *Sat.* III, ll. 116-118.

⁵⁵ Cf. Tacitus. *Ann.* XVI, 21.

⁵⁶ The action of Demetrius is somewhat puzzling. Dudley (*A History of Cynicism*, London, 1937, p. 134) says, "Tacitus says that Demetrius appeared to be acting 'ambitiosius quam honestius' in undertaking the defence. It is hard to see what he means, and one is tempted to suppose he is indulging his penchant for discovering evil motives behind every action. Celer lacked the skill or the nerve to defend himself, and however guilty, had a claim to be represented; it is hard to say what ambition Demetrius could be serving in thus championing an unpopular case. The spectacle of Stoic and Cynic appearing in the Roman courts as prosecutor and counsel for the defence is in itself remarkable, and appears even more so when we consider the charge on which Celer was tried."

⁵⁷ Cf. Cassius Dio, *Ep.* LXVI, 13; Zonaras, *Ep.* XI, 17.

⁵⁸ Hieronymus, *Interpretatio Chronicae Eusebii Pamphili* 597f.; Suetonius, *Deperditorum librorum reliquiae* (ed. C. L. Roth, Leipzig, 1886) p. 301. Theonistus (*Orationes* XIII 'Ερωτικός 173c, p. 212, l. 23) attests the friendship of Titus and Musonius.

son-in-law, and that the choice fell to the Stoic philosopher Artemidorus.⁵⁹ It may have been on a visit to Greece at this time that Musonius made a vigorous protest to the Athenians against their practice of holding bloody gladiatorial games in the theatre of Dionysus which had also to serve as the setting for religious festivals. His arguments met with such warm opposition that Musonius found it advisable to leave Athens.⁶⁰ In the intervals of comparative quiet between political disturbances, he taught philosophy at Rome, apparently always conducting his discussions⁶¹ in Greek.⁶² His death may have occurred toward

⁵⁹ Cf. Pliny, *Ep.* III, 11. This was probably the year 81.

⁶⁰ Cf. Dio Chrysostom, *Orationes* XXXI, 122 (*ed.* von Arnim, I, 254, II, p. 364). That ὁ φιλόσοφος is Musonius is not entirely established, although it is generally believed to have been Musonius because no other Roman of his day enjoyed such a reputation. Cf. J. W. Cohoon, *ed.* of Dio, III, p. 127 and von Arnim, *Dio von Prusa* p. 216. On the other hand, all the older scholars, e. g. Valesius (*Emendationes*, Amsterdam, 1740, pp. 78 f.) and Reiske (*Dio Chrysostomus*, Leipzig, 1784, I, p. 631), and among the contemporary ones, Phillemore (*Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, Oxford, 1912, II, p. 269) and Graindor (*Athènes de Tibère à Trajan*, Cairo, 1931, pp. 134 f.) consider the philosopher Apollonius of Tyana, in spite of the fact that Dio says that the man was a Roman. This reasoning is based upon two arguments. First, the episode in Dio is closely paralleled by an incident in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* (IV, 22) in which Apollonius attacked the practice of having gladiatorial games in the theatre, and when invited to attend the assembly he refused in a spirited letter to the Athenians. In the second place, Synesius (*Dion 3, Oeuvres de Synésius tr.* H. Druon, Paris, 1878) records that Dio once wrote a polemic πρὸς Μουσώνιον as well as a general κατὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων, apparently propagandist material to support Vespasian's edict against the philosophers. Both works are now lost, but the contention is that the same person would not have spoken in such high terms of praise about one whom he had earlier attacked. On the other hand, Hense (*Musonius* pp. xxiv f.), von Arnim (*Dio von Prusa* pp. 151 f.), and Cohoon (*Dio I*, p. vii) think there was a change of heart on the part of Dio. The incident recalls Lucian's famous anecdote of Demonax' appeal to the men of Athens not to pass a resolution to introduce gladiatorial games into Athens without first tearing down the altar of Mercy. Cf. *Demonax* 57. Charlesworth (*Five Men* p. 36) notes the martyrdom of St. Telemachus for attempting to protest against the games.

⁶¹ Apparently less than a generation later, it was not altogether safe to hold public discussions in Rome. Epictetus (*Disc.* II, 12, 17-25) says he used to be fond of doing it, but that times had changed and he felt it was no longer possible.

⁶² Croiset (*Hist. de la Lit. grec.* V, p. 419, note 3) first called attention to the fact that although some of the conversations are reported in Latin by Aulus Gellius, yet originally they were in Greek. "Plusieurs passages d'Aulu-Gelle prouvent que Musonius enseignait en grec (IX, 2, 8; XVI, 1, 1). Le mot cité en latin (XVIII, 2, 1: Remittere animum quasi amittere est) est probablement

the end of the century, for Pliny, writing in 101⁶³ speaks as if he were no longer living. His family seems to have survived at least for several centuries. It was a descendant of his, Rufius Festus Avienus, who is honored by an inscription on a stone found in his native Volsinii.⁶⁴ Also in the fourth century there is a memorial to a descendant, Rufinus, the talented son whom Himerius mourns in a touching eclogue.⁶⁵ Two Greek inscriptions from the time of the Antonines honor one Γάιος Μουσώνιος Ρούφος who may have been a grandson of the philosopher.⁶⁶

Musonius' spiritual descendants, the pupils and friends who experienced some influence from his teachings in their lives and carried on his work, form a distinguished group. Rubellius

une traduction du grec: "Ὅμοιον τὸ ἀνίεναι ψυχὴν τῷ ἀφίεναι." Colardeau (*Épictète* p. 145) repeats this contention. Cf. also Hirzel, *Der Dialog* II, p. 242, note 3. Three scholars at least voice dissent. Cf. A. Oltramare, *Les Origines de la Diatribe romaine* p. 23: "Ajoutons encore qu'il parlait latin."; C. Favez, "Un Féministe Romain, Musonius Rufus," *Bulletin de la Société des Études de Lettres* VIII (Lausanne, 1933) no. 20, p. 2, note 4: "Musonius enseignait parfois aussi en Latin."; Hense, *Musonius* p. 133 *app. crit.* That Epictetus sometimes resorted to Latin to make clear a difficulty would seem to be indicated by his use of the word *Ῥωμαϊστὶ* (*Disc.* I, 17, 17).

⁶³ No one has seriously challenged the dating of this letter which was established by Mommsen ("Zu Lebensgeschichte des jüngeren Plinius," *Hermes* III (1868), pp. 31-139 and in particular for Book III, p. 40). Cf. also I. Asbach, "Zur Chronologie der Briefe des jüngeren Plinius," *Rh. Mus.* XXXVI (1881), pp. 38-49.

⁶⁴ Cf. *C. I. L.* VI, 537. The inscription is in honor of the poet who is known for his translation of the works of the Stoic poet Aratus.

⁶⁵ *Oratio* XXIII, 21 (*ed.* G. Wernsdorf, Göttingen, 1790, pp. 768-770).

⁶⁶ An inscription found in Athens and dated about 140-143 A. D. (*Inscriptiones Atticae* III, 1, 1298 = *Inscriptiones Graecae* II, 2, 2472. It was first published by K. Pittakis in *Ἐφημερίς ἀρχαιολογική* 3833 [1856-1860]. Cf. also R. Neubauer, "Zu Corp. Inscr. Graec. No. 381," *Hermes* IV [1869], p. 417, note 1) bears the name Μουσώνιος Ρούφ[ος] and identifies him as *ιερεὺς Ἀπόλλωνος Δηλίου δι[ὰ βίον]*. At Delos there is an inscription, dated in the reign of the Antonines, in honor of this same man: *ὁ ἱερεὺς τοῦ Δηλίου Ἀπόλλωνος [διὰ βίον] Γά(ιος) Μουσώνιος Ρούφος* to commemorate the three occasions on which he, in the capacity of priest of the Delian Apollo at Athens, conducted dodecades to Delos at annual festivals. (Cf. F. Dürrbach, "Fouilles de Délos," *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* XXVIII [1904], p. 184, no. 60; P. Roussel and J. Hatzefeld, "Fouilles de Délos," *B. C. H.* XXXIV [1910], p. 422, no. 89; P. Roussel and M. Launey, *Inscriptions de Délos*, Paris, 1937, 2538. For the function of the priest, cf. P. Roussel, *Délos colonie athénienne*, Paris, 1916, p. 339; V. von Schoeffer, *De Deli Insulae Rebus*, Berlin, 1889, p. 223, note 46; W. A. Laidlaw, *A History of Delos*, Oxford, 1933, p. 218). In a long list of ephebes in another inscription (*Inscriptiones Atticae* III, 1, 1112 = *Inscriptiones Graecae* II, 2,

Plautus,⁶⁷ Barea Soranus,⁶⁸ and Thræsea,⁶⁹ all friends of Musonius to whom he seems to have acted as spiritual adviser, belong in the set of Stoic martyrs. In the circle of Pliny who was himself a professed admirer of Musonius, though too young to have been his pupil,⁷⁰ was Musonius' son-in-law Artemidorus⁷¹ whom Pliny considered the greatest of the philosophers of his day, and his old friend Fundanus⁷² whom Plutarch represents discussing the teachings of Musonius.⁷³ Fronto names as pupils and followers of Musonius,⁷⁴ Euphrates of Tyre,⁷⁵ eloquent philosopher and teacher, Timocrates of Heracleia,⁷⁶ sublime in thought and word, Athenodotus,⁷⁷ the teacher of Fronto himself, and Dio of Prusa,⁷⁸ the golden-tongued orator—all of whom achieved some success and fame in the field of philosophy. Of course the pupil whose fame has been the greatest and who seems to have been the truest interpreter of the spirit and intent of his master's life and

2044. It was first published by S. Kumanudis in *Φιλίστωρ* IV [1863], pp. 164 f. Cf. also R. Neubauer, "Chronologie der Attischen Archonten," *Hermes* XI [1876], p. 397) generally dated about 140-141, at the end of the group of names headed *πρωτέγγραφοι*, native born boys, the names *Μουσώνιος Ρούφος* and *Μουσώνιος Πάμφιλος* appear without the name of their deme. The first is commonly thought to have been the son of the priest in the first inscription mentioned.

The completely Roman name of the priest which is identical with the name of the philosopher is hard to explain unless one assumes that he was a Roman, a man of importance enough to be given the honor of the priesthood. The name of the ephebe, standing without a demotic, seems to bear this out, for only the sons of very prominent people, proconsuls etc. were given without it. Hence this may be a grandson and great grandson of Musonius the philosopher.

⁶⁷ Cf. note 46.

⁶⁸ Cf. note 54.

⁶⁹ Cf. fragment XLIII where Musonius corrects his reasoning on exile.

⁷⁰ Cf. *Ep.* III, 11; cum admiratione dilexi. No doubt Pliny was one of the superior or gifted young men whom Musonius finds so well worth teaching (frag. XLVI).

⁷¹ Cf. Pliny, *ibid.*

⁷² Cf. Pliny, *Ep.* IV, 15; I, 9; V, 16; VI, 6.

⁷³ Cf. *De cohibenda ira* 453D (Musonius, frag. XXXVI). Fundanus and Sulla are the two speakers in the dialogue. Cf. also Plutarch, *De tranquillitate animi* 464E.

⁷⁴ Cf. Fronto, *Ep. ad Verum* I, 1, 4 (C. R. Haines, *Correspondence of Marcus Cornelius Fronto*, London, 1919, II, p. 51).

⁷⁵ Cf. Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* I, 7 (488); I, 25 (536); Pliny, *Ep.* I, 10, 7; Epictetus, *Disc.* III, 15, 8; IV, 8, 17.

⁷⁶ Cf. Philostratus, *Lives* I, 25 (536); Lucian, *Demonax* 3.

⁷⁷ Cf. Marcus Aurelius, *Eis éavtón* I, 13.

⁷⁸ That Dio was a pupil of Musonius has been questioned in view of the tradition that he wrote a *πρὸς Μουσώνιον*. Cf. note 60.

teaching was Epictetus.⁷⁹ Finally,⁸⁰ Lucius and probably Pollio⁸¹ are to be numbered in the group of Musonius' hearers. Beyond Musonius' immediate circle, Hierocles most effectively carried on his tradition of liberal Stoicism,⁸² and one of the great Christian apologists, Clement of Alexandria, adapted his teachings in his treatise on Christian education, the *Paedagogus*.⁸³

In general, the fabrication of apocryphal tales about a man's career is a tribute to his fame. So, at any rate, one may judge

⁷⁹ A number of references in Epictetus himself make it abundantly clear that he was Musonius' pupil. Cf. I, 7, 32; I, 9, 29-31; III, 23, 29. W. A. Oldfather (ed. of Epictetus, I, p. viii, note 2) says, "So many passages in Epictetus can be paralleled closely from the remaining fragments of Rufus (as Epictetus always calls him) that there can be no doubt but the system of thought in the pupil is little more than an echo, with changes of emphasis due to the personal equation, of that of the master." Colardeau (*Épictète*) gives quantities of examples to prove this statement and concludes (p. 203), "Du commencement à la fin de cette étude sur l'enseignement d'Épictète, nous avons eu assez souvent l'occasion de citer le nom de Musonius pour pouvoir affirmer que l'enseignement du maître avait exercé sur celui du disciple une influence profonde et durable."

⁸⁰ Arnold (*Roman Stoicism* p. 117) says, "Amongst his (Musonius') pupils were Aulus Gellius the antiquarian . . ." Undoubtedly this mistake has been corrected before now. Aulus Gellius, living about 117-180, could hardly have been the pupil of a man who died before 100. The error originated from *Noct. Att.* V, 1, a passage which could easily convey a wrong impression.

⁸¹ The fragments from Pollio's *Ἀπομνημονεύματα* have the appearance of direct and exact quotations from the master, hence we feel that Pollio must have been present at the discussions with a notebook.

⁸² Hierocles, who lived during the reign of Hadrian, was strongly influenced by Musonius, particularly on the subject of marriage and the family. Cf. K. Praechter, *Hierokles der Stoiker*, Leipzig, 1901, and H. von Arnim, *Hierokles ethische Elementarlehre*, Berlin, 1906; also E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* III, 1, p. 715, R. Philippson, "Hierokles der Stoiker," *Rh. Mus.* LXXXII (1933), pp. 97-114.

⁸³ The whole question of the extensive borrowing from Musonius in Clement of Alexandria has been discussed at length by P. Wendland, *Quaestiones Musonianae* pp. 35-64. Cf. also C. P. Parker, "Musonius in Clement," *Harvard Studies* XII (1901), pp. 191-200; F. C. Conybeare, *Philo about the Contemplative Life*, Oxford, 1895, pp. 225-227, 345; E. de Faye, *Clément d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1906, pp. 86, note 1, 336.

E. Rohde (*Der Griechische Roman*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 593, note 2) suggests that in *Al-Fihrist*, a great catalogue of a large Arabic library composed by an-Nadim at Bagdad in 988, under the name Murujanus (or Muzujanus, Muzubanus, Muzunajus) a work of Musonius, probably a *περί παιδείας* is referred to. If this were the case, it would mean that part of the *Corpus Musonianum* now completely lost must have been in existence as late as the tenth century. But Professor Philip K. Hitti has kindly translated for me the pertinent section of *Al-Fihrist* in the edition of G. Flügel (Leipzig, 1872, pp. 305 f.), and has called to my attention the fact that Flügel considered the book a work on literature by a Greek monk rather than Musonius.

to be the case of the fanciful stories about Musonius which were disseminated, for the most part, by Philostratus. There is the tale, already alluded to,⁸⁴ of the imprisonment of Musonius and the secret exchange of letters with Apollonius of Tyana. Nero threw him into prison for the "crime of being a sage" and caused him to be subjected to such cruel treatment that he would have died if it had not been for his rugged constitution.⁸⁵ At another

⁸⁴ Cf. note 1. In addition to the fact that the alleged letters are unworthy of either writer, Hense (*Musonius* p. xxxii) doubts if the two philosophers ever met. The statement in Suidas γνῶριμος δ' Ἀπολλωνίου τοῦ Τυανέως he suggests was derived from Philostratus.

⁸⁵ Cf. IV, 35. Here Philostratus calls him ὁ Βαβυλώνιος which it has been conjectured may have been corrupted from ὁ Βουλσίνιος (cf. Nieuwland, *Dissertatio* p. 35 and E. Baltzer, *Apollonius von Tyana*, Rudolstadt, 1883, p. 189, note to IV, 35), although Hense remains dubious (pp. xxxiii f.). One thing which seems certain is that Philostratus was referring to Musonius Rufus, though no one else calls him Βαβυλώνιος. K. von Fritz in his article in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie* (XXXI, p. 897) has a separate entry for Musonius aus Babylon, but he states his doubts about it. "Dagegen es wohl möglich, dass die ganze Person dieses M(usonius) nur die Verdichtung einer Anzahl von Legenden ist, die sich ursprünglich auf C. M. Rufus bezogen, aber mit sicheren historischen Tatsachen (Verbannung des M. Rufus nach Gyara) in Widerspruch standen, so dass man zu diesen Legenden eine neue Person hinzuerfand."

In the life of Herodes Atticus, Philostratus (*Lives of the Sophists* II, 1, 556-558) tells a tale about a Lucius who had been trained in philosophy by Musonius of Tyre (Μουσωνίῳ δὲ τῷ Τυρίῳ). This Lucius was a personal friend of Herodes, and after the death of Regilla, when Herodes was mourning immoderately, Lucius tried to make him see reason, recalling all he had ever said about the golden mean, citing the testimony of his teacher Musonius on the subject, and reminding Herodes of his own preaching of moderation. But his words had little effect. As he was leaving the house, he saw some slaves preparing white radishes for dinner. Lucius remarked caustically that Herodes was insulting Regilla by eating white radishes in a house black with mourning. Herodes was thus brought to reason. In the same passage Philostratus relates a story about Lucius and Marcus Aurelius. The emperor was very much interested in hearing the lectures of the philosopher Sextus. One day Lucius, who had recently returned to Rome, met Marcus Aurelius just as he was about to leave his house to attend a lecture. The emperor explained where he was going and added that he thought it a good thing even for one who was growing old to acquire knowledge. Lucius acidly called heaven to witness that the Roman emperor, already growing old, was still going to school while Alexander the Great died at thirty-two.

These two anecdotes have posed difficult questions. In the first place, there is the problem of the name Μουσώνιος ὁ Τύριος which occurs only in this one instance. It has been suggested that Τύριος would not be an extraordinary misreading for Τυρηνός (cf. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* II, p. 245, note 1; Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* III, 1, p. 716; Rohde, *Lucians Schrift* p. 26, note 1), though Hense remains skeptical. (*Musonius* pp. xvi f.). Even if that difficulty were solved, the chronology would cause trouble. The definitely established facts of Musonius' life make it certain that he lived about 30-95. Lucius was

time, probably after this episode, when Musonius was forced into the unhappy situation of having to listen to Nero playing the lyre, he had the temerity to try to dissuade the emperor from his musical attempts.⁸⁶ A dramatic incident of a meeting between Demetrius the Cynic and Musonius deserves to be told in Philostratus' words.⁸⁷ He says, "Demetrius said he happened to meet Musonius at the Isthmus, where he, in chains, was being forced to dig. He gave him what hope and encouragement he could under the circumstances, but Musonius grasped his spade and firmly thrust it into the ground, and proudly raising his

with him in exile in 65, but seems not to have written his reports before 106. Now Herodes' wife Regilla died in 160. In the second episode, Marcus Aurelius is represented as *γηράσκων*. If one considered him forty at the time, the story would have taken place in 161. So it could not have been the same Lucius. Moreover, the kind of advice which Lucius gave Herodes would more properly come from a Peripatetic (Hense, *Musonius* p. xvii). As a matter of fact, this Lucius may have been identical with the one who wrote commentaries on the *Categories* of Aristotle which Simplicius used later. (Cf. K. Praechter, "Nikostrates der Platoniker," *Hermes* LVII [1922], p. 502). If we take the stories of Philostratus at face value, we are confronted with a singular coincidence—two Musonii with two Lucii as pupils! It is not very difficult to account for the second Lucius, but only one scholar is willing to accept a second Musonius on such slender evidence. In an effort to explain the difference between the two groups of works left in the name of Musonius, C. P. Parker ("Musonius the Etruscan," *Harvard Studies* VII, pp. 123-137) presented the theory that there were two philosophers, one, Etruscan born, who lived at the time of Nero, whose ideas are preserved in Epictetus and Persius, the other *Μουσώνιος ὁ Τύριος* once called *Βαβυλώνιος* by Philostratus, living in the time of Hadrian, whose works are given in Stobaeus. This theory is broken down immediately by the fact that the Musonius described in Stobaeus speaks of his own exile which occurred in 65. (Cf. K. von Fritz, "Musonius" in Pauly's *Real-Encyclopädie* XXXI, pp. 895 f. and Hense, *Musonius* pp. xviii f. C. Sittl in *Neue Philologische Rundschau* XIX [1897], p. 301 reviewed the *Harvard Studies* volume in which Parker's article appears, but in the few lines devoted to the article, made no attempt to refute the theory.) We know from two inscriptions (cf. note 66) that there was another Caius Musonius Rufus, possibly a grandson of our author, living in Athens in 140, but there is no evidence to indicate that he too was a philosopher. Since Philostratus is the only source for the two stories which are told about a philosopher Musonius and his pupil Lucius, and when we consider that by the time of Philostratus Musonius had become a legendary figure, it is not impossible to imagine that Philostratus made a mistake in chronology and connected the philosopher with a later emperor. I am inclined to accept this explanation in the case of Lucius too.

⁸⁶ Cf. Themistius, *Orationes* XXXIV *περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς* XV, p. 460 ed. Dindorf. There is no other reference to any personal contact between Musonius and Nero. Philostratus (*Apollonius of Tyana* VII, 16) says that Musonius opposed the rule of Nero in many ways (*πολλὰ τῇ ἀρχῇ ἐναντιωθέντα*), but that Nero only exiled him to Gyara presumably in a deliberate attempt to frustrate a martyr's death for him.

⁸⁷ Cf. Philostratus, *Apollonius of Tyana* V, 19.

head, said, 'You are troubled to see me digging through the Isthmus for Greece, but if you saw me playing the harp like Nero, how would you feel then?'⁸⁸ The kernel of this story is used in a dialogue entitled *Nero* which was often included in the manuscripts of Lucian but is probably the work of Philostratus.⁸⁹ In the dialogue Musonius is the chief speaker. He is answering some questions of Menecrates concerning Nero's dramatic and musical talent and his performances in Greece, and explaining why, after all the talk about digging through the Isthmus of Corinth, the project was abandoned. Musonius gives the official explanation that some Egyptian surveyors convinced Nero that the sea was higher on one side than the other and that if a canal were dug, the land would be submerged,⁹⁰ but offers as his own opinion that Nero was preoccupied with the activities of Vindex. His conversation is interrupted by the arrival of a ship bringing the welcome news of the end of Nero.

These legendary accounts, emphasizing as they do the particular aspects of Musonius' character and life which most forcibly struck the popular imagination, perform the important function of supporting the conclusions which one draws from

⁸⁸ There are several objections to spoil this good story. (1) There is no evidence outside of Philostratus (*Nero* 638) that Nero used convicts and exiles in addition to the six thousand Jewish youths sent by Vespasian after the destruction of Jerusalem (cf. Josephus, *Jewish Wars* III, 540). (2) It hardly seems possible that Demetrius would play the role of comforter to Musonius when later he took opposing sides in the trial of Egnatius Celer (cf. note 56). (3) Philimore (*Apollonius of Tyana* II, p. 270) observes, "Note that Musonius is in prison at Rome in A. D. 66 (pp. 153, 164), but in A. D. 68 he is represented as having been at convict labour on the Corinthian canal (p. 178), and again (p. 271) as having been in banishment in Gyara."

⁸⁹ Cf. Pseudo-Lucian, *NEPQN seu De Fossione Isthmi* in J. T. Lehman, *Luciani Samosatensis Opera*, Leipzig, 1831, IX, pp. 276-284, also printed in the works of Philostratus in the edition of C. L. Kayser, Leipzig, 1871, II, pp. 220-224. Suidas names the *Nérwna* among the works of Philostratus. Cf. Hirzel, *Der Dialog* II, pp. 383-341, 245; K. Mras, "Die Überlieferung Lucians," *Berliner Akademie Sitzungsberichte* CLXVII (1911) Bd. 7, p. 236; W. Schmid, *Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern*, Stuttgart, 1887, II, p. 537; J. S. Phillimore, *Apollonius of Tyana* I, p. xiii.

⁹⁰ Cf. 4 ἔφασαν δὲ τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους γεωμετροῦντας τῆς ἐκατέρας θαλάττης τὰς φύσεις οὐκ ἰσοπέδους αὐταῖς συντυχεῖν, ἀλλ' ὑψηλοτέραν ἡγουμένους τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Λεχαίου περὶ τῇ Αἰγίνῃ δεδοικέναι. πελάγους γὰρ τοσοῦτου νήσω ἐπιχυθέντος, κ' ἂν ὑποβρύχιον ἀπενεχθῆναι τὴν Αἴγιναν. This passage particularly is reminiscent of Philostratus (*Apollonius of Tyana* IV, 24) where he relates Apollonius' prophecy seven years earlier that the Isthmus would not be cut through, and its fulfillment at the time of Nero. ἡ ὀρυχὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ Λεχαίου λαβοῦσα στάδια προὔβη ἰσως τέτταρα ξυνεχῶς ὀρυττόντων, σχεῖν δὲ λέγεται Νέρων τὴν τομὴν οἱ μὲν Αἰγυπτίων φιλοσοφούντων αὐτῷ τὰς θαλάττας καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ Λεχαίου πέλαιος ὑπερχυθὲν ἀφανεῖν εἰπόντων τὴν Αἴγιναν.

the more strictly authentic sources and from autobiographical references in Musonius' own works as recorded by his pupils. They do well to emphasize the fact that, unlike some philosophers, Musonius was no *doctor umbraticus*, but was rather a public figure, a conspicuous participant in civic affairs. His very prominence in public life, his active concern with the problems of his day, and his keen sense of duty to society necessarily made him an object of Nero's persecution. The courage and spirit which he showed in this crisis in his life were the same high qualities which he demonstrated over and over again in the course of his varied career. Always consistent himself in facing life with courage, he constantly challenged his fellow men to be brave and strong. As a noble example of the good life, Musonius would be an outstanding character in any age; against the background of spiritual poverty and moral decay of his own generation, he appears a truly heroic figure.

In his book on Roman Stoicism, Arnold says, "The influence of Musonius was so great that we may almost regard him as a third founder of the philosophy."⁹¹ The justification for this statement lies in the testimony of his contemporaries and successors,⁹² rather than in the extant reports of his pupil Lucius. Indeed Lucius made no attempt to delineate the philosophic system of his master or to set forth the fundamentals of Stoic dogma.⁹³ He avoided reproducing the daily lessons which would consist of explanations of terminology, exercises in logic,⁹⁴ and formal lectures on doctrine. Excluding systematic presentation

⁹¹ *Roman Stoicism* p. 117.

⁹² Julian the emperor testifies (*Letter to Themistius*, ed. Hertlein p. 343, ll. 20-22). "Musonius became famous because he bore his sufferings with courage, and sustained with firmness the cruelty of tyrants, and perhaps he was not less happy than those who administered great kingdoms." Dio of Prusa (*Orationes* XXXI, 122) says that he "enjoyed a reputation greater than any one man has attained for generations and was admittedly the man who since the time of the ancients had lived most nearly in conformity with reason." Pliny (*Ep.* III, 11), in speaking of Artemidorus, puts him at the head of all living philosophers for his integrity and gives as proof of his extreme worth the fact that he was chosen by Musonius for his son-in-law. Philostratus states (*Apolonius of Tyana* IV, 46) that Musonius was a man "unsurpassed in philosophic ability."

⁹³ Lucius assumes that his audience already knows Stoic theory. For instance at p. 54, ll. 31 f. he says, "All of us who have participated in philosophic discussion have heard and apprehended that neither pain nor death nor poverty—is an evil," but he does not explain *why* they are not. He takes it for granted that they know.

⁹⁴ In fragment XLIV which is taken from Epictetus, we get an impression of the use of logic in the school exercises.

and even technical language,⁹⁵ he has reported only the informal discussions which must have been stimulated by the class exercises. Apparently these discussions or conversations were an important aspect of the teaching program⁹⁶ of Musonius who placed the greatest emphasis upon the constant need for making practical application of theoretical principles.⁹⁷ "For only in this way will philosophy be of profit to anyone, if to sound doctrine he adds conduct in harmony with it."⁹⁸ So, in these conversations he spoke specifically and at length about a number of concrete ethical problems.⁹⁹ Each discourse represents the answer to a direct question put to Musonius by one of his pupils about some moral problem.¹⁰⁰ Musonius must have looked upon the performance of his pupils in these discussions of practical issues as the real testing of their achievement in philosophy.¹⁰¹

The fact that Lucius, in preparing literary accounts of these

⁹⁵ The few technical expressions we do have attributed to Musonius are found in Epictetus' stories about him rather than in Lucius' reports. Cf. Frag. XXXVIII (134, 23); τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν (136, 1); τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν Frag. XL (136, 19 f.) συναρμόσαι τὴν ὁρμὴν τῇ τοῦ προσήκοιτος καὶ ὠφελίμῳ φαντασίᾳ.

⁹⁶ One cannot, I believe, think of Musonius, a Roman knight of wealth and influence, a friend of at least one of the Roman emperors, as conducting a school like any *Graeculus esuriens*. Rather, it would seem that after the pattern of the old Republican statesmen who took young men of promise under their tutelage and trained them in law and oratory chiefly by their own distinguished example, Musonius took chosen young men into his intimate circle to guide them toward the attainment of the good life. Perhaps the description which the Stoic poet Persius has left of his happy relationship with his teacher and guide, L. Annaeus Cornutus, may apply to Musonius' pupils also. Persius speaks of spending long hours of the day with his teacher and sharing his meals and his leisure time. (Sat. V, 39-44). Musonius himself gives as his ideal to have his pupils constantly with him, learning both by precept and example. (XI, 84, 6-26). Seneca (Ep. 94 *passim*) discusses at length this type of teaching.

⁹⁷ Cf. VI.

⁹⁸ I, 36, 10-12.

⁹⁹ E. g. "What is the best viaticum for old age?" (XVII); "Should daughters receive the same education as sons?" (IV); "Is marriage a handicap for the pursuit of philosophy?" (XIV).

¹⁰⁰ Except in a very few cases where the excerptor, Stobaeus, has not been concerned with preserving the complete discussion, the circumstances which initiated the conversation are indicated.

¹⁰¹ Musonius tried to discourage young men who had not the stamina to become serious students (cf. Frag. XLVI), for he felt that they gave philosophy a bad name (cf. XI, 84, 3-6). Those who passed the preliminary testings and were admitted as pupils felt that they were constantly being tried (cf. Frag. XLIV and XLVIII). Musonius describes the receptive attitude he expects on the part of his pupils (cf. Frag. XLIX).

conversations, has generally recast the dialogue¹⁰² into an essay has muffled the original tone of his teacher and caused his humor to vanish, but here and there one can still see traces of a fine irony in his manner of speaking.¹⁰³ Though the accounts are necessarily abridged¹⁰⁴ and one must imagine that Musonius used a great deal more in the way of questioning as he drew from his listeners the ideas he wished to convey, still Lucius gives a very clear impression of Musonius' various methods of discussion. For example, he demonstrates his use of the inductive method in answering the question whether theory or practice is more effective.¹⁰⁵ By the syllogistic method he proves to the entire satisfaction of the king of Syria who had asked the question that kings also should study philosophy.¹⁰⁶ In the discourse entitled, "Must one obey one's parents under all circumstances?", he undertakes to settle the problem by establishing definitions of the terms obedience and disobedience.¹⁰⁷ Observing that his master was conducting these discussions in the manner of Socrates, Lucius appropriately adopted the style of Xenophon to report them.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² In several places he states that he has given only the general trend of the argument. Cf. XIV, 96, 6-7, *Τότε μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτά τινα εἶπεν*.

¹⁰³ A good example of studied innocence is seen when Musonius is pretending to try to discover the reason for the mistaken notion that marriage is a good thing for the ordinary person but not for the philosopher. He asks, "Why should one say that marriage and a family are the proper concern of the average man but not of the philosopher? Can it be because the philosopher is worse than other men? Certainly he ought not to be worse but better and more just and more truly good" (XIV, 94, 33-37). Other instances occur at XII, 86, 36-88, 1; XXI, 128, 36 f., and X, 78, 15 f. For this last, Hense cites a scholion to the text in the form of a warning: *ἐν ᾗθει ἀναγνωστέον*, that is one must interpret this in character with Socrates and not take it seriously.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. VII, 58, 29 *ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα εἶπε τότε*. In one case he tells us that he has included only the arguments that were a little unusual (XVIII, 114, 30 f.).

¹⁰⁵ V.

¹⁰⁶ VIII.

¹⁰⁷ XVI.

¹⁰⁸ C. Schmich (*De arte rhetorica in Musonii Diatribis conspicua* p. 2) remarks, "Plus semel enim eius laudatur elegantia et Xenophonte stili quasi aemula venustas." The Xenophonteon flavor of the discourses which impresses almost everyone can, I believe, be explained by the influence of the Atticist movement upon the author. This literary development of the first and second centuries may be characterized as an effort to purge the language by eliminating popular elements and to enrich it by reinstating words once used by classical writers but since fallen into discard. This *μύησις τῶν ἀρχαίων* included a study of the style of the older writers as models for contemporary works. (Cf. W. Schmid, *Der Atticismus in seinen Hauptvertretern*; L. Radermacher, "Über die Anfänge des Atticismus," *Rh. Mus.* LIV [1899], pp. 351-380; A. Meillet, *Aperçu d'une Histoire de la Langue Grecque*, Paris, 1938, 5th ed. pp. 314-318; E. Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, Leipzig, 1898, pp. 126-128, 149, 391). Appar-

It was a singular role that Musonius played in thus treating Stoic doctrine according to Socratic method.¹⁰⁹ For the principles which he applied to the various ethical problems presented to him are indeed familiar Stoic tenets for which Musonius would claim no originality. As one would expect from the nature of the discussions, there is no treatment of physics,¹¹⁰ metaphysics,¹¹¹ or logic, but the sole concern is with ethics. Musonius' view of philosophy as the means to the attainment of the good life¹¹² may be outlined very briefly. The primary concern of philosophy is the care of the soul in order that the qualities of prudence, temperance, justice, and courage¹¹³ may be perfected in it. This education should begin in infancy¹¹⁴ and continue throughout life, for every member of human society.¹¹⁵ Though we are all

ently the clear, fresh, and unpretentious style of Xenophon had a particular appeal for Lucius because he felt that he stood in the same relationship to Musonius as Xenophon to Socrates. So one finds that Lucius revived a number of words which he found in Xenophon, e. g. *ἀξιοθέατον* (98, 12), *ἐπικούρημα* (110, 26; 122, 15), *κακοδοξεῖν* (72, 12), *θρυπτικός* (80, 20), *διανυκτερεύω* (92, 4). His favorite stylistic mannerisms include the use of a pair of nearly synonymous words, e. g. *μόγισ καὶ βραδέως* (34, 19), *τῶν φανερῶν καὶ προδήλων* (32, 21); contrast, e. g. *εὖ ποιεῖν μὲν θέλειν, κακοποιεῖν δὲ μὴ θέλειν* (48, 10); balance, e. g. *ὅσοι εὐφύεστεροι . . . οὗτοι ῥᾶν τε καὶ θάπτον* (34, 4 f.); anaphora, e. g. *ὅτι εὐγενὴς ἢ ὅτι δυνατὸς ἢ ὅτι πλούσιος ἢ καὶ νῆ Δία ὅτι τύραννος* (42, 1 f.); a series of words containing a common sound, e. g. *φρονίμω, σώφρονι, μεγαλόφρονι* (66, 7 f.); and striking metaphors, e. g. *ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ χορηγός* (56, 24).

¹⁰⁹ Disregarding Epictetus, Nieuwland (*Dissertatio* p. 56), considers Musonius the only one to have done so. "Haec enim fragmenta ex omnibus, quae supersunt, Graecae Philosophiae monumentis, sola exemplum praebent Stoicae doctrinae Socratica methodo tractandae."

¹¹⁰ He reveals a perfectly orthodox attitude in his incidental references to the Stoic universe. Cf. *Frag. XLII*.

¹¹¹ Musonius shows an unwavering confidence in a beneficent and kindly God (cf. XVII, 108, 14 f.). More personal than the cosmic Providence of the earlier Stoics, the Deity Musonius claims is omniscient (32, 17 f.) and altogether perfect (XVII, 108, 11-13); He has so formed man that he may best develop his spiritual life (XVI, 106, 6-8; XVIII B, 118, 21-29); it is man's duty to obey God's law (XVI, 104, 32-36), but he has also the privilege of prayer (XVI, 104, 24 f.).

¹¹² In these informal conversations, Musonius gives several descriptions rather than definitions of philosophy (cf. III, 40, 13-16; VIII, 66, 1; IV, 48, 25 f.; III, 40, 5 f.). Undoubtedly they were made simple deliberately to form a contrast to the pretensions of some of those philosophers who, by unnecessarily involved systems of proofs and demonstrations wasted a man's whole lifetime (cf. X, 82, 36 f.).

¹¹³ Unlike the other later philosophers who had multiplied the original four cardinal virtues expounded by Socrates (Plato, *Republic* IV, 428-434), Musonius found the four an adequate basis for his ethical system.

¹¹⁴ Cf. IV, 46, 35 f.

¹¹⁵ Cf. III. That women too should study philosophy; VIII That kings also should study philosophy.

born with a capacity for virtue,¹¹⁶ from our surroundings we have become morally ill.¹¹⁷ It is philosophy alone which can cure us by its remedy of reason¹¹⁸ which teaches how to live in accord with nature¹¹⁹ so that we may develop the excellences which are peculiar to a human being. Of these virtues, prudence or understanding will enable a person to make correct judgments concerning all the phenomena which touch his life. By means of it he will realize that virtue is the only good and vice the only evil, that everything else is indifferent. Hence he will raise himself above all indifferent things and achieve inner freedom. Understanding the good, he will, of course, avoid all wrong¹²⁰ and engage only in honorable action. Through temperance a man will so toughen his body¹²¹ and discipline his mind,¹²² that he will achieve mastery of himself.¹²³ Both understanding and self-mastery are the means to the real end of philosophy which is to attain true happiness.¹²⁴

Such was the simple theme which Musonius chose to impress upon his pupils by stressing some aspect of it in every one of his conversations. His suggestions for the details of their physical existence are given in four discourses,¹²⁵ somewhat different in treatment and temper from the others, on the elementary matters of food, clothing, and shelter. In them he advocates a rigorous austerity¹²⁶ which seems closer to the Cynic than to the Stoic ideal.¹²⁷ Apparently the intent of these discourses, unlike the

¹¹⁶ Cf. II, 36, 16 f. and II, 38, 14.

¹¹⁷ Cf. VI, 52, 31 f.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Frag. XXXVI. Epictetus too stresses the role of the philosopher as physician. Cf. *Disc.* III, 23, 30.

¹¹⁹ XIV, 92, 6-8; XVII, 108, 2 f.; 15 f.; Frag. XLII.

¹²⁰ He will not repay wrong with wrong (X, 78, 7-11); he will be convinced that it is better to suffer injury to inflict it (X, 78, 2-7).

¹²¹ Cf. VI, 54, 11-16.

¹²² Cf. VI, 54, 16-25.

¹²³ Cf. VI, 54, 2-10.

¹²⁴ Cf. VII, 58, 13-15.

¹²⁵ XVIII A, XVIII B, XIX, XX. In this group also belongs the fragmentary discourse on cutting the hair (XXI).

¹²⁶ For example, he advocates going barefoot (XIX, 122, 5-8), and suggests that all one needs in the way of a house is what a natural cave would offer (XIX, 122, 15-18).

¹²⁷ By the middle of the first century of our era, elements of the Cynic and Stoic tenets were fairly well merged in the teachings of the popular philosophers. One can see in these essays on food, clothing, and houses, where Musonius argues that the very minimum is desirable, some of the ascetic principles of Cynicism, though there is nothing more extreme than what the Cynics originally took from Socrates. Indeed the reason Musonius gives for advising men not to

others, is critical;¹²⁸ certainly the tone verges on the satirical.¹²⁹

Completely opposed, however, to the Cynics' diffident, not to say hostile attitude toward society, is Musonius' active concern for his fellow-men. Indeed, Musonius' contribution to ethical philosophy, and that a significant one, lies in the new spirit which he infused into the old Stoic concept of "humanitas." In his own personal relations, he reveals kindness and warm human sympathy for human kind.¹³⁰ In his teachings he emphasizes the necessity for sympathetic understanding in all human relationships. Although he makes no compromise with any deviation from the right,¹³¹ yet in dealing with wrong-doers he preaches forbearance and forgiveness.¹³² He insists that masters respect

build costly houses is not Cynic at all, he thinks that they could make better use of their money by helping their fellow men; the reason why they should avoid extravagance in food is that it ruins their health. It is true, however, that there are many parallels in the work of Musonius to the anonymous dialogue entitled *The Cynic* which is often attributed to Lucian. Cf. Colardeau, *Épictète*, p. 125; H. W. Fowler and F. G. Fowler, *The Works of Lucian of Samosata* IV, pp. 172-181. *Inter alios* Dudley (*History of Cynicism* pp. 193-196) has discussed Cynic influences in Musonius.

Hirzel (*Der Dialog* II, p. 246) claims that Epictetus was converted from Cynicism by Musonius. The most interesting picture of the life which a professional Cynic teacher might expect to lead is given by Epictetus (*Disc.* III, 22).

¹²⁸ In general, Musonius took no time to express disapproval of the accepted conventions of civilized life, or to condemn man to a barren, cheerless existence (as the Cynics seemed to do). Here he criticizes the waste and extravagance which seem to characterize at least one stratum of society (cf. XVIII B, 118, 31-35). It is greatly to his credit that, although he was aware of the morbid condition of both the individual and of the state, he neither fell into passive pessimism and despair nor thundered forth in invective. Instead of advocating a bonfire of vanities, with fine courage and healing optimism, he taught a positive program for creating a healthy and rational society.

¹²⁹ The subject he was treating required rather bold and exaggerated statements to point up his remarks. Some of his darts are cleverly thrust, e.g., "Surely, if God had planned eating as a pleasure for us, He would have had us enjoy it a longer time and not merely the brief moment when we are swallowing." (XVIII B, 118, 27-29).

¹³⁰ This impression is conveyed by many of his discourses. One story in particular stresses it. Cf. Frag. L.

¹³¹ He claims that "everyone who sins and does wrong, even if it affects none of the people about him, yet immediately reveals himself as a worse and a less honorable person." (XII, 86, 24-27.) Cf. also IX, 76. 8-11 and Frag. XLI.

¹³² Cf. X, 78, 31-80, 6 and Frag. XXXIX. In this last Musonius cites the anecdote of Lycurgus and the remarkable reform he effected in a young man who had willfully blinded him, as a praiseworthy example. The idea of forgiveness was alien to the thought of the older Stoics. They, whose fault was pride, refused to admit that a wrong could be done to them, hence they had nothing to forgive. Furthermore, the old Stoic doctrine of the equality of sins tended to create the impression that they were all a severe and austere group. Cf. Horace, *Sat.* I, 3, 113 f.

the essential human rights of their slaves.¹³³ For women he claims the right to be judged by the same moral standards as men.¹³⁴ He is one of the first to advocate contributing to the common good by devoting one's resources to charity.¹³⁵ These are details in the larger plan which Musonius keeps ever before his hearers, namely to prepare a social order¹³⁶ wherein men may find a "benevolent and civilized way of life."¹³⁷ Resting upon the integrity of the individual,¹³⁸ the high moral and spiritual qualities of husband and wife in marriage,¹³⁹ the deep loyalty of the family,¹⁴⁰ the will to cooperate with one's neighbor,¹⁴¹ and a concern for the welfare of one's city,¹⁴² Musonius' goal is to make men honorable and responsible citizens of the city of God.¹⁴³ The high idealism, combined with the noble humanitarianism of his teachings, represents the greatest height Stoicism ever reached.¹⁴⁴

¹³³ Cf. XII, 86, 29-32. This attitude is highly unusual in a society which was based upon slavery.

¹³⁴ Cf. XII, 86, 38-88, 4.

¹³⁵ Cf. XIX, 122, 26-32.

¹³⁶ Undoubtedly the fact that Musonius came of a family of wealth and position and that he himself was an active participant in public life had an influence upon his teachings on this subject. In contrast to him, Epictetus, as Professor Oldfather points out (*Disc. I*, p. xvi), was so conditioned by the difficult circumstances of his slavery that he made little of the question. "The social obligations for the maintenance and advancement of order and civilization, toward which men of higher station were sensitive, clearly did not weigh heavily upon his conscience."

¹³⁷ Cf. XIV, 92, 25-34 and X, 78, 33.

¹³⁸ Everywhere Musonius stresses the need for the four virtues in the soul of every individual, but he emphasizes justice especially as the important social virtue.

¹³⁹ Cf. XIII, 88, 20-23: He devotes three essays to a consideration of marriage.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. XV *passim*. Musonius is one of the few moralists who inveigh against the practice of exposing unwanted children.

¹⁴¹ Cf. XIV, 92, 17-34.

¹⁴² Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁴³ Cf. IX, 68, 21 f.

¹⁴⁴ Some of his discourses have been compared to the writings of the early Christians. A number of passages, indeed, have a truly Scriptural ring. Cf. XVII, 108, 15-18 and *Matthew* V, 48 and *Colossians* III, 10; Fragment XXVI, 130, 17 f. and *Matthew* IX, 12; XV, 98, 19-22 and *Matthew* VI, 26; VI, 56, 10 f. and *Acts* XX, 35.

NOTE ON THE TEXT

There are two editions of the text of Musonius Rufus, that of I. Venhuizen Peerlkamp (Haarlem, 1822) and that of O. Hense (Leipzig, 1905). With the exception of thirteen fragments and part of discourse XV which is preserved only in the *Rendel Harris Papyri* (ed. J. Enoch Powell, Cambridge, 1936) I, the discourses and fragments were assembled from the two works of Stobaeus, the *Anthologium* (ed. C. Wachsmuth, Berlin, 1884) and the *Florilegium* (ed. A. Meineke, Leipzig, 1856). There is a Latin translation in Gesner's edition of Stobaeus (Basle, 1549). The present edition follows the text of O. Hense, except in a few instances which are indicated in the footnotes.

I.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤ

ΟΤΙ ΟΤ ΔΕΙ ΠΟΛΛΑΙΣ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΕΣΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΕΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑ ΧΡΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ.

- 5 Λόγου δέ ποτε γενομένου περὶ ἀποδείξεων, ἃς χρή ἀκούειν τοὺς νέους παρὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων πρὸς κατάληψιν ὧν μαθηάνουσιν, ἔφη ὁ Μουσώνιος οὐχὶ πολλὰς ἐφ' ἐκάστου πράγματος ζητεῖν ἀποδείξεις προσήκειν, ἀλλ' ἀνυσίμους καὶ ἐναργεῖς. οὐτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς ἐκεῖνος, ἔφη, ἐπαινετὸς ὁ φάρμακα πολλὰ προσφέρων τοῖς νοσοῦσιν, ἀλλ'
- 10 ὁ δι' ὀλίγων ὧν προσφέρει λόγου ἀξίως ὠφελῶν· οὐτε φιλόσοφος ὁ διὰ πολλῶν ἀποδείξεων διδάσκων τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἀλλ' ὁ δι' ὀλίγων ἐπάγων αὐτοὺς ἐφ' ὃ μέντοι βούλεται· καὶ ὁ ἀκουστῆς ὅσῳ περ ἂν ἦ συνετώτερος, τοσοῦτῳ μειόνων δεήσεται τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ τοσοῦτῳ θάπτον συναινέσει τῷ κεφαλαίῳ τοῦ λόγου, ὅντι
- 15 γε ὑγιεῖ. ὅστις δὲ πανταχοῦ δεῖται ἀποδείξεως καὶ ὅπου σαφὴ τὰ πράγματά ἐστιν, ἢ διὰ πολλῶν ἀποδείκνυσθαι βούλεται αὐτῷ τὰ δι' ὀλίγων δυνάμενα, παντάπασιν ἄτοπος καὶ δυσμαθής. θεοὺς μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς οὐδεμιᾶς ἀποδείξεως δεῖσθαι πρὸς οὐδέν, ὅτι μήτε ἀσαφὲς μήτε ἄδηλόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς μηδέν, πρὸς <οἷα> μόνᾳ δεῖ τῶν
- 20 ἀποδείξεων· τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους ἀνάγκη τὰ μὴ φανερά μηδ' αὐτόθεν γνῶριμα διὰ τῶν φανερῶν καὶ προδήλων ζητεῖν ἀνευρίσκειν, ὅπερ ἔργον ἀποδείξεώς ἐστιν. οἷον, ὅτι ἡδονὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, αὐτόθεν μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι γνῶριμον, ἐπεὶ περ ἔργῳ προσκαλεῖται ἡμᾶς ὡς ἀγαθὸν οὖσα ἢ ἡδονή· λαβόντος δὲ τινος λήμμα γνῶριμον τὸ πᾶν
- 25 ἀγαθὸν αἰρετὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβόντος ἕτερον γνῶριμον τούτῳ τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς οὐχ αἰρετὰς εἶναι, ἀποδεικνύομεν τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, διὰ τῶν γνωρίμων τὸ μὴ γνῶριμον. πάλιν ὡς ὁ πόνος οὐκ ἔστι κακόν, αὐτόθεν μὲν οὐ φαίνεται πιθανόν· τούναντίον γὰρ τούτου δοκεῖ πιθανώτερον, τὸ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον· τεθέντος
- 30 δὲ φανεροῦ λήμματος, τοῦ πᾶν τὸ κακὸν φευκτὸν εἶναι, καὶ προστεθέντος αὐτῷ φανερωτέρου τοῦ πόνου πολλοὺς οὐκ εἶναι φευκτοὺς, περαίνεται τὸ μὴ κακὸν εἶναι τὸν πόνον. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ γένους τοῦ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν ὀξύτεροι οἱ δ' ἀμβλύτεροί εἰσι καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν ἔθεσι κρείττωσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐν χείροσι
- 35 τεθραμμένοι, οἱ μὲν ἥθους ἢ φύσεως ὄντες χείρονος πλείονων

I

THAT THERE IS NO NEED OF GIVING MANY PROOFS FOR ONE PROBLEM

Once when discussion turned upon proofs or demonstrations, such as beginners must learn from their teachers of philosophy in gaining a mastery of whatever they are studying, Musonius said that there was no sense in seeking many proofs for each point, but rather cogent and lucid ones. Thus just as the physician who prescribes many drugs for his patients deserves less praise than the one who succeeds in helping them with a few, so the philosopher who teaches his pupils with the use of many proofs is less effective than the one who leads them to the desired goal with few. And the pupil too, the quicker his intelligence, the fewer proofs he will require, and the sooner he will assent to the conclusion of the argument in question, provided it be sound. But those who require proofs at every point, even where the matter is perfectly clear, or demand to have demonstrated at length things which could be explained briefly are completely inept and dull-witted.

The gods, we may assume, need no proof of anything inasmuch as nothing to them lacks clearness or is obscure, and it is only in reference to obscurity that there is any need of proof. Man, however, must needs seek to find out that which is not plain nor self-evident through the medium of the plain and obvious. That is the function of proof. Take for example the proposition that pleasure is not a good. At first sight we do not recognize it as true, since in fact pleasure appeals to us as a good. But starting from the generally accepted premise that every good is desirable and adding to it a second equally accepted that some pleasures are not desirable, we succeed in proving that pleasure is not a good: that is we prove the unknown or unrecognized by means of the known or recognized. Or again, that toil is not an evil is not on the face of it a persuasive proposition, while its opposite, that toil is an evil, seems much more persuasive. But starting from the known and accepted premise that every evil is a thing to be avoided, and adding to it another obvious one, namely that many forms of toil are not in the category of things to be avoided, we conclude that toil is not an evil. Since this, then, is the nature of proof, when we consider that some men are quicker of wit and others duller, that some are reared in better environment, others

δέουντ' ἂν ἀποδείξω καὶ πραγματείας μείζονος, ὥστε δέξασθαι ταυτὶ τὰ δόγματα καὶ τυπωθῆναι κατὰ ταῦτα, καθάπερ οἶμαι καὶ τὰ πονηρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, ὅποταν μέλλῃ καλῶς ἔξειν, πάνυ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας δέεται· ὅσοι δὲ τῶν νέων εὐφύεστεροι καὶ ἀγωγῆς
 5 μετεσχηκότες κρείττονος, οὗτοι ῥᾶόν τε καὶ θάττον καὶ δι' ὀλίγων ἀποδείξω συναινοῦν ἂν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀκολουθοῦν. ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἔχει ταῦτα, γνοίημεν ἂν ῥαδίως, εἰ νοήσαιομεν μειράκιον ἢ νεανίαν, τὸν μὲν ἐν τρυφῇ πάσῃ τεθραμμένον καὶ τό τε σῶμα τεθηλυμμένον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκκελυμένον ὑπὸ ἐθῶν ἀγόντων εἰς
 10 μαλακίαν, ἔτι δὲ νοθῇ παρεχόμενον καὶ δυσμαθῇ τὴν φύσιν· τὸν δ' αὖ Λακωνικῶς πῶς ἡγμένον καὶ τρυφᾶν οὐκ εἰθισμένον καὶ καρτερεῖν μεμελετηκότα καὶ τῶν λεγομένων ὀρθῶς εὐήκοον ὄντα· εἶτα τοὺς δύο τούτους νεανίας εἰ θείημεν ἀκούοντας φιλοσόφου λέγοντος περὶ θανάτου, περὶ πόνου, περὶ πενίας, περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων,
 15 ὡς οὐ κακῶν ὄντων, πάλιν δ' αὖ περὶ ζωῆς, περὶ ἡδονῆς, περὶ πλούτου, περὶ τῶν παραπλησίων τούτοις ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, ἄρα γε ὁμοίως ἅμφω προσήσονται τοὺς λόγους καὶ παραπλησίως ἐκάτερος <ἂν> πείθοιτο τοῖς λεγομένοις; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν μόγις καὶ βραδέως καὶ ὥσπερ μοχλευόμενος ὑπὸ μυρίων λόγων
 20 τάχ' ἂν ἐπινεύσειεν, ὁ νοθέστερος· ὁ δ' αὖ ταχέως καὶ ἐτοίμως δέξεται τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς οἰκεῖα καὶ προσήκοντα αὐτῷ, μήτε ἀποδείξω δεόμενος πολλῶν μήτε πραγματείας μείζονος. ἢ οὐ τοιοῦτος παῖς ἐκείνος ὁ Λάκων, ὃς Κλεάνθην τὸν φιλόσοφον ἠρώτησεν, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ὁ πόνος ἐστίν; οὕτω γὰρ ἐκείνος φαίνεται φύσει πεφυκῶς
 25 καλῶς καὶ τεθραμμένος εὔ πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ὥστε ἐγγύτερον εἶναι νομίζειν τὸν πόνον τῆς τἀγαθοῦ φύσεως ἢ τῆς τοῦ κακοῦ· ὅς γε ὡς ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ μὴ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, εἰ ἀγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὦν, ἐπυνθάνετο. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Κλεάνθης ἀγασθεὶς τοῦ παιδὸς εἶπεν ἄρα πρὸς αὐτόν·

30 αἵματος εἰς ἀγαθοῖο, φίλον τέκος, οἷ' ἀγορεύεις.

πῶς οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐ ῥαδίως ἐπείσθη ἂν μήτε πενίαν μήτε θάνατον δεδιέναι μήτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν δοκούντων φοβερῶν, μηδ' αὖ διώκειν πλούτον ἢ ζωὴν ἢ ἡδονήν;

Ἵνα δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπανέλθω τοῦ λόγου, φημι δεῖν τὸν διδά-
 35 σκαλον τὸν φιλόσοφον μὴ λόγων πλήθος μηδ' ἀποδείξω ζητεῖν

35 τὸν φιλόσοφον Wachsmuth τοῦ φιλοσόφου Hense

22 The incident is related in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* VII, 5 (172).

30 *Odyssey* IV, 611.

in worse, those of the latter class being inferior in character and native disposition will require more proofs and more diligent attention to be led to master the teachings in question and to be moulded by them; just as defective physiques, when the goal is to restore perfect health, require very diligent and prolonged treatment. On the other hand such pupils as are of a finer nature and have enjoyed better training will more easily and more quickly, and with few proofs, assent to sound reasoning and put it into practice. How true this is we may readily recognize if we chance to know two lads or young men, of whom one has been reared in luxury, his body effeminate, his spirit weakened by soft living, and having besides a dull and torpid disposition; the other reared somewhat in the Spartan manner, unaccustomed to luxury, practiced in self-restraint, and ready to listen to sound reasoning. If then we place these two young men in the position of pupils of a philosopher arguing that death, toil, poverty, and the like are not evils, or again that life, pleasure, wealth, and the like are not goods, do you imagine that both will give heed to the argument in the same fashion, and that one will be persuaded by it in the same degree as the other? Far from it. The one reluctantly and slowly, and fairly pried loose by a thousand arguments, will perhaps in the end give sign of assent—I mean of course the dullard. The other quickly and readily will accept the argument as cogent and relevant to himself, and will not require many proofs nor a fuller treatment. Was not just such a lad that Spartan boy who asked Cleanthes the philosopher if toil was not a good? He made it plain that he was so well-endowed by nature and by training for the practice of virtue as to consider toil closer to the nature of good than of evil, in that he asked whether toil was not perchance a good, as if it were conceded that it was not an evil. Thereupon Cleanthes in surprise and admiration of the boy replied, ‘Thou art of noble blood, dear child, so noble the words thou speakest.’ Can you doubt that such a lad would have been readily persuaded not to fear poverty nor death nor any of the things which seem terrible, and again, not to seek after wealth nor life nor pleasure?

To come back to the starting point of my discussion, I repeat that it is mistaken zeal for the teacher, if he be a true philosopher, to rehearse a multitude of arguments and proofs to his pupils. He should rather touch upon each one with just measure, seek to penetrate to the very intellect of his hearer, and present persuasive arguments and such as cannot easily be refuted. But most of all his treatment should consist in showing himself not

διξιέναι πρὸς τοὺς μανθάνοντας, ἀλλὰ καιρίως περὶ ἐκάστου λέγειν καὶ καθικνεῖσθαι τῆς διανοίας τοῦ ἀκούοντος, καὶ <ᾧ πει>στικά εἶναι λέγειν καὶ ἀνατραπήναι μὴ ῥάδια, καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ τῷ παρέχειν αὐτὸν περὶ τε τῶν χρησιμωτάτων λέγοντα καὶ ὁμολο-
 5 γούμενα οἷς λέγει πράττοντα, τοῦτ' μεταχειριζόμενον τοὺς ἀκούον-
 τας· τὸν δὲ μαθητὴν ἐντετάσθαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σκοπεῖν μὲν ὅπως μὴ λάθῃ ψεῦδος τι παραδεξάμενος· τῶν δὲ ἀληθῶν μὴ μὰ Δία πολλὰς ζητεῖν ἀποδείξεις ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' ἐναργεῖς καὶ ἄπερ
 10 ἂν πεισθῇ τῶν παραινυμένων ἑαυτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῇ, τοῦτοις ἐπακολουθεῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἔσται τις ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ὠφελημένος, ἂν οἷς παραδέδεκται λόγοις οὖσιν ὑγίεσι τὰ ἔργα παρέχεται συνωδᾷ.

II.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

<ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤ

15 ΟΤΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΑΡΕΤΗΝ ΓΕΓΟΝΕ Ο ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΣ>

Πάντες, ἔφη, φύσει πεφύκαμεν οὕτως, ὥστε ζῆν ἀναμαρτήτως καὶ καλῶς, οὐχ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ὁ δ' οὐ καὶ τούτου μέγα τεκμήριον ὅτι πᾶσιν ὁμοίως οἱ νομοθέται καὶ προστάττουσιν ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἀπαγορεύουσιν ἃ μὴ χρὴ, οὐχ ὑπεξαιρούμενοι οὐδένα τῶν ἀπει-
 20 θούντων ἢ τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων, ὥστε ἀτιμώρητον εἶναι, οὐ νέον, οὐ πρεσβύτην, οὐκ ἰσχυρόν, οὐκ ἀσθενῆ, οὐχ ὄντιναοῦν. καίτοι ἐχρήν, εἰ ὅλον ἐπέισακτον τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἦν, καὶ μηδὲν αὐτοῦ φύσει ἡμῖν μετῆν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας οὖσιν ἔργοις οὐδεὶς ἀπαιτεῖται εἶναι ἀναμάρτητος, μὴ μεμαθηκὼς τὴν τέχνην,
 25 οὕτως μὴδ' ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον μηδένα ἀπαιτεῖσθαι εἶναι ἀναμάρτητον, ὅστις ἀρετὴν μὴ ἐξέμαθεν, ἐπεὶπερ ἀρετὴ μόνῃ ποιεῖ μὴ ἁμαρτάνειν ἐν βίῳ. νῦν δὲ ἐν μὲν θεραπείᾳ καμνόντων οὐδεὶς ἀναμάρτητον ἀξιοῖ εἶναι ἄλλον ἢ τὸν ἱατρὸν καὶ ἐν χρήσει λύρας οὐδένα ἄλλον ἢ τὸν μουσικὸν <καὶ> ἐν χρήσει πηδαλίων οὐδένα
 30 ἄλλον ἢ τὸν κυβερνήτην· ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ οὐκέτι μόνον ἀναμάρτητον εἶναι τὸν φιλοσοφὸν ἀξιούσιν, ὃς δοκεῖ μόνος ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ταύτης πεποιη-

14 f. This is the only one of the treatises for which a title is lacking. A satisfactory heading may be supplied from the text at 38, 1-2.

only as one who utters words which are most helpful, but as one who acts consistently with them. As for the pupil, it is his duty to attend diligently to what is said and to be on his guard lest he accept unwittingly something false. But of what he accepts as truth, his effort should not be directed toward learning numbers of proofs—far from it—but only such as are plain and lucid. Finally whatever precepts enjoined upon him he is persuaded are true, these must he follow out in his daily life. For only in this way will philosophy be of profit to anyone, if to sound teaching he adds conduct in harmony with it.

II

◁THAT MAN IS BORN WITH AN INCLINATION TOWARD VIRTUE▷

All of us, he used to say, are so fashioned by nature that we can live our lives free from error and nobly; not that one can and another cannot, but all. The clearest evidence of this is the fact that lawgivers lay down for all alike what may be done and forbid what may not be done, exempting from punishment no one who disobeys or does wrong, not the young nor the old, not the strong nor the weak, not anyone whomsoever. And yet if the whole notion of virtue were something that came to us from without, and we shared no part of it by birth, just as in activities pertaining to the other arts no one who has not learned the art is expected to be free from error, so in like manner in things pertaining to the conduct of life it would not be reasonable to expect anyone to be free from error who had not learned virtue, seeing that virtue is the only thing that saves us from error in daily living. Now in the care of the sick we demand no one but the physician to be free from error, and in handling the lyre no one but the musician, and in managing the helm no one but the pilot, but in the conduct of life it is no longer only the philosopher whom we expect to be free from error, though he alone would seem to be the only one concerned with the study of virtue, but all men alike, including those who have never given any attention to virtue. Clearly, then, there is no explanation for this other than that the human being is born with an inclination toward virtue. And this indeed is strong evidence of the presence of goodness in our nature, that all speak of themselves as having virtue and being good. For take the common man; when asked

- μένους. δῆλον οὖν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἕτερον τούτου αἵτιον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἀρετὴν
γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. καὶ μὴν κακεῖνο μέγα τεκμήριον τοῦ
μετεῖναι ἀρετῆς φύσει ἡμῖν, τὸ πάντας οὕτως διαλέγεσθαι περὶ
ἑαυτῶν, ὡς ἐχόντων ἀρετὴν καὶ ὄντων ἀγαθῶν. οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστι
5 τῶν πολλῶν, ὃς ἐρωτώμενος πότερον ἄφρων ἢ φρόνιμος τυγχάνει
ᾧ, ἄφρων ὁμολογήσει εἶναι· οὐδ' αὖ ἐρωτώμενος πότερον ἄδικος ἢ
δίκαιος τυγχάνει ᾧ, φήσει ὅτι ἄδικος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐρωτᾷ τις
πότερον σῶφρων ἢ ἀκόλαστος, † ἢ οὕτως ἀποκρίνεται ἐρωτηθεὶς,
ὅτι σῶφρων· καὶ ἀπλῶς ἂν ἐρωτᾷ τις πότερον ἀγαθὸς εἴη ἢ φαῦλος,
10 φαίη ἂν <ὅτι> ἀγαθός, καὶ ταῦτ' οὐκ ἂν ἔχων εἰπεῖν οὔτε διδά-
σκαλον αὐτοῦ καλοκαγαθίας, οὔτε μάθησιν ἀρετῆς ἢ ἀσκησιν ἣν
τυγχάνει πεποιημένος. τοῦτ' οὖν τίνος ἄλλου τεκμήριόν ἐστιν ἢ
τοῦ φυσικὴν εἶναι ὑποβολὴν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ πρὸς καλο-
καγαθίαν καὶ σπέρμα ἀρετῆς ἐκάστω ἡμῶν ἐνεῖναι; διὰ δὲ τὸ
15 πάντως ἀγαθοὺς ὑπάρχειν προσήκειν ἡμῖν, οἱ μὲν ἀπατῶμεθα ὡς
καὶ δὴ ὄντες ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ αἰσχυρόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν <ὅτι> οὐκ ἐσμέν.
ἐπεὶ διὰ τί, πρὸς θεῶν, γράμματα μὲν ἢ μουσικὴν ἢ παλαιστρικήν
οὐδεὶς μὴ μαθὼν εἰδέναι φησὶν, οὐδὲ ἔχειν τὰς τέχνας ταύτας
προσποιεῖται, μὴ καὶ διδάσκαλον παρ' ὃν ἐφοῖτα ἔχων εἰπεῖν,
20 ἀρετὴν δὲ ἔχειν πᾶς ὑποσχεῖται; ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν οὐδενὸς φύσει τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ μέτεστιν, οὐδὲ ἦκει <τις> εἰς τὸν βίον ἔχων ὑποβολὰς
* * *

III.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΟΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΕΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΤΕΟΝ.

- 25 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπύθετό τις αὐτοῦ, εἰ καὶ γυναιξὶ φιλοσοφητέον, οὕτω
πῶς ἤρξατο διδάσκειν ὡς φιλοσοφητέον αὐταῖς. Λόγον μὲν, ἔφη,
τὸν αὐτὸν εἰλήφασιν παρὰ θεῶν αἱ γυναῖκες τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ᾧ
τε χρώμεθα πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ καθ' ὃν διανοούμεθα περὶ
ἐκάστου πράγματος, <εἰ> ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν ἐστι, καὶ καλὸν ἢ
30 αἰσχρόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεις τὰς αὐτὰς ἔχει τὸ θῆλυ τῷ
ἄρρενι, ὁρᾶν, ἀκούειν, ὁσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
μέρη σώματος τὰ αὐτὰ ὑπάρχει ἐκατέρῳ, καὶ οὐδὲν θατέρῳ πλεόν.

8 πότερον codd. Peerlkamp πότερα Hense

9 ἐρωτᾷ F.P. ἐρωτᾶται Wachsmuth, Hense

whether he is stupid or intelligent, not one will confess to being stupid; or again, when asked whether he is just or unjust, not one will say that he is unjust. In the same way, if one asks him whether he is temperate or intemperate, he replies at once that he is temperate; and finally, if one asks whether he is good or bad, he would say that he is good, even though he can name no teacher of virtue or mention any study or practice of virtue he has ever made. Of what, then, is this evidence if not of the existence of an innate inclination of the human soul toward goodness and nobleness, and of the presence of the seeds of virtue in each one of us? Moreover, because it is entirely to our advantage to be good, some of us deceive ourselves into thinking that we are really good, while others of us are ashamed to admit that we are not. Why then pray, when one who has not learned letters or music or gymnastics never claims to have knowledge of these arts nor makes any pretence of knowing them, and is quite unable even to name a teacher to whom he went, why, I say, does everyone profess that he has virtue? It is because none of those other skills is natural to man, and no human being is born with a natural faculty <for them, whereas an inclination toward virtue is inborn in each one of us.>

III

THAT WOMEN TOO SHOULD STUDY PHILOSOPHY

When someone asked him if women too should study philosophy, he began to discourse on the theme that they should, in somewhat the following manner. Women as well as men, he said, have received from the gods the gift of reason, which we use in our dealings with one another and by which we judge whether a thing is good or bad, right or wrong. Likewise the female has the same senses as the male; namely sight, hearing, smell, and the others. Also both have the same parts of the body, and one has nothing more than the other. Moreover, not men alone, but

10 ἀν ὅτι Elter cf. Hense addenda

11 ἦν F Elter, Peerkamp τiva Hense

14 Cicero also used this metaphor of the seeds of virtue which exists in every human being. Cf. *De Finibus* V, 15, 43 and *Tusc. Disp.* III, 1, 2.

21 The text breaks off in the middle of a sentence, but one can easily supply the conclusion to his thought.

24 The Stoics as a group advocated the study of philosophy for women. Cf. Lactantius *Inst. Div.* III, 25.

- ἔτι δὲ ὀρεξίς καὶ οἰκείωσις φύσει πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐ μόνον γίνεται τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναιξίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον αἰτὰι γε τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοῖς μὲν καλοῖς καὶ δικαίοις ἔργοις ἀρέσκεισθαι πεφύκασιν, τὰ δ' ἐναντία τούτων προβάλλεσθαι. τούτων δὲ ταύτῃ ἐχόντων, διὰ
 5 τί ποτ' οὖν τοῖς μὲν ἀνδράσι προσήκοι ἂν ζητεῖν καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως βιώσονται καλῶς, ὅπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστίν, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐ; πότερον ὅτι ἄνδρας μὲν προσήκει ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι, γυναικάς δὲ οὐ; σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ καθ' ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν προσηκόντων γυναικὶ τῇ ἐσομένῃ ἀγαθῇ· φανέεται γὰρ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας τούτων ἕκαστον
 10 μάλιστ' ἂν αὐτῇ περιγινόμενον. αὐτίκα δεῖ οἰκονομικὴν εἶναι τὴν γυναικαὶ καὶ ἐκλογιστικὴν τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων καὶ ἀρχικὴν τῶν οἰκετῶν. ταῦτα δ' ἐγὼ φημὶ τῇ φιλοσοφούσῃ ὑπάρξαι ἂν μάλιστα· εἴ γε ἕκαστον μὲν τούτων μέρος τοῦ βίου ἐστίν, ἐπιστήμη δὲ περὶ βίον οὐχ ἑτέρα τις ἢ φιλοσοφία ἐστί, καὶ ὁ φιλόσοφος,
 15 ὥσπερ ἔλεγε Σωκράτης, τοῦτο διατελεῖ σκοπῶν,

ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.

- ἀλλὰ δεῖ δὴ καὶ σῶφρονα εἶναι τὴν γυναικα· οἶαν καθαρεύειν μὲν ἀφροδισίων παρανόμων, καθαρεύειν δὲ τῆς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἀκρασίας, μὴ δουλεύειν ἐπιθυμίαις, μηδὲ φιλόνεικον εἶναι, μὴ
 20 πολυτελῆ, μὴ καλλωπίστριαν. ταῦτα μὲν ἔργα τῆς σῶφρονός ἐστι καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις ἐκεῖνα· κρατεῖν μὲν ὀργῆς, μὴ κρατεῖσθαι δ' ὑπὸ λύπης, κρεῖττον αὖ δὲ πάθους παντὸς εἶναι. ταῦτα δ' ὁ φιλόσοφος παρεγγυᾷ λόγος· ὁ δὲ μαθὼν αὐτὰ καὶ ἀσκήσας ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ γενέσθαι ἂν κοσμιώτατος, εἴτ' ἀνὴρ εἴη εἴτε γυνή. τί οὖν;
 25 ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ ἔχει· δικαία δ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη γυνὴ φιλοσοφοῦσα, οὐδ' ἄμεμπτος βίου κοινωνός, οὐδ' ὁμονοίας ἀγαθῇ συνεργός, οὐδ' ἀνδρός γε καὶ τέκνων ἐπιμελὴς κηδεμών, οὐδὲ φιλοκερδείας ἢ πλεονεξίας πάντῃ καθαρὰ; καὶ τίς ἂν μᾶλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου τοιαύτῃ γένοιτο ἢν γε ἀνάγκη πᾶσα, εἴπερ εἴη τῷ ὄντι φιλόσοφος,
 30 τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι χεῖρον νομίζειν, ὅσῳ περ αἴσχιον, τὸ δὲ ἐλαττοῦσθαι τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν κρεῖττον ὑπολαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τέκνα μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾶν ἢ τὸ ζῆν; τῆς δ' ἐχούσης οὕτω τίς ἂν εἴη γυνὴ δικαιότερα; καὶ μὴν καὶ ἀνδριότεραν εἶναι προσήκει γυναικα τῆς ἀπαιδεύτου τὴν πεπαιδευμένην καὶ τὴν φιλόσοφον τῆς
 35 ἰδιώτιδος· ὥς μήτε θανάτου φόβῳ μήτε ὀκνῳ τῷ πρὸς πόνον

15 This saying of Socrates is preserved in Diogenes Laertius, *op. cit.* II, 6, 21.

16 *Odyssey* IV, 392.

29 Socrates' teaching that it is worse to do wrong than to suffer wrong (Plato, *Gorg.* 509C) was taken over by the Stoics. Cf. Seneca *Ep.* 95, 52.

women too, have a natural inclination toward virtue and the capacity for acquiring it, and it is the nature of women no less than men to be pleased by good and just acts and to reject the opposite of these. If this is true, by what reasoning would it ever be appropriate for men to search out and consider how they may lead good lives, which is exactly the study of philosophy, but inappropriate for women? Could it be that it is fitting for men to be good, but not for women? Let us examine in detail the qualities which are suitable for a woman who would lead a good life, for it will appear that each one of them would accrue to her most readily from the study of philosophy. In the first place, a woman must be a good housekeeper; that is a careful accountant of all that pertains to the welfare of her house and capable of directing the household slaves. It is my contention that these are the very qualities which would be present particularly in the woman who studies philosophy, since obviously each of them is a part of life, and philosophy is nothing other than knowledge about life, and the philosopher, as Socrates said, quoting Homer, is constantly engaged in investigating precisely this: "Whatsoever of good and of evil is wrought in thy halls." But above all a woman must be chaste and self-controlled; she must, I mean, be pure in respect of unlawful love, exercise restraint in other pleasures, not be a slave to desire, not be contentious, not lavish in expense, nor extravagant in dress. Such are the works of a virtuous woman, and to them I would add yet these: to control her temper, not to be overcome by grief, and to be superior to uncontrolled emotion of every kind. Now these are the things which the teachings of philosophy transmit, and the person who has learned them and practices them would seem to me to have become a well-ordered and seemly character, whether man or woman. Well then, so much for self-control. As for justice, would not the woman who studies philosophy be just, would she not be a blameless life-partner, would she not be a sympathetic help-mate, would she not be an untiring defender of husband and children, and would she not be entirely free of greed and arrogance? And who better than the woman trained in philosophy—and she certainly of necessity if she has really acquired philosophy—would be disposed to look upon doing a wrong as worse than suffering one (as much worse as it is the baser), and to regard being worsted as better than gaining an unjust advantage? Moreover, who better than she would love her children more than life itself? What woman would be more just than such a one? Now as for courage, certainly it is to be expected that the educated woman will be more courageous than the uneducated, and one

ὑπομείναι τι αἰσχρόν, μηδ' ὑποπτήξαι μηδενὶ ὅτι εὐγενὴς ἢ ὅτι
 δυνατὸς ἢ ὅτι πλούσιος ἢ καὶ νῆ Δία ὅτι τύραννος. ὑπάρχει γὰρ
 αὐτῇ μεμελετηκέναι μέγα φρονεῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν θάνατον ἡγείσθαι μὴ
 5 ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀπονίαν μὴ διώκειν ἐξ ἅπαντος. ὅθεν εἰκὸς
 εἶναι τὴν γυναῖκα ταύτην καὶ αὐτουργικὴν καὶ κακόπαθον, οἷαν
 ἃ μὲν ἂν τέκη τρέφειν μαστῶ τῷ ἑαυτῆς, τῷ δὲ ἀνδρὶ ὑπηρετεῖν
 χερσὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῆς· ἃ δὲ δουρικὰ νομίζουσιν ἔνιοι, ταῦτα ἀόκνως
 10 ποιεῖν. ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη γυνὴ μέγα μὲν ὄφελος εἴη τῷ γεγαμη-
 κότε, κόσμος δὲ τοῖς προσήκουσι γένει, παράδειγμα δὲ χρηστὸν
 ταῖς ἐπισταμέναις αὐτήν; ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία, φασὶ τινες, ὅτι αὐθάδεις
 ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ θρασείας εἶναι ἀνάγκη τὰς προσιούσας τοῖς
 φιλοσόφοις γυναῖκας, ὅταν ἀφέμεναι τοῦ οἰκουρεῖν ἐν μέσοις
 15 ἀναστρέφονται τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ μελετῶσι λόγους καὶ σοφίζονται
 καὶ ἀναλύωσι συλλογισμούς, δέον οἴκοι καθημένας ταλασιουργεῖν.
 ἐγὼ δὲ οὐχ ὅπως τὰς γυναῖκας τὰς φιλοσοφούσας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς
 ἀνδρας ἀξιῶσαιμ' ἂν ἀφεμένους τῶν προσηκόντων ἔργων εἶναι περὶ
 λόγους μόνον· ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσους μεταχειρίζονται λόγους, τῶν ἔργων
 20 φημὶ δεῖν ἔνεκα μεταχειρίζεσθαι αὐτούς. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρικοῦ
 λόγου ὄφελος οὐδέν, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς ὑγίειαν φέρῃ σώματος ἀνθρω-
 πίνου, οὕτως οὐδ' εἴ τινα φιλόσοφος ἔχει ἢ διδάσκει λόγον, οὐδὲν
 ὄφελος αὐτοῦ, ἐὰν μὴ φέρῃ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης. πρὸ
 παντὸς δὲ σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον χρή, ᾧ ἔπεσθαι τὰς φιλοσοφούσας
 ἀξιούμεν, εἰ δύναται θρασείας ποιεῖν ὁ τὴν αἰδῶ μέγιστον ἀπο-
 25 φαίνων ἀγαθόν· εἰ ζῆν ἱταμώτερον ἐθίζει ὁ καταστολὴν πλείστην
 ὑψηλοῦμενος· εἰ μὴ διδάσκει σωφρονεῖν ὁ κακὸν ἀποδεικνύς
 ἔσχατον τὴν ἀκολασίαν· εἰ μὴ προτρέπει οἰκονομεῖν ὁ παριστὰς
 ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν οἰκονομικὴν. καὶ στέργειν δὲ . . . καὶ αὐτουργεῖν
 ὁ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγος παρακαλεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα.

IV.

30

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΤ

ΕΙ ΠΑΡΑΠΛΗΣΙΩΣ ΠΑΙΔΕΥΤΕΟΝ ΤΑΣ

ΘΥΓΑΤΕΡΑΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΤΙΟΙΣ.

Λόγου δέ ποτέ τινος ἐμπεσόντος, εἰ τὴν αὐτὴν παιδείαν παιδεύ-
 35 τέον τοὺς υἱέας καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας, ἵππους μὲν, ἔφη, καὶ κύνας ὁμοῦ

who has studied philosophy than one who has not; and she will not therefore submit to anything shameful because of fear of death or unwillingness to face hardship, and she will not be intimidated by anyone because he is of noble birth, or powerful, or wealthy, no, not even if he be the tyrant of her city. For in fact she has schooled herself to be high-minded and to think of death not as an evil and life not as a good, and likewise not to shun hardship and never for a moment to seek ease and indolence. So it is that such a woman is likely to be energetic, strong to endure pain, prepared to nourish her children at her own breast, and to serve her husband with her own hands, and willing to do things which some would consider no better than slaves' work. Would not such a woman be a great help to the man who married her, an ornament to her relatives, and a good example for all who know her? Yes, but I assure you, some will say, that women who associate with philosophers are bound to be arrogant for the most part and presumptuous, in that abandoning their own households and turning to the company of men they practice speeches, talk like sophists, and analyze syllogisms, when they ought to be sitting at home spinning. I should not expect the women who study philosophy to shirk their appointed tasks for mere talk any more than men, but I maintain that their discussions should be conducted for the sake of their practical application. For as there is no merit in the science of medicine unless it conduces to the healing of man's body, so if a philosopher has or teaches reason, it is of no use if it does not contribute to the virtue of man's soul. Above all, we ought to examine the doctrine which we think women who study philosophy ought to follow; we ought to see if the study which presents modesty as the greatest good can make them presumptuous, if the study which is a guide to the greatest self-restraint accustoms them to live heedlessly, if what sets forth intemperance as the greatest evil does not teach self-control, if what represents the management of a household as a virtue does not impel them to manage well their homes. Finally, the teachings of philosophy exhort the woman to be content with her lot and to work with her own hands.

IV

SHOULD DAUGHTERS RECEIVE THE SAME EDUCATION AS SONS?

Once when the question arose as to whether or not sons and daughters ought to be given the same education, he remarked

- οὐδὲν διαφερόντως παιδεύουσιν οἱ τε ἵππικοὶ καὶ οἱ κυνηγετικοὶ τοὺς ἄρρενας τῶν θηλειῶν· ἀλλ' αἱ τε κύνες αἱ θήλειαι παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄρρεσι διδάσκονται θηρᾶν· ἵππους τε θηλείας ἄν τις θέλῃ τὰ ἵππων ἔργα ἀποτελεῖν καλῶς, οὐ διάφορον τῶν ἄρρένων διδασκαλίαν διδασκομένας ἰδεῖν ἔστιν· ἀνθρώπους δὲ τοὺς ἄρρενας ἐξαίρετόν τι ἄρα δεήσει ἔχειν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ καὶ τροφῇ παρὰ τὰς θηλείας, ὥσπερ οὐχὶ τὰς αὐτὰς παραγίνεσθαι δέον ἀρετὰς ἀμφοῖν ὁμοίως ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικί, ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀρετὰς μὴ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν παιδευμάτων ἀλλὰ δι' ἐτέρων οἷόν τε ὅν ἐλθεῖν. ὅτι δὲ οὐκ
- 10 ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ ἀνδρός, ἄλλαι δὲ γυναικός, ῥάδιον μαθεῖν. αὐτίκα, φρονεῖν δεῖ μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα, δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα· ἢ τί ὄφελος εἴη ἂν ἄφρονος ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικός; εἴτα <δεῖ> δικαίως βιοῦν οὐδέτερον ἥττον θατέρου· ἀλλ' ὁ τε ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολίτης ἀγαθὸς ἄδικος ὢν, ἢ τε γυνὴ οὐκ ἂν οἰκονομοίῃ χρηστῶς, εἰ μὴ δικαίως·
- 15 ἀλλ' ἄδικος οὖσα περὶ αὐτὸν ἀδικήσει τὸν ἄνδρα, ὥσπερ τὴν Ἐριφύλην φασί. σωφρονεῖν μὲν αὖ καλὸν τὴν γυναῖκα, καλὸν δ' ὁμοίως καὶ τὸν ἄνδρα· τὸ γοῦν μοιχεύειν τῷ μοιχεύεσθαι ἐπ' ἴσης κολάζουσιν οἱ νόμοι. καὶ λιχνεῖαι καὶ οἰνοφλυγίαι καὶ ἄλλα παραπλήσια κακά, ἀκολαστήματα ὄντα καὶ καταισχύνοντα μεγάλως τοὺς ἐνεχομένους αὐτοῖς, ἀποφαίνει τὴν σωφροσύνην ἀναγκαιοτάτην οὖσαν ἀνθρώπῳ παντί, τῷ τε θήλει καὶ τῷ ἄρρενι· διὰ γὰρ σωφροσύνης μόνης ἐκφεύγομεν ἀκολασίαν, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς. τὴν ἀνδρείαν φαίη τις ἂν ἴσως μόνοις προσήκειν τοῖς ἀνδράσιν. ἔχει δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ταύτη. δεῖ γὰρ ἀνδρίζεσθαι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα
- 25 <καὶ> καθαρεύειν δειλίας τὴν γε ἀρίστην, ὥς μήθ' ὑπὸ πόνου μήθ' ὑπὸ φόβου κάμπτεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς ἔτι σωφρονήσῃ, ἔάν τις ἢ φοβῶν ἢ προσάγων πόνους βιάσασθαι δύνηται αὐτὴν ὑπομείναι <τι> τῶν αἰσχυρῶν; δεῖ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀμυντικῶς ἔχειν τὰς γυναῖκας, εἰ μὴ νῆ Δία φαίνεσθαι μέλλουσι κακίους ἀλεκτορίδων
- 30 καὶ ἄλλων ὀρνίθων θηλειῶν, αἱ πολὺ μείζουσι ζώοις ἐαντῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν νεοττῶν διαμάχονται. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἀνδρείας αἱ γυναῖκες δέοιντο; ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀλκῆς τῆς δι' ὅπλων μέτεστιν αὐταῖς, ἐδήλωσε τὸ Ἀμαζόνων γένος ἔθνη πολλὰ δι' ὅπλων καταστρεφάμενον· ὥστ' εἴ τι ἐνδεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναῖξιν, ἀνασκησῖα μᾶλλον
- 35 ἢ τὸ μὴ πεφυκέναι <πρὸς ἀνδρείαν αἰτία ἂν εἴη. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι πέφυκεν>

35 πρὸς ἀνδρείαν αἰτία ἂν εἴη, εἰ μὲν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι πέφυκεν coniecit Wachsmuth

16 The story of Eriphyle, who betrayed her husband Amphiaras for the sake of a necklace, was commonly cited by the Stoic-Cynic philosophers as the supreme example of treachery. Cf. Epictetus *Disc.* II, 22, 32 f.
22 The Greek word for courage (*ἀνδρεία*) means manliness. Apparently Musonius' attempt to justify its appropriate application to women is not

that trainers of horses and dogs make no distinction in the training of the male and the female; for female dogs are taught to hunt just as the males are, and one can see no difference in the training of mares, if they are expected to do a horse's work, and the training of stallions. In the case of man, however, it would seem to be felt necessary to employ some special and exceptional training and education for males over females, as if it were not essential that the same virtues should be present in both alike, in man and woman, or as if it were possible to arrive at the same virtues, not through the same, but through different instruction. And yet that there is not one set of virtues for a man and another for a woman is easy to perceive. In the first place, a man must have understanding and so must a woman, or what pray would be the use of a foolish man or woman? Then it is essential for one no less than the other to live justly, since the man who is not just would not be a good citizen, and the woman would not manage her household well if she did not do it justly; but if she is unjust she will wrong her husband like Eriphyle in the story. Again, it is recognized as right for a woman in wedlock to be chaste, and so is it likewise for a man; the law, at all events, decrees the same punishment for committing adultery as for being taken in adultery. Gluttony, drunkenness, and other related vices, which are vices of excess and bring disgrace upon those guilty of them, show that self-control is most necessary for every human being, male and female alike; for the only way of escape from wantonness is through self-control; there is no other. Perhaps someone may say that courage is a virtue appropriate to men only. That is not so. For a woman too of the right sort must have courage and be wholly free of cowardice, so that she will neither be swayed by hardships nor by fear; otherwise, how will she be said to have self-control, if by threat or force she can be constrained to yield to shame? Nay more, it is necessary for women to be able to repel attack, unless indeed they are willing to appear more cowardly than hens and other female birds which fight with creatures much larger than themselves to defend their young. How then should women not need courage? That women have some prowess in arms the race of the Amazons demonstrated when they defeated many tribes in war. If, therefore, something of this courage is lacking in other women, it is due to lack of use and practice rather than because they were not

mere rhetoric, for Plutarch in his long treatise on the *Bravery of Women* (*Moralia* III, pp. 474-580 *ed.* Babbitt) 242E consistently avoids using the word, and is obliged to use the general word for virtue (*ἀρετή*).

33 He may have in mind a passage from Plato, *De Leg.* VII, 804D.

- αὐτὰς εἶναι πέφυκεν> ἀρετὰς ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τροφήν καὶ παιδείαν τὴν αὐτὴν προσήκειν ἀμφοῖν. παντὶ γὰρ δὴ ζῳῷ καὶ φυτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τὴν προσαγομένην ὀρθῶς ἐμποιεῖν χρή τὴν ἐκείνῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν. ἢ εἰ μὲν ἔδει αὐλεῖν δύνασθαι
- 5 παραπλησίως ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα, καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' ἑκατέρῳ αὐτοῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἦν πρὸς τὸν βίον, ἀμφοτέρους ἂν ἐπ' ἴσον τὴν αὐλητικὴν τέχνην ἐξειδιάσκομεν, καὶ εἰ καθαρίζειν ἔδει ἑκάτερον ἀμφοτέρους δὲ εἰ δεῖ γενέσθαι ἀγαθοὺς τὴν ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν καὶ φρονεῖν ὁμοίως δύνασθαι καὶ σωφρονεῖν καὶ ἀνδρείας μετέχειν
- 10 καὶ δικαιοσύνης μηδὲν ἥττον θατέρου θάτερον, οὐκ ἄρ' ὁμοίως ἑκάτερον παιδεύσομεν οὐδὲ τὴν τέχνην, ἀφ' ἧς γένοιτ' ἂν ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθός, ἐπ' ἴσον ἀμφοτέρους διδάξομεν; ἀλλὰ χρή οὕτω ποιεῖν καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρως. τί οὖν; καὶ ταλασίαν' φησί τις ἴσως ἁξιοῖς σὺ παραπλησίως ἐκμανθάνειν ταῖς γυναιξίν τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ
- 15 γυμναστικὴν μετέρχεσθαι τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ὁμοίως τὰς γυναῖκας; τοῦτο μὲν οὐκέτι ἀξιόσω ἐγώ· φημὶ δὲ ὅτι οὕσης ἐν τῷ γένει <τῷ> ἀνθρώπινῳ τῆς μὲν ἰσχυροτέρας φύσεως τῆς τῶν ἀρρένων, τῆς δ' ἀσθενεστερας τῆς τῶν θηλειῶν, ἑκατέρᾳ φύσει τῶν ἔργων ἀπονεμητέον τὰ προσφορώτατα, καὶ τὰ μὲν βαρύτερα τοῖς ἰσχυροτέροις
- 20 ἀποδοτέον, τὰ δὲ ἐλαφρότερα τοῖς ἀσθενεστεροῖς· διὰ τοῦτο ταλασία μὲν ταῖς γυναιξὶ μᾶλλον πρέποι ἂν ἢ περ ἀνδράσιν, ὥσπερ <καὶ> οἰκουρία· γυμναστικὴ δὲ ἀνδράσι μᾶλλον ἢ γυναιξίν, ὥσπερ καὶ θυραυλία· ἐνίοτε μέντοι καὶ ἄνδρες τινὲς τῶν ἐλαφροτέρων ἔργων ἔνια καὶ δοκούντων γυναικείων μεταχειρίζονται ἂν εἰκότως, καὶ
- 25 γυναῖκες αὖ τῶν σκληροτέρων καὶ δοκούντων μᾶλλον προσήκειν ἀνδράσιν ἐργάζασθαι ἂν, ὅταν ἢ τὰ τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ὑφηγῇται ἢ τὰ τῆς χρείας ἢ τὰ τοῦ καιροῦ. πάντα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως ἐν κοινῷ κεῖται τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἔργα καὶ ἔστι κοινὰ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀποτακτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῷ ἑτέρῳ· ἔνια δὲ δι' ἐπιτηδειότερα
- 30 τὰ μὲν τῇδε τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ τῇδε δι' ὃ τὰ μὲν ἀνδρεία καλεῖται, τὰ δὲ γυναικεῖα· ὅσα μέντοι τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει εἰς ἀρετὴν, ταῦτα φαίη τις ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐπ' ἴσον ἑκατέρᾳ προσήκειν φύσει, εἴ γε καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς προσήκειν φάμεν οὐδὲν τοῖς ἑτέροις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἑτέροις. ὅθεν εἰκότως οἶμαι καὶ παιδευτέον ὅσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν
- 35 παραπλησίως τό τε θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ ἀρξαμένους ἀπὸ νηπίων εὐθὺς διδασκτέον, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο δὲ κακὸν καὶ ταῦτόν ἀμφοῖν, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὠφέλιμον, τοῦτο δὲ βλαβερόν, καὶ τότε μὲν

endowed with it. If then men and women are born with the same virtues, the same type of training and education must, of necessity, befit both men and women. For with every animal and plant whatsoever, proper care must be bestowed upon it to produce the excellence appropriate to it. Is it not true that, if it were necessary under like circumstances for a man and a woman to be able to play the flute, and if, furthermore, both had to do so in order to earn a living, we should give them both exactly the same thorough training in flute playing; and similarly if it were necessary for either to play the harp? Well then, if it is necessary for both to be proficient in the virtue which is appropriate to a human being, that is for both to be able to have understanding, and self-control, and courage, and justice, the one no less than the other, shall we not teach them both alike the art by which a human being becomes good? Yes, certainly we must do that and nothing else. "Come now," I suppose someone will say, "do you expect that men should learn spinning the same as women, and that women should take part in gymnastic exercises the same as men?" No, that I should not demand. But I do say that, since in the human race man's constitution is stronger and woman's weaker, tasks should be assigned which are suited to the nature of each; that is the heavier tasks should be given to the stronger and lighter ones to the weaker. Thus spinning and indoor work would be more fitting for women than for men, while gymnastics and outdoor work would be more suitable for men. Occasionally, however, some men might more fittingly handle certain of the lighter tasks and what is generally considered women's work, and again, women might do heavier tasks which seem more appropriate for men whenever conditions of strength, need, or circumstance warranted. For all human tasks, I am inclined to believe, are a common obligation and are common for men and women, and none is necessarily appointed for either one exclusively, but some pursuits are more suited to the nature of one, some to the other, and for this reason some are called men's work and some women's. But whatever things have reference to virtue, these one would properly say are equally appropriate to the nature of both, inasmuch as we agree that virtues are in no respect more fitting for the one than the other. Hence I hold it reasonable that the things which have reference to virtue ought to be taught to male and female alike; and furthermore that straight from infancy they ought to be taught that this is right and that is wrong, and that it is the same for both alike; that this is helpful, that is harmful, that one must do this, one must not do that. From this training understanding

- πρακτέον, τόδε δὲ οὐ· ἐξ ὧν περιγίνεται φρόνησις τοῖς μαθη-
 νουσιν ὁμοίως κόραις καὶ κόροις, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφορώτερον τοῖς
 ἑτέροις· εἴτα δὲ ἐμποιητέον αἰδῶ πρὸς ἅπαν αἰσχρόν· ὧν ἐγγενομέ-
 νων ἀνάγκη σώφρονας εἶναι καὶ ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα. καὶ μὴν τὸν
 5 παιδευόμενον ὀρθῶς, ὅστις ἂν ᾗ, εἴτε ἄρρην εἴτε θήλειαν, ἐπιστέον
 μὲν ἀνέχεσθαι πόνου, ἐπιστέον δὲ μὴ φοβείσθαι θάνατον, ἐπιστέον
 δὲ μὴ ταπεινούσθαι πρὸς συμφορὰν μηδεμίαν· δι' ὅσων ἂν τις
 εἴη ἀνδρείος. ἀνδρείας δὲ μικρῷ πρότερον ἐδείχθη δεῖν μετεῖναι
 καὶ γυναιξίν. ἔτι τοῖνυν πλεονεξίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἰσότητά δὲ τιμᾶν,
 10 καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν μὲν θέλειν, κακοποιεῖν δὲ μὴ θέλειν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα
 ἀνθρώπους, ἔστι μὲν δίδαγμα κάλλιστον καὶ δικαίους ἐπιτελεῖ τοὺς
 μαθητὰς· τί δὲ μᾶλλον ἄνδρα μεμαθηκέναι χρή ταῦτα; εἰ γὰρ
 νῆ Δία πρέπει δικαίως εἶναι γυναῖκας, καὶ ταῦτα δεῖ μεμαθηκέναι
 ἅμφω τά γε κυριώτατα καὶ μέγιστα. εἰ γὰρ τί που καὶ μικρὸν ὁ
 15 μὲν εἴσεται, ἡ δὲ οὐ, ἡ ἀνάπαλιν ἡ μὲν εἴσεται, ὁ δὲ οὐ, τεχνίτου
 τινὸς ἐχόμενον, οὐπω τοῦτο διάφορον ἀποφαίνει τὴν ἐκατέρου
 παιδείαν· μόνον περὶ μηδενὸς τῶν μεγίστων ἕτερος ἕτερα μεμαθη-
 κέτω, ἀλλὰ ταῦτά. ἂν δέ τις ἐρωτᾷ με, τίς ἐπιστήμη τῆς παιδείας
 ταύτης ἐπιστατεῖ, λέξω πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι φιλοσοφίας ἄνευ ὥσπερ
 20 ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἂν οὐδέις, οὕτως οὐδ' ἂν γυνὴ παιδευθεῖ ὀρθῶς. καὶ οὐ
 τοῦτο βούλομαι λέγειν, ὅτι τρανότητά περὶ λόγους καὶ δεινότητά
 τινα περιττὴν χρή προσεῖναι ταῖς γυναιξίν, εἴπερ φιλοσοφῆσουσιν
 ὥς γυναῖκες· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐγὼ πάνν τι τοῦτο ἐπαινῶ·
 ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡθους χρηστότητα καὶ καλοκάγαθειαν τρόπον κτητέον ταῖς
 25 γυναιξίν· ἐπειδὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία καλοκάγαθίας ἐστὶν ἐπιτηδευσις
 καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον.

V.

ΛΤΚΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΩΝ

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ ΠΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΙΣΧΥΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΕΘΟΣ

30

Η ΛΟΓΟΣ.

Αὐθις ἐνέπεσεν ἡμῖν ζήτησις πότερον ἀνυσιμώτερον πρὸς
 κτήσιν ἀρετῆς ἔθος ἢ λόγος, εἰ ὁ μὲν λόγος διδάσκει ὀρθῶς τί εἴη

32 λόγος <εἴη> Hense

27 The name of the editor, Lucius, appears in the title of this treatise alone. Cf. Introduction note 15.

is developed in those who learn, boys and girls alike, with no difference. Then they must be inspired with a feeling of shame toward all that is base. When these two qualities have been created within them, man and woman are of necessity self-controlled. And most of all the child who is trained properly, whether boy or girl, must be accustomed to endure hardship, not to fear death, not to be disheartened in the face of any misfortune; he must in short be accustomed to every situation which calls for courage. Now courage, it was demonstrated above, should be present in women too. Furthermore to shun selfishness and to have high regard for fairness and, being a human being, to wish to help and to be unwilling to harm one's fellow men is the noblest lesson, and it makes those who learn it just. What reason is there why it is more appropriate for a man to learn this? Certainly if it is fitting for women to be just, it is necessary for both to learn the same lessons which are in the highest degree appropriate to the character of each and supremely important. If it happens that a man knows a little something about a certain skill and a woman not, or again she knows something and he not, that suggests no difference in the education of either. But about the all-important things let not one know and the other not, but let them know the same things. If you ask me what doctrine produces such an education, I shall reply that as without philosophy no man would be properly educated, so no woman would be. I do not mean that women should possess technical skill and acuteness in argument. It would be quite superfluous, since they will use philosophy for the ends of their life as women. Even in men I do not prize this accomplishment too highly. I only urge that they should acquire from philosophy goodness in conduct and nobility of character. Now in very truth philosophy is training in nobility of character and nothing else.

V

WHICH IS MORE EFFECTIVE, THEORY OR PRACTICE?

At another time the problem arose among us whether for the acquisition of virtue practice or theory is more effective, under-

32 The word *êthos* which has been translated 'practice' is puzzling. Musonius seems to have in mind some practical school exercise as contrasted with pure theory (*lógos*); for conduct in daily life he generally uses *praxis*.

- ποιητέον, τὸ δὲ ἔθος γίνουτο κατὰ τοιοῦτον λόγον πράττειν ἐθιζομένων. τῷ δὲ Μουσωνίῳ τὸ ἔθος ἐδόκει εἶναι ἀνυσιμώτερον, καὶ συνηγορῶν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ δόξῃ ἤρετο τῶν παρόντων τινα οὕτως· Δυοῖν ὄντιναι ἱατροῖν, τοῦ μὲν ἱκανοῦ λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱατρικῶν ὡς
- 5 ὅτι ἐμπειρότατα, περὶ δὲ θεραπείαν τῶν καμνόντων μηδὲν τετριμμένου, τοῦ δ' εἰπεῖν μὲν ἀδυνάτου, θεραπεύειν δ' εἰθισμένου κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἱατρικόν, πότερον, ἔφη, μᾶλλον ἔλοιο ἂν παρεῖναι σοι νοσοῦντι; Ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο, <ὅτι> τὸν θεραπεύειν εἰθισμένον. Καὶ ὁ Μουσώνιος· Τί δέ; δυοῖν ἀνδρῶν τοῦ μὲν πεπλευκότος
- 10 πολλάκις καὶ κυβερνήσαντος ἤδη πλοῖα ἱκανά, τοῦ δὲ ὀλιγάκις μὲν πεπλευκότος, κυβερνήσαντος δὲ μηδέποτε· ἐὰν οὗτος ὁ μὴ κυβερνήσας ἱκανώτατα λέγῃ ὃν τρόπον χρὴ κυβερνᾶν, ὁ δ' ἕτερος ἐνδεῶς καὶ παντάπασιν ἀσθενῶς, ποτέρῳ ἂν πλέων χρήσαιο κυβερνήτῃ; Καὶ ὡς εἶπεν, ὅτι τῷ κυβερνήσαντι πολλάκις. Πάλιν
- 15 ὁ Μουσώνιος· Μουσικοῖν δὲ δυοῖν, τοῦ μὲν τοὺς λόγους ἐπισταμένου τοὺς μουσικοὺς καὶ λέγοντος αὐτοὺς πιθανώτατα, ἄδειν δὲ ἢ κιθαρίζειν ἢ λυρίζειν ἀδυνατοῦντος, τοῦ δὲ περὶ μὲν τοὺς λόγους ὄντος ἡττονος, κιθαρίζοντος δὲ καλῶς καὶ λυρίζοντος, ἔτι δὲ ἄδοντος· ποτέρῳ ἂν ἐπιτρέψαις ἔργον μουσικόν, ἢ πότερον ἂν
- 20 ἐθέλοις γενέσθαι διδάσκαλον τῶν μουσικῶν παιδὸς οὐκ εἰδότος; Ὁ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι τὸν ἐκ τοῖς <ἔργοις> ἱκανόν. Τί οὖν; εἶπεν ὁ Μουσώνιος, ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ ἔχει· περὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης ἢ ἐγκρατείας τοῦ ἂ χρὴ δύνασθαι λέγειν οὐ πολὺ κρεῖττον τὸ ἐγκρατῇ γενέσθαι καὶ σώφρονα περὶ τὰ πραττόμενα πάντα; Συνεχώρει
- 25 κἀνταῦθα ὁ νεανίσκος, ἥττον καὶ φαυλότερον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἔργῳ τὸ λέγειν περὶ σωφροσύνης ἱκανῶς. Ὅθεν ὁ Μουσώνιος συνάπτων τοῖς προειρημένους, πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ἔφη, τὸ τὸν ἐκάστου λόγον ἐπίστασθαι πράγματος κρεῖττον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐθίζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τοῦ λόγου;
- 30 ἐπεὶπερ τὸ μὲν ἔθος πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πράττειν ἄγει, τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι λόγον τοῦ πράγματος πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι λέγειν. συνεργεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῇ πράξει ὁ λόγος διδάσκων ὅπως πρακτέον

21 Unless one bears in mind the background against which they are told, these examples seem altogether too simple and obvious to be worthy of Musonius. Apparently he has developed the thesis that theory is more effective than practice to combat the influence of the older sophists who professed to talk better on any subject than the experts in that field. Cicero (*De Oratore* II, 75) illustrates the pretentious claims of the sophists by his story of the philosopher Phormio. The presumptuous fellow had the temerity to give a discourse on military strategy, though he had never even seen an army or a camp, before the exiled Hannibal

standing that theory teaches what is right conduct, while practice represents the habit of those accustomed to act in accordance with such theory. To Musonius, practice seemed to be more effective, and speaking in support of his opinion, he asked one of those present the following question: "Suppose that there are two physicians, one able to discourse very brilliantly about the art of medicine but having no experience in taking care of the sick, and the other quite incapable of speaking but experienced in treating his patients according to correct medical theory. Which one," he asked, "would you choose to attend you if you were ill?" He replied that he would choose the doctor who had experience in healing. Musonius then continued, "Well, then, let us take another example of two men. One has sailed a great deal and served as pilot on many boats, the other one has sailed very little and has never acted as pilot. If the one who had never piloted a ship should speak most ably on the methods of navigation, and the other very poorly and ineffectively, which one would you employ as pilot if you were going on a voyage?" The man said he would take the experienced pilot. Again Musonius said, "Take the case of two musicians. One knows the theory of music and discourses on it most convincingly but is unable to sing or play the harp or the lyre; the other is inferior in theory but is proficient in playing the harp and the lyre and in singing as well. To which one would you give a position as musician, or which one would you like to have as teacher for a child who does not know music?" The man answered that he would choose the one who was skilled in practice. "Well, then," said Musonius, "that being the case, in the matter of temperance and self-control, is it not much better to be self-controlled and temperate in all one's actions than to be able to say what one ought to do?" Here too the young man agreed that it is of less significance and importance to speak well about self-control than to practice self-control. Thereupon Musonius, drawing together what had been said, asked, "How, now, in view of these conclusions, could knowledge of the theory of anything be better than becoming accustomed to act according to the principles of the theory, if we understand that application enables one to act, but theory makes one capable of speaking about it? Theory which teaches how one should act is related to application, and comes first, since it is not possible to do anything really well unless its practical execution be in

in Ephesus. The rest of the audience was thoroughly delighted, but Hannibal remarked that he had seen a good many crazy people in his life, but never any one crazier than Phormio.

καὶ ἔστι τῇ τάξει πρότερος τοῦ ἔθους· οὐ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναί τι καλὸν οἶόν τε μὴ κατὰ λόγον ἐθιζόμενον· δυνάμει μέντοι τὸ ἔθος προτερεῖ τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι ἔστι κυριώτερον ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἄγειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ περὶ ὁ λόγος.

VI.

5

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΣΚΗΣΕΩΣ.

Παρόρμα δὲ πρὸς ἄσκησιν τοὺς συνόντας ἐντεταμένως αἰ τοιοῖσδέ τισι λόγοις χρώμενος. Ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἔφη, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν οὐ θεωρητικὴ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρακτικὴ καθάπερ ἡ τε ἰατρικὴ καὶ
 10 ἡ μουσικὴ. δεῖ οὖν ὥσπερ τὸν ἱατρὸν καὶ τὸν μουσικὸν μὴ μόνον ἀνειληφέναι τὰ θεωρήματα τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάτερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ γεγυμνάσθαι πράττειν κατὰ τὰ θεωρήματα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα μὴ μόνον ἐκμανθάνειν ὅσα μαθήματα φέρει πρὸς
 15 ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυμνάζεσθαι κατὰ ταῦτα φιλοτίμως καὶ φιλοπόνως. ἐπεὶ πῶς μὲν ἂν εὐθὺς γένοιτό τις σώφρων, εἰ μόνον εἰδέη ὅτι οὐ χρὴ ἡττᾶσθαι ἡδονῶν, ἀγύμναστος δ' εἴη ἀντέχειν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς; πῶς δ' ἂν δίκαιός τις γένοιτο, μεμαθηκὼς μὲν ὅτι χρὴ τὸ ἴσον ἀγαπᾶν, μὴ μεμελετηκὼς δὲ φεύγειν τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν; πῶς δ' ἂν ἀνδρείαν κτησαίμεθα, τὸ μὲν ὅτι μὴ φοβερά τὰ δοκούντα τοῖς
 20 πολλοῖς δεινὰ καταανοηκότες, ἄφοβοι δ' εἶναι εἰς αὐτὰ μὴ μεμελετηκότες; πῶς δ' ἂν φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα, τὰ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακὰ τίνα ἐστὶν ἐγνωκότες, μὴ γεγυμνασμένοι δὲ καταφρονεῖν τῶν δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν; διὸ χρὴ τῇ μαθήσει τῶν προσηκόντων ἀρετῇ ἐκάστη μαθημάτων καὶ τὴν ἄσκησιν ἐπακολουθεῖν πάντως,
 25 εἴ γε μέλλει καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς μαθήσεως ὄφελός τι γενήσεσθαι ἡμῖν. καὶ τοσούτῳ γε χρὴ μᾶλλον ἀσκεῖν τὸν φιλοσοφεῖν ἀξιούντα ἢ περ τὸν ἱατρικῆς ἢ τινος τέχνης ὁμοίας ἐφιέμενον, ὅσῳ μείζον καὶ δυσκατεργαστότερον φιλοσοφία παντὸς ἐπιτηδεύματος ἐτέρου. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας † εἶναι οἱ ἐφιέμενοι αὐτῶν, οὐ
 30 προδιεφθαρμένοι τὰς ψυχὰς οὐδ' ἐναντία μεμαθηκότες οἷς μαθήσεσθαι μέλλουσιν· οἱ δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπιχειροῦντες, ἐν διαφθορᾷ γεγεννημένοι πρότερον πολλῇ καὶ ἐμπεπλησμένοι κακίας, οὕτω

8 Musonius here identifies himself with the philosophers who, following the example of Plato, believe that virtue can be taught.

harmony with theory. In effectiveness, however, practice takes precedence over theory as being more influential in leading men to action."

VI

ON TRAINING

He was always earnestly urging those who were associated with him to make practical application of his teachings, using some such arguments as the following. Virtue, he said, is not simply theoretical knowledge, but it is practical application as well, just like the arts of medicine and music. Therefore, as the physician and the musician not only must master the theoretical side of their respective arts but must also train themselves to act according to their principles, so a man who wishes to become good not only must be thoroughly familiar with the precepts which are conducive to virtue but must also be earnest and zealous in applying these principles. How, indeed, could a person immediately become temperate if he only knew that one must not be overcome by pleasures, but was quite unpracticed in withstanding pleasures? How could one become just when he had learned that one must love fairness but had never exercised himself in avoidance of selfishness and greed? How could we acquire courage if we had merely learned that the things which seem dreadful to the average person are not to be feared, but had no experience in showing courage in the face of such things? How could we become prudent if we had come to recognize what things are truly good and what evil, but had never had practice in despising things which only seem good? Therefore upon the learning of the lessons appropriate to each and every excellence, practical training must follow invariably, if indeed from the lessons we have learned we hope to derive any benefit. And moreover such practical exercise is the more important for the student of philosophy than for the student of medicine or any similar art, the more philosophy claims to be a greater and more difficult discipline than any other study. The reason for this is that men who enter the other professions have not had their souls corrupted beforehand and have not learned the opposite of what they are going to be taught, but the ones who start out to study philosophy have been born and reared in an environment filled with corruption and evil, and therefore turn to virtue in such a state that they need a longer and more thorough training. How, then, and in what manner should they receive such training? Since it so happens that the human being is not soul alone, nor

- μετίασι τὴν ἀρετὴν, ὥστε καὶ ταύτῃ πλείονος δεηθῆναι τῆς ἀσκήσεως. πῶς οὖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον τούτοις ἀσκητέον; ἐπεὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὔτε ψυχὴν μόνον εἶναι συμβέβηκεν οὔτε σῶμα μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι σύνθετον ἐκ τοῖν δυοῖν τούτων, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀσκούντα
- 5 ἀμφοῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, τοῦ μὲν κρείττονος μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ ἄξιον, τουτέστι τῆς ψυχῆς· καὶ θατέρου δέ, εἴ γε μέλλει μηδὲν ἐνδεῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου μέρος. δεῖ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα παρεσκευάσθαι καλῶς πρὸς τὰ σώματος ἔργα τὸ τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος, ὅτι πολλάκις αἱ ἀρεταὶ καταχρῶνται τούτῳ ὄντι ὀργάνῳ ἀναγκαίῳ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ
- 10 βίου πράξεις. τῆς οὖν ἀσκήσεως ἡ μὲν τις ἰδία τῆς ψυχῆς μόνης γίνοιτ' ἂν ὀρθῶς, ἡ δέ τις κοινὴ ταύτης τε καὶ τοῦ σώματος. κοινὴ μὲν οὖν ἀσκησις ἀμφοῖν γενήσεται, συνεπιζομένων ἡμῶν ῥίγει, θάλλει, δίψει, λιμῶ, τροφῆς λιτότητι, κοίτης σκληρότητι, ἀποχῇ τῶν ἡδέων, ὑπομονῇ τῶν ἐπιπόνων. διὰ γὰρ τούτων καὶ τῶν
- 15 τοιούτων ῥώννυται μὲν τὸ σῶμα καὶ γίνεται δυσπαθές τε καὶ στερεὸν καὶ χρήσιμον πρὸς ἅπαν ἔργον, ῥώννυται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ γυμναζομένη διὰ μὲν τῆς ὑπομονῆς τῶν ἐπιπόνων πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, διὰ δὲ τῆς ἀποχῆς τῶν ἡδέων πρὸς σωφροσύνην. ἰδία δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσκησίς ἐστι πρῶτον μὲν τὰς ἀποδείξεις προχείρους ποιεῖσθαι τὰς τε περὶ
- 20 τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν δοκούντων ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὰ, καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν κακῶν τῶν δοκούντων ὡς οὐ κακά, καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὰ γνωρίζειν τε καὶ διακρίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀληθῶς ἐθίζεσθαι. εἰτα δὲ μελετᾶν μήτε φεύγειν μηδὲν τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν μήτε διώκειν μηδὲν τῶν δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῶς κακὰ πάσῃ μηχανῇ
- 25 ἐκτρέπεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ μετέρχεσθαι.
- Ἐν κεφαλῇ μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν εἴρηται, ὁποῖος ἐκάτερος τρόπος ἀσκήσεως· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ μέρος ὡς ποιητέον ἕκαστα, πειράσομαι εἰπεῖν, οὐ διακρίνων οὐδὲ χωρίζων οὐκέτι τὰ τε κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀσκήματα καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ
- 30 ἀναμιξ τὰ ἐκατέρου μέρους διεξιὼν. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα μὲν τυγχάνομεν ἀκηκοότες τε καὶ ὑπειληφότες, ὅσοι γε φιλοσόφου διατριβῆς μετεσχέκαμεν, ὡς οὔτε πόνος οὔτε θάνατος οὔτε πενία κακὸν οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἄλλο τι τῶν κακίας ἀπηλλαγμένων, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ἀγαθὸν πλοῦτος, ζωὴ, ἡδονή, ἥ τι ἕτερον τῶν μὴ μετεχόντων
- 35 ἀρετῆς· ὅμως δὲ καὶ ταῦθ' ὑπειληφότες διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ παίδων εὐθύς γεγρονῦιαν ἡμῖν διαφθορὰν καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῆς διαφθορᾶς συνήθειαν ποιηρὰν πόνου μὲν προσερχομένου κακὸν ἡγούμεθα προσέρχεσθαι

4-18 Unlike his pupil Epictetus, who showed contempt for the body, Musonius emphasizes the interdependence of soul and body. This view,

body alone, but a kind of synthesis of the two, the person in training must take care of both, the better part, the soul, more zealously, as is fitting, but also of the other, if he shall not be found lacking in any part that constitutes man. For obviously the philosopher's body should be well prepared for physical activity, because often the virtues make use of this as a necessary instrument for the affairs of life. Now there are two kinds of training, one which is appropriate for the soul alone, and the other which is common to both soul and body. We use the training common to both when we discipline ourselves to cold, heat, thirst, hunger, meagre rations, hard beds, avoidance of pleasures, and patience under suffering. For by these things and others like them the body is strengthened and becomes capable of enduring hardship, sturdy and ready for any task; the soul too is strengthened since it is trained for courage by patience under hardship and for self-control by abstinence from pleasures. Training which is peculiar to the soul consists first of all in seeing that the proofs pertaining to apparent goods as not being real goods are always ready at hand and likewise those pertaining to apparent evils as not being real evils, and in learning to recognize the things which are truly good and in becoming accustomed to distinguish them from what are not truly good. In the next place it consists of practice in not avoiding any of the things which only seem evil, and in not pursuing any of the things which only seem good; in shunning by every means those which are truly evil and in pursuing by every means those which are truly good.

In summary, then, I have tried to tell what the nature of each type of training is. I shall not, however, endeavor to discuss how the training should be carried out in detail, by analyzing and distinguishing what is appropriate for the soul and the body in common and what is appropriate for the soul alone, but by presenting without fixed order what is proper for each. It is true that all of us who have participated in philosophic discussion have heard and apprehended that neither pain nor death nor poverty nor anything else which is free from wrong is an evil, and again that wealth, life, pleasure, or anything else which does not partake of virtue is not a good. And yet, in spite of understanding this, because of the depravity which has become implanted in us straight from childhood and because of evil habits engendered by this depravity, when hardship comes we think an evil has come upon us, and when pleasure comes our way we

wholly consistent with the true Stoic pantheism, is not alien to Neoplatonic thought.

5 *ἐαυτοῖς, ἡδονῆς δὲ παραγινομένης ἀγαθὸν ἡγούμεθα παραγίνεσθαι
 ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸν μὲν θάνατον ὡς ἐσχάτην συμφορὰν πεφρίκαμεν, τὴν
 δὲ ζωὴν ὡς τῶν ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον ἀσπαζόμεθα, καὶ διδόντες
 μὲν ἀργύριον ὡς βλαπτόμενοι λυπούμεθα, λαμβάνοντες δὲ ὡς
 10 ὠφελοῦμενοι χαίρομεν, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πλείονων ἄλλων
 οὐκ ἀκολουθῶς ταῖς ὁρθαῖς ὑπολήψεσι τοῖς πράγμασι χρώμεθα,
 τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ ἔθει μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦμεν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ταῦτα φημι
 ταύτῃ ἔχειν, δεῖ τὸν ἀσκοῦντα ζητεῖν περιγίγνεσθαι ἑαυτῷ τῇ
 15 μὲν ἡδονῇ μὴ ἀσμενίζειν, τὸν πόνον δὲ μὴ ἐκτρέπεσθαι, καὶ τῷ
 μὲν ζῆν μὴ φιληδεῖν, τὸν δὲ θάνατον μὴ δεδιέναι, καὶ ἐπὶ χρημάτων
 μὴ προτιμᾶν τοῦ προῖεσθαι τὸ λαμβάνειν.*

VII.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΟΤΙ ΠΟΝΟΤ ΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΤΕΟΝ.

15 *Πρὸς δὲ τὸ ῥᾶον καὶ προθυμότερον ὑφίστασθαι τῶν πόνων
 ἐκείνους, οὓς ἂν ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς καὶ καλοκάγαθίας μέλλωμεν πονεῖν,
 ταῦτα λελογίσθαι χρήσιμα· πόσα μὲν πονοῦσιν ἔνιοι δι' ἐπιθυμίας
 κακάς, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐρῶντες ἀκολάστως, πόσα δ' ὑπομένουσιν ἄλλοι
 τοῦ κερδαίνειν χάριν, πόσα δ' αὖτε κακοπαθοῦσιν ἔνιοι θηρώμενοι
 20 δόξαν, καὶ ὅτι οὗτοι πάντες ὑπομένουσιν αὐθαίρετοι πᾶσαν
 ταλαιπωρίαν. ἄρ' οὖν οὐχὶ δεινὸν ἐκείνους μὲν ὑπὲρ οὐδενὸς τῶν
 καλῶν ἀνέχεσθαι ταῦτα πάσχοντας, ἡμᾶς δ' ὑπὲρ καλοκάγαθίας
 καὶ τοῦ κακίαν μὲν ἐκφυγεῖν τὴν λυμαιομένην ἡμῶν τὸν βίον, κτή-
 σασθαι δὲ ἀρετὴν, ἣ τις ἀπάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶ χορηγός, μὴ
 25 πάντα πόνον ἐτοίμως ὑφίστασθαι; καίτοι οὐδ' ἂν εἴποι τις ὅσῳ
 κρεῖττον ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ πονεῖν ἵνα τύχῃ τις γυναικὸς ἄλλοτρίας, τὸ
 πονεῖν ἵνα παιδαγωγῇ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἑαυτοῦ· ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ
 περὶ χρημάτων ταλαιπωρεῖν τὸ ἀσκεῖν ὥστε ὀλίγων δεῖσθαι· πρὸ
 δὲ τοῦ πράγματα ἔχειν ὑπὲρ δόξης τὸ πραγματεύεσθαι ὅπως μὴ*

20 καὶ ὅτι codd. Wendland καίτοι Hense

18 Intemperate lovers furnish a great deal of the humor and suspense in the plays of the Greek New Comedy and in Plautus and Terence.

think that a good has befallen us; we dread death as the most extreme misfortune; we cling to life as the greatest blessing, and when we give away money we grieve as if we were injured, but upon receiving it we rejoice as if a benefit had been conferred. Similarly with the majority of other things, we do not meet circumstances in accordance with right principles, but rather we follow wretched habit. Since, then, I repeat, all this is the case, the person who is in training must strive to habituate himself not to love pleasure, not to avoid hardship, not to be infatuated with living, not to fear death, and in the case of goods or money not to place receiving above giving.

VII

THAT ONE SHOULD DISDAIN HARDSHIPS

In order to support more easily and more cheerfully those hardships which we may expect to suffer in behalf of virtue and goodness, it is useful to recall what hardships people will endure for unworthy ends. Thus for example consider what intemperate lovers undergo for the sake of evil desires, and how much exertion others expend for the sake of making profit, and how much suffering those who are pursuing fame endure, and bear in mind that all of these people submit to all kinds of toil and hardship voluntarily. Is it not then monstrous that they for no honorable reward endure such things, while we for the sake of the ideal good—that is not only the avoidance of evil such as wrecks our lives, but also the acquisition of virtue, which we may call the provider of all goods—are not ready to bear every hardship? And yet would not anyone admit how much better it is, in place of exerting oneself to win someone else's wife, to exert oneself to discipline one's desires; in place of enduring hardships for the sake of money, to train oneself to want little; instead of giving oneself trouble about getting notoriety, to give oneself trouble how not to thirst for notoriety; instead of trying to find a way to injure an envied person, to inquire how not to envy anyone;

They are a target for the satirist. Cf. Horace, *Sat.* II, 3, 259-267; Persius *Sat.* V, 161-175; Epictetus, *Disc.* IV, 1, 19-20.

19 Horace develops this theme in his first satire.

22 That there *are* some persons of noble nature who do willingly endure hardships to gain moral excellence is testified by Dio Chrysostom. Cf. *Orationes* VIII, 15.

δοξοκόπος ἦ· πρὸ δέ γε τοῦ ζητεῖν, ὅπως ᾧ φθονεῖ τις κακοποιήσῃ
 τοῦτον, τὸ σκοπεῖν ὅπως μὴδὲν φθονήσῃ μηδενί· καὶ πρὸ γε τοῦ
 δουλεύειν τισὶ καλουμένοις φίλοις, ὥσπερ οἱ κόλακες, τὸ κακοπα-
 θεῖν ἵνα κτήσῃται φίλους ἀληθινούς. καθόλου δὲ τοῦ πονεῖν πᾶσιν
 5 ἀνθρώποις ἀναγκαῖον ὄντος, τοῖς τε τῶν κρειττόνων ὀρεγομένοις
 καὶ τοῖς τῶν χειρόνων, τὸ μὴ πολλῶ εἶναι προθυμότερους πονεῖν
 τοὺς τὰ κρείττω μετιόντας <ἦ> οἷς ἐλπίδες μικραὶ τῶν πόνων εἰσίν,
 ἀτοπώτατον. ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄρα θαυματοποιοὶ δύσκολα οὕτως
 ὑφίστανται πράγματα καὶ τὴν ζωὴν παραβάλλονται τὴν ἑαυτῶν,
 10 οἱ μὲν εἰς μαχαίρας κυβιστῶντες, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ κάλων μετέωροι βαδί-
 ζοντες, οἱ δ' ὥσπερ ὄρνεα πετόμενοι διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὧν τὸ σφάλμα
 θάνατός ἐστιν καὶ ταῦτα πάντα δρῶσι μικροῦ χάριν μισθοῦ,
 ἡμεῖς δ' οὐκ ἀνεξόμεθα ταλαιπωρεῖν ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας ὅλης; οὐ
 γὰρ ἄλλο τί γε τέλος ἐστὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν
 15 καὶ ζῆν μακαρίως εἰς τὸ λοιπόν. εἰκότως δ' ἂν τις λογίζοιτο καὶ
 τὸ τῶν ζώων ἐνίων ὁποῖόν ἐστι, πάνυ δὴ δυνάμενον ἐντρέπειν ἡμᾶς
 φιλοπόνους εἶναι. οἱ γοῦν ὄρνυγες καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνες οὐτ' ἀρετῆς
 ἐπαίοντες οὐδὲν ὥσπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε τὸ καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον
 εἰδότες οὐθ' ὑπὲρ τοιούτου πονοῦντες οὐθενός, ὅμως μαχόμενοι
 20 πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πηρούμενοι ἀνέχονται καὶ μέχρι θανάτου
 καρτεροῦσιν, ὥστε μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι θατέρου ὁ ἕτερος. πόσῃ δὴ
 μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ἡμᾶς ἀνέχεσθαι τε καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὅταν ἐπιστώμεθα
 διὰ τι τῶν καλῶν κακοπαθοῦντες, ἢ ἵνα φίλοις βοηθήσωμεν ἢ
 πόλιν ὠφελήσωμεν ἢ ἵνα γυναικῶν ἢ τέκνων ὑπερμαχήσωμεν, τὸ
 25 δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον, ἵνα ἀγαθοὶ ὦμεν καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ
 σώφρονες, ὃ δίχα πόνων οὐ παραγίνεται οὐδενί. ὅθεν ἔπεισί
 μοι λέγειν, ὥς ὁ μὴ θέλων πονεῖν σχεδὸν καταδικάζει αὐτὸς
 αὐτοῦ μηδενὸς εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ ἄξιος, ὅτι τὰ ἀγαθὰ πόνῳ πάντα
 30 κτώμεθα. Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα εἶπε τότε, ἐπεγείρων καὶ
 παρορμῶν τοὺς παρόντας πόνου καταφρονεῖν.

7 Seneca corroborates the statement of the small remuneration which acrobats receive. Cf. *De ira* II, 12, 5.

8 Another picture of the hardships athletes suffer is drawn by Seneca. Cf. *Ep.* 78, 16.

10 Some of these performers are described by Athenaeus. Cf. *Deipnosophistae* IV, 129d.

and instead of slaving, as sycophants do, to win false friends, to undergo suffering in order to possess true friends? Now, since, in general, toil and hardship are a necessity for all men, both for those who seek the better ends and for those who seek the worse, it is preposterous that those who are pursuing the better are not much more eager in their efforts than those for whom there is small hope of reward for all their pains. Yet when we see acrobats face without concern their difficult tasks and risk their very lives in performing them, turning somersaults over up-turned swords or walking ropes set at a great height or flying through the air like birds, where one misstep means death, all of which they do for a miserably small recompense, shall we not be ready to endure hardship for the sake of complete happiness? For surely there is no other end in becoming good than to become happy and to live happily for the remainder of our lives. One might reasonably reflect upon characteristics even of certain animals which are very well calculated to shame us into endurance of hardships. At all events, cocks and quails, although they have no understanding of virtue as man has and know neither the good nor the just and strive for none of these things, nevertheless fight against each other and even when maimed stand up and endure until death so as not to submit the one to the other. How much more fitting, then, it is that we stand firm and endure, when we know that we are suffering for some good purpose, either to help our friends or to benefit our city, or to defend our wives and children, or, best and most imperative, to become good and just and self-controlled, a state which no man achieves without hardships. And so it remains for me to say that the man who is unwilling to exert himself almost always convicts himself as unworthy of good, since we gain every good by toil. These words and others like them he then spoke, exhorting and urging his listeners to look upon hardship with disdain.

17 Plutarch suggests that Nature has implanted fine instincts into animals with the express purpose of shaming man into goodness. Cf. *De Amore Proles* (*Moralia* VI, p. 341 ed. Helmbold) 495A.

29 This epigram of Epicharmus is quoted by Xenophon, *Mem.* II, 1, 20.

VIII.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΟΤΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΗΤΕΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣΙΝ.

- Εἰσελθόντος δέ ποτε ὡς αὐτὸν τῶν βασιλέων τινὸς τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς
 5 Συρίας, ᾗσαν γὰρ ἔτι τότε ἐν Συρίᾳ βασιλεῖς Ῥωμαίων ὑπήκοοι,
 ἄλλα τε πολλὰ εἶπε πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δὴ καὶ ταῦτα. Μὴ οἶον, ἔφη,
 ἄλλω τινὶ μᾶλλον προσήκειν φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ σοί, μηδ' ἄλλου του
 χάριν μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτι βασιλεὺς τυγχάνεις ὢν. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ δήπου
 10 δύνασθαι τὸν βασιλέα σφίζειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ εὐεργετῆν τὸν δέ
 γὰρ σώσοντα καὶ εὐεργετήσοντα χρὴ ἐπίστασθαι τί μὲν ἀγαθὸν
 ἀνθρώπῳ τί δὲ κακόν, καὶ τί μὲν ὠφέλιμον τί δὲ βλαβερόν, καὶ
 συμφέρον γὰρ καὶ ἀσύμφορον· εἴ γὰρ ἀπόλλυνται μὲν οἱ περιπίπτοντες
 τοῖς κακοῖς, σφίζονται δὲ οἱ τυγχάνοντες τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εὐεργε-
 15 τοῦνται μὲν οἱ ἀξιούμενοι τῶν ὠφελίμων καὶ συμφερόντων, κακο-
 ποιοῦνται δὲ οἱ ἐμβαλλόμενοι τοῖς ἀσύμφοροις καὶ βλαβεροῖς.
 ἀγαθὸν μέντοι καὶ κακὸν ἢ συμφέρον καὶ ἀσύμφορον ἢ ὠφέλιμον
 καὶ βλαβερὸν οὐκ ἄλλου του διαγινώσκειν ἢ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ἐστίν,
 ὃς αὐτὸ τοῦτο διατελεῖ πραγματευόμενος ὅπως μηδὲ ἐν τούτων
 ἀγνοήσῃ, καὶ τέχνην πεποιήται ταύτην εἰδέναι τί φέρει πρὸς
 20 ἀνθρώπου εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ κακοδαιμονίαν. διὸ φαίνεται δεῖν τὸν
 βασιλέα φιλοσοφεῖν. καὶ μὴν προσήκει μὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ, μᾶλλον
 δ' ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, τὰ δίκαια βραβεύειν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις, ὡς
 μῆτε πλέον ἔχειν μῆτε ἐλαττοῦσθαι μηδένα παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τιμῆς καὶ τιμωρίας τυγχάνειν τοὺς ἀξίους. ταῦτα δὲ πῶς ποτε
 25 δυνήθειν ἂν τις δίκαιος οὐκ ὢν; δίκαιος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη τις μὴ
 ἐπιστάμενος δικαιοσύνην, ὁποῖόν τί ἐστιν; πάλιν οὖν καὶ ταύτη
 φιλοσοφητέον τῷ βασιλεῖ, ὅτι δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἂν
 ἄλλως φαίνοιτο γινούς, εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφήσῃ. οὐ γὰρ οὐθ' ὡς οὐχ
 ὁ μαθὼν μᾶλλον εἰδήσει τὰ δίκαια τοῦ μὴ μαθόντος ἐστιν εἰπεῖν,
 30 οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς εἰσι τῶν τοιούτων πάντες οἱ μὴ φιλοσοφή-
 σαντες. στασιάζουσι γοῦν καὶ πολεμοῦσι περὶ τῶν δικαίων πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους, οἱ μὲν ταῦτα φάσκοντες οἱ δὲ ἐκείνα δικαιότερα εἶναι.

4 The reference to the king from Syria furnishes a *terminus post quem* for the editing of the works of Musonius. There were no longer kings in Syria after 106 A. D.

VIII

THAT KINGS ALSO SHOULD STUDY PHILOSOPHY

When one of the kings from Syria once came to him (for at that time there were still kings in Syria, vassals of the Romans), amongst many other things he had to say to the man were the following words in particular. Do not imagine, he said, that it is more appropriate for anyone to study philosophy than for you, nor for any other reason than because you are a king. For the first duty of a king is to be able to protect and benefit his people, and a protector and benefactor must know what is good for a man and what is bad, what is helpful and what harmful, what advantageous and what disadvantageous, inasmuch as it is plain that those who ally themselves with evil come to harm, while those who cleave to good enjoy protection, and those who are deemed worthy of help and advantage enjoy benefits, while those who involve themselves in things disadvantageous and harmful suffer punishment. But to distinguish between good and bad, advantageous and disadvantageous, helpful and harmful is the part of none other than the philosopher, who constantly occupies himself with this very question, how not to be ignorant of any of these things, and has made it his art to understand what conduces to a man's happiness or unhappiness. Therefore it appears that the king should study philosophy. Furthermore it is fitting for a king, or rather it is an absolute necessity for him, to arbitrate justice as between subjects so that no one may have more or less than his just deserts, but may receive honor or punishment as he deserves. But how would anyone who was not just ever be able to manage this? And how would anyone ever be just if he did not understand the nature of justice? Here again is a reason the king should study philosophy, for without such study it would not be plain that he knew justice and the just. For one cannot deny either that the one who has learned it will understand justice better than the one who has not learned it, or that all who have not studied philosophy are ignorant of its nature. The truth of this statement appears from the fact that men disagree and contend with one another about justice, some saying that it is here, others that it is there. Yet about things of which men have knowledge there is no difference of opinion, as for example about white and black, or hot and cold, or soft and hard, but all think the same about them and use the same words. In just the same way they would agree about justice if they

- καίτοι περί γε ὧν ἐπίστανται ἄνθρωποι, περὶ τούτων οὐ διαφέρονται· οὔτε περὶ λευκῶν ἢ μελάνων, ἢ θερμῶν ἢ ψυχρῶν, οὔτε περὶ μαλακῶν ἢ σκληρῶν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τούτων ἅπαντες φρονούσι τε καὶ λέγουσιν· ὥστε καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων ὁμονόουν
- 5 ἂν παραπλησίως, εἴπερ ἦδεσαν ἅ τινά ἐστιν· ἐν ᾧ δ' οὐχ ὁμο-
νοοῦσιν, ἀγνοοῦντες φαίνονται. καὶ οὐδὲ σὺ ταύτης ἐκτὸς εἰ τῆς
ἀγνοίας, ὥς ἐγὼ δοκῶ· ὅθεν ἐπιμελητέον σοι τῆς γνώσεως μᾶλλον
ἢ ἄλλῃ ὁτῶν, καὶ τοσούτῳ γε μᾶλλον <ὅσῳ περ> αἵσχιον ἀνδρὶ
βασίλει ἢ ιδιώτῃ εἶναι ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ δικαιοσύνης.
- 10 Ἐπι τοίνυν δεῖ μὲν τὸν βασιλέα σωφρονεῖν αὐτόν, δεῖ δὲ τοὺς
ὑπηκόους σωφρονίζειν ἵν' ὁ μὲν ἄρχῃ σωφρόνως, οἱ δ' ἄρχωνται
κοσμίως, μηδέτεροι δὲ τρυφῶσι· λυμαντικὸν γὰρ ἄρχοντός τε καὶ
ιδιώτου παντὸς ἡ τρυφή. πῶς δ' ἂν ἡ αὐτὸς σωφρονήσῃ τις μὴ
μελετήσας κρατεῖν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ἢ ἀκόλαστος ὧν ἄλλους ποιήσῃ
- 15 σάφρονας; τίς μέντοι ἐπιστήμη πρὸς σωφροσύνην ἄγει πλήν
φιλοσοφίας, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν· αὕτη γὰρ διδάσκει μὲν ἐπάνω ἡδονῆς
εἶναι, διδάσκει δ' ἐπάνω πλεονεξίας, διδάσκει δὲ ἀγαπᾶν εὐτέλειαν,
διδάσκει δὲ φεύγειν πολυτέλειαν, ἐθίζει δ' αἰδῶ ἔχειν, ἐθίζει δὲ
γλώττης κρατεῖν, τάξιν δὲ καὶ κόσμον καὶ εὐσχημοσύνην περιποιεῖ
- 20 καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἐν κινήσει καὶ σχέσει πρέπον. ταῦτα δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ
προσόντα παρέχεται σεμνὸν καὶ σάφρονα αὐτόν. καὶ δὴ καὶ βασι-
λεύς, ὅτῳ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, μάλιστα ἂν εἴῃ θεοπρεπής τε καὶ αἰδοῦς
ἄξιος. τό γε μὴν ἄφοβον καὶ ἀνέκπληκτον καὶ θαρσαλέον ἔστι
μὲν ἀνδρείας ἔργον, πῶς δ' ἂν ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπάρξειεν
- 25 ἢ εἴ τις περὶ θανάτου καὶ πόνου λάβοι πίστιν ἰσχυράν ὥς οὐ
κακοῖν ὄντοιν αὐτοῖν; ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἐξιστάνα καὶ φοβούμενα
τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν, ὃ τε θάνατος καὶ ὁ πόνος, ὅταν ὥς περὶ
κακῶν πεπεισμένοι ᾖσιν αὐτῶν· μὴ κακὰ δ' εἶναι ταῦτα φιλοσοφία
διδάσκει μόνη. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἀνδρείαν κτητέον τοῖς βασιλεῦσι,
- 30 κτητέον δὲ παντὸς <ότου>οὖν ἐτέρου μᾶλλον, ἐπιμελητέον τοῦ
φιλοσοφεῖν αὐτοῖς, ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἐτέρως ἀνδρείοις γενομένοις. καὶ
δὴ βασιλικὸν μὲν, εἴ τι ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ ἀήτητον ἐν λόγῳ εἶναι καὶ
δύνασθαι κρατεῖν ὥσπερ ὅπλοις τῶν μαχομένων, οὕτω λόγους
<τῶν> διαλεγομένων· ὥς ἂν γε ταύτῃ ἀσθενήσωσιν οἱ βασιλεῖς,
- 35 ἀνάγκη πολλάκις περιάγεσθαι αὐτοὺς καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὰ ψευδῆ ὥς
ἀληθῆ προσίεσθαι, ὅπερ ἀφροσύνης ἔργον καὶ ἀμαθίας τῆς ἐσχά-
της. φιλοσοφία δ' οὐκ οἶδ' εἴ τι <ἄλλο> μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦτο παρέχειν
τοῖς μετιοῦσιν αὐτὴν πέφυκεν, ὥστε περιεῖναι λόγῳ τῶν πλησίον
καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ διακρίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐλέγχειν τὰ δὲ
- 40 βεβαιοῦν. οἱ γοῦν ῥήτορες ὁπόταν ἔλθωσιν εἰς ταῦτ' οἱς φιλο-

knew what it was, but in their very lack of agreement they reveal their ignorance. Indeed I am inclined to think that you are not far from such ignorance yourself, and you ought therefore more than anyone else to concern yourself with this knowledge, the more disgraceful it is for a king than for a private citizen to be ignorant about justice.

In the next place it is essential for the king to exercise self-control over himself and demand self-control of his subjects, to the end that with sober rule and seemly submission there shall be no wantonness on the part of either. For the ruin of the ruler and the citizen alike is wantonness. But how would anyone achieve self-control if he did not make an effort to curb his desires, or how could one who was undisciplined make others temperate? One can mention no study except philosophy that develops self-control. Certainly it teaches one to be above pleasure and greed, to admire thrift and to avoid extravagance; it trains one to have a sense of shame, and to control one's tongue, and it produces discipline, order, and courtesy, and in general what is fitting in action and in bearing. In an ordinary man when these qualities are present they give him dignity and self-command, but if they be present in a king they make him preeminently godlike and worthy of reverence.

Now, since fearlessness and intrepidity and boldness are the product of courage, how else would a man acquire them than by having a firm conviction that death and hardships are not evils? For these are the things, death and hardships, I repeat, which unbalance and frighten men when they believe that they are evils; that they are not evils philosophy is the only teacher. Consequently if kings ought to possess courage, and they more than anyone else should possess it, they must set themselves to the study of philosophy, since they cannot become courageous by any other means.

It is also the prerogative of kings (if they enjoy any whatever) to be invincible in reason and to be able to prevail over disputants by their arguments, just as over their enemies by their arms. Thus when kings are weak in this, it stands to reason that often they are misled and forced to accept the false as the true, which is the price of folly and dense ignorance. Now philosophy by its nature confers upon its devotees perhaps more than anything else the ability to remain superior to others in debate, to distinguish the false from the true, and to refute the one and to confirm the other. Professional speakers, at any rate, whenever they enter into the give and take of argument with philosophers one can see confused and confounded and obliged to contradict

- σόφοις καὶ διδῶσι καὶ λαμβάνωσι λόγον, ἔστιν ὁρᾶν αὐτοὺς συγκρονομένους ἀπορουμένους, ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτοῖς ἀναγκαζομένους· καίτοι ὁπότεν οἱ ῥήτορες, οἱ τοῦτο πεποιημένοι ἔργον λόγους μελετᾶν, ἀσθενέστεροι περὶ λόγους ἀλίσκωνται τῶν φιλοσόφων
- 5 ὄντες, τί χρὴ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ὑπολαμβάνειν; ὅθεν εἴ τινα ὄντι βασιλεῖ ἔστιν ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἐν λόγῳ κράτους, φιλοσοφητέον αὐτῷ, ἵνα μὴ δεδίη μηδὲ ταύτῃ μηδένα ὡς περιγενησόμενον αὐτοῦ, δέον ἀπανταχοῦ ἀδεῇ εἶναι τὸν βασιλέα καὶ θαρραλέον καὶ ἀήττητον.
- 10 Καθόλου δὲ τὸν μὲν βασιλέα τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ εἶναι ἀναμάρτητον καὶ τέλειον· εἴ περ δεῖ αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ἐδόκει τοῖς παλαιοῖς, νόμον ἔμφυχον εἶναι, εὐνομίαν μὲν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν μηχανώμενον, ἀνομίαν δὲ καὶ στάσιν ἀπείργοντα, ζηλωτὴν δὲ τοῦ Διὸς ὄντα καὶ πατέρα τῶν ἀρχομένων ὥσπερ
- 15 ἐκείνου. τοιοῦτος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη τις μὴ φύσει τε διαφερούσης κεχηρημένος παιδείαν τε τὴν ἀρίστην πεπαιδευμένος ἀρετάς τε ἀπάσας ἔχων, ὅσαι περ ἀνθρώπῳ προσήκουσιν; εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἑτέρα ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν ἢ ποδηγοῦσα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀνθρώπου φύσιν καὶ ἀσκεῖν καὶ μετιέναι τὰ καλὰ διδάσκουσα, παραβλητέον ἂν
- 20 εἴη καὶ συγκριτέον, εἴτε ἐκείνη εἴτε φιλοσοφία κρείττων καὶ ἀποχρῶσα μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἀποδείξαι βασιλέα· καὶ τῇ κρείττονι χρῶντ' ἂν εἰκότως ὁ βασιλεὺς βουλόμενός γε δὴ εἶναι ἀγαθός. εἰ δ' ἄλλη μὲν οὖν οὐδ' ὑπὸ σκηνῇ τέχνη οὐδεμία παράδοσιν καὶ διδασκαλίαν ἀρετῆς, <ἀλλ' εἰσὶν> αἱ μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἀνθρώ-
- 25 πινον καὶ τὰ τοῦτ' ἀχρήσιμα πραγματευόμεναι μόνον, ὅσαι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφάπτονται, πάντα σκοπούμεναι μᾶλλον, ἣ ὅθεν αὐτῇ σωφρονήσῃ μόνῃ δὲ φιλοσοφία τοῦτο σκοπεῖται καὶ τοῦτο μηχανᾶται, πῶς ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κακίαν μὲν ἐκφύγοι, κτήσαιοτο δὲ ἀρετήν· εἰ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ἔχει, τί ἂν ἄλλο εἴη βασιλεῖ τῷ γε ἀγαθῷ εἶναι
- 30 βουλομένῳ προυργιαίτερον τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν; μᾶλλον δὲ πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον δύναιτο ἂν τις βασιλεύσαι ἢ βιώναι καλῶς, εἰ μὴ φιλοσοφήσειεν; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἀγαθὸν εὐθὺς καὶ φιλόσοφον ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι καὶ τόν γε φιλόσοφον εὐθὺς καὶ βασιλικὸν εἶναι.
- 35 Πρῶτον δὲ τὸ πρότερον θεασώμεθα. ἄρ' ἔσθ' ὅπως βασιλεὺς ἀγαθὸς εἴη τις ἂν μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἀγαθὸς ὢν; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. ἀγαθὸς δὲ τις ἀνὴρ ὢν οὐ καὶ φιλόσοφος εἴη ἂν; νῆ Δία, εἴ γε

12 The concept of the king as the embodiment of Law is expressed in a number of writers, perhaps first in Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* VII, 1, 22. Musonius' phrase *νόμος ἐμψυχος* 'living law' or 'law incarnate,' taken

themselves. And yet if such speakers, whose business it is to practice debate, are caught because they are inferior to the philosophers in argument, what is bound to happen to other men? Therefore if it is the ambition of anyone who is a king to be powerful in debate, he should study philosophy in order that he may not have to fear that anyone will prevail over him in this, for a king should be completely fearless and courageous and invincible.

In general it is of the greatest importance for the good king to be faultless and perfect in word and action, if, indeed, he is to be a "living law" as he seemed to the ancients, effecting good government and harmony, suppressing lawlessness and dissension, a true imitator of Zeus and, like him, father of his people. But how could anyone be such a king if he were not endowed with a superior nature, given the best possible education, and possessed of all the virtues which befit a man? If, then, there is any other knowledge which guides man's nature to virtue and teaches him to practice and associate with the good, it should be placed beside philosophy and compared with it to see whether it or philosophy is better and more capable of producing a good king. Then the man who wished to become a good king would be wise to use the better one. If, however, no other art professes the teaching and transmission of virtue, though there are some which are concerned solely with man's body and what is useful for it, while others which touch the mind aim at everything else but making it self-controlled, yet philosophy alone makes this its aim and occupies itself with this, how a man may avoid evil and acquire virtue, if this I say is so, what else would be more serviceable to a king who wished to be good than the study of philosophy? How better or how otherwise could a man be a good ruler or live a good life than by studying philosophy? For my part, I believe that the good king is straightway and of necessity a philosopher, and the philosopher a kingly person.

Of these two propositions let us examine the former: Is it possible for anyone to be a good king unless he is a good man? No, it is not possible. But given a good man, would he not be entitled to be called a philosopher? Most certainly, since philosophy is the pursuit of ideal good. Therefore a good king is found to be forthwith and of necessity a philosopher also. Now again that the philosopher is entirely kingly you may understand

possibly from Philo (*Moses II*, 1, 4, *ed.* Colson, VI, p. 452), was used later by Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata II*, 438P).

26 He is probably referring to rhetoric.

- τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καλοκάγαθίας ἐπιτήδευσις ἐστίν. ὥσθ' ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης εὐθύς καὶ φιλόσοφος εὐρίσκεται ὢν. καὶ μὴν ὁ γε φιλόσοφος ὅτι πάντως καὶ βασιλικός, οὕτως ἂν μάθοις. τοῦ γὰρ βασιλικοῦ δῆπου ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς ἐπιτροπεύειν ἔθνη
 5 καὶ πόλεις καὶ εἶναι ἄξιον ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν. τίς δ' ἂν ἢ ἱκανώτερος εἴη πόλεως προστάτης ἢ ἀξιώτερος ἀνθρώπων ἄρχειν τοῦ φιλοσόφου; ὧ γέ προσήκει (ἂν περ ἢ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος) εἶναι φρονίμῳ, σῶφρονι, μεγαλόφρονι, τῶν δικαίων κριτικῶ καὶ τῶν πρεπόντων, καταπρακτικῶ τῶν νοηθέντων, καρτερικῶ τῶν ἐπιπόνων· πρὸς δὲ
 10 τούτοις θαρραλέος, ἀδεής, ὑποστατικὸς τῶν δοκούντων δεινῶν εἴη ἂν, ἔτι δὲ εὐεργετικὸς, χρηστὸς, φιλόανθρωπος. τοῦ δὲ τοιούτου τίς ἂν εὐρεθείη ἄρχειν ἐπιτηδειότερος ἢ δυνατώτερος; οὐδεὶς. ἂν δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ πολλοὺς τοὺς ὑπακούοντας καὶ πειθομένους αὐτῷ, οὕτω διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ βασιλικὸς εἶναι ἐστέρηται· ἐξαρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ τῶν
 15 φίλων ἄρχειν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἢ γυναικὸς τε καὶ παίδων, ἢ καὶ νῆ Δία αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ μόνον. καὶ γὰρ ἱατρὸς οὐδὲν ἥττον τοῦ θεραπεύοντος πολλοὺς ὁ θεραπεύων ὀλίγους, εἴ γε ἔχει τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τὴν ἱατρικὴν· καὶ μουσικὸς οὐδὲν ἥττον τοῦ διδάσκοντος πολλοὺς ὁ διδάσκων ὀλίγους, εἴ γε ἔχει τὴν μουσικὴν· καὶ ἵππικὸς ὁμοίως
 20 τῷ χρωμένῳ πολλοῖς ἵπποις ὁ χρώμενος ἐνὶ ἡ δυοῖν, ἂν γε ἐπιστήμων τῆς ἵππικῆς ἦ· καὶ δὴ καὶ βασιλικὸς παραπλησίως τῷ κεκτημένῳ πολλοὺς ὑπηκόους ὁ ἔχων ἓνα ἢ δύο τοὺς πειθομένους αὐτῷ· μόνον ἐχέτω τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύειν ἐμπειρίαν, ὥστε καὶ βασιλικὸς εἴη ἂν. διὰ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ καὶ Σωκράτης τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν
 25 τε καὶ βασιλικὴν ἐπιστήμην ὀνομάζειν, ὅτι ὁ ταύτην ἀναλαβὼν εὐθύς πολιτικός ἐστι. Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Μουσωνίου εἰπόντος, ἥσθεις ὁ βασιλεὺς τοῖς λόγοις χάριν τε ἔχειν ὡμολόγει τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτων, ἔφη, αἴτησον ὅ τι βούλει με, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀντίποιμί σοι περὶ οὐδενός. Ὁ οὖν Μουσώνιος, αἰτῶ σε, ἔφη, τούτοις στοι-
 30 χεῖν καὶ ἔπεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, οὓς ἐπαινεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ οὕτω χαριεῖ μάλιστα καὶ ὠφελήθησθαι αὐτὸς οὐχ ἐτέρως μᾶλλον.

from this. The attribute of a kingly person is obviously the ability to rule peoples and cities well and to be worthy to govern men. Well, then, who would be a more capable head of a city or more worthy to govern men than the philosopher? For it behooves him (if he is truly a philosopher) to be intelligent, disciplined, noble-minded, a good judge of what is just and of what is seemly, efficient in putting his plans into effect, patient under hardship. In addition to this, he should be courageous, fearless, resolute in the face of things apparently disastrous, and besides beneficent, helpful, and humane. Could anyone be found more fit or better able to govern than such a man? No one. Even if he does not have many subjects obedient to him, he is not for that reason less kingly, for it is enough to rule one's friends or one's wife and children or, for that matter, only oneself. For, indeed, a physician who attends few patients is no less a physician than the one who attends many if, to be sure, he has skill and experience in healing. In the same way the musician who teaches only a few pupils is no less a musician than the one who teaches many, provided he knows the art of music. Likewise the horseman who trains only one or two horses is just as much a horseman as the one who trains many if he is skilled in horsemanship. And so the title of kingly person belongs to the one who has only one or two subjects just as well as to the one who has many, only let him have the skill and ability to rule, so that he may deserve the name of king. For this reason it seems to me that Socrates too called philosophy the statesmanlike and royal discipline, because one who masters it immediately becomes a statesman. When Musonius said these things, the king was glad at his words and told him that he was grateful for what he said and added, "In return for this, ask of me whatever you wish for I shall refuse you nothing." Then Musonius said, "The only favor I ask of you is to remain faithful to this teaching, since you find it commendable, for in this way and no other will you best please me and benefit yourself."

IX.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΟΤΙ ΟΤ ΚΑΚΟΝ Η ΦΥΓΗ.

Φυγάδος δέ τινος ὁδυρομένου ὅτι φεύγει, οὕτω πως παρεμυθή-
 5 σατο αὐτόν. Φυγὴν γάρ, ἔφη, πῶς ἂν τις μὴ ἀνόητος ὢν βαρύνοιτο;
 ἥτις ὕδατος μὲν καὶ γῆς καὶ ἀέρος, ἔτι δὲ ἡλίου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἄστρον οὐκ ἀπείργει ἡμᾶς οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας,
 ἀπανταχοῦ γὰρ καὶ πάντῃ τούτων μετουσία ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ μέρους
 τινὸς τῆς γῆς ἀφαιρούμεθα καὶ τινῶν ἀνθρώπων συνουσίας, τί
 10 τοῦτο δεινόν; οὐδὲ γὰρ οἴκοι ὄντες ἀπάσῃ τῇ γῇ ἐχρώμεθα, οὐδὲ
 ἀνθρώποις ἅπασιν συνήμεν· τοῖς μέντοι φίλοις καὶ νῦν συνείημεν
 ἅν, τοῖς γε ἀληθινοῖς καὶ ὧν προσήκει ποιεῖσθαι τινα λόγον· οὐ
 γὰρ ἂν οὗτοι προδοῖέν ποτε ἡμᾶς οὐδ' ἐγκαταλίποιν· εἰ δέ τινες
 πλαστοὶ καὶ οὐκ ἀληθινοὶ φίλοι εἰσὶ, τούτων ἀπηλλάχθαι κρεῖττον
 15 ἢ συνεῖναι αὐτοῖς. τί δ'; οὐχὶ κοινὴ πατρίς ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὁ
 κόσμος ἐστίν, ὥσπερ ἡξίου Σωκράτης; ὥστ' οὐδὲ φεύγειν τῇ γε
 ἀληθείᾳ τὴν πατρίδα νομιστέον, ἂν ἀπέλθῃς ἐντεῦθεν ἔνθα ἔφυς τε
 καὶ ἐτράφης, πόλεως δὲ μόνον ἐστερήσθαι τινος, ἄλλως τε καὶ
 ἀξιοῖς εἶναι ἐπιεικῆς. ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος χωρίον μὲν οὐδὲν οὔτε τιμᾷ
 20 οὐτ' ἀτιμάζει οὕτως ὥς εὐδαιμονίας <ἢ κακοδαιμονίας> αἵτιον
 αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τίθεται τὸ πᾶν, καὶ νομίζει εἶναι πολίτης τῆς τοῦ
 Διὸς πόλεως, ἣ συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν. σύμφωνα δὲ
 τούτοις λέγει καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐν οἷς φησιν

ἅπας μὲν ἀὴρ ἀετῷ περάσιμος,
 25 ἅπασα δὲ χθὼν ἀνδρὶ γενναίῳ πατρίς.

ὥσπερ οὖν εἴ τις ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ὢν καὶ ἐτέραν οἰκίαν οἰκῶν, οὐκ
 ἐν ἣ ἐτέχθη, δεινοπαθοῖ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὀδύροιο, μάταιος ἂν εἴη
 καὶ καταγέλαστος· οὕτω καὶ ὅστις ἐτέραν πόλιν οἰκῶν, οὐκ ἐν ἣ
 τυγχάνει γεγονώς, συμφορὰν ἡγείται, ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰκότως ἂν ἄφρων
 30 νομίζοιτο καὶ ἀνόητος. καὶ μὴν πρὸς γε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν
 καὶ πρὸς κτήσιν ἀρετῆς πῶς ἂν τὸ φεύγειν ἐνίσταται; ὁπότε γε

19 ἀξιοῖς τις Hense

1 This treatise seems to represent a letter. Cf. Introduction, note 8.

6 Cf. Epictetus, Disc. II, 16, 33.

IX

THAT EXILE IS NOT AN EVIL

Hearing an exile lament because he was living in banishment, Musonius consoled him in somewhat the following way. Why, he asked, should anyone who was not devoid of understanding be oppressed by exile? It does not in any way deprive us of water, earth, air, or the sun and the other planets, or indeed, even of the society of men, for everywhere and in every way there is opportunity for association with them. What if we are kept from a certain part of the earth and from association with certain men, what is so dreadful about that? Why, when we were at home, we did not enjoy the whole earth, nor did we have contact with all men; but even now in exile we may associate with our friends, that is to say the true ones and those deserving of the name, for they would never betray or abandon us; but if some prove to be sham and not true friends, we are better off separated from them than being with them. Tell me, is not the universe the common fatherland of all men, as Socrates held? Well, then, you must not consider it really being banished from your fatherland if you go from where you were born and reared, but only being exiled from a certain city, that is if you claim to be a reasonable person. For such a man does not value or despise any place as the cause of his happiness or unhappiness, but he makes the whole matter depend upon himself and considers himself a citizen of the city of God which is made up of men and gods. Euripides speaks in harmony with this thought when he says,

“As all the heavens are open to the eagle’s flight
So all the earth is for a noble man his fatherland.”

Therefore, just as a man who was living in his own country but in a different house from the one where he was born would be thought silly and an object of laughter if he should weep and wail because of this, so whoever considers it a misfortune because he is living in another city and not the one where he happens to have been born would rightly be considered foolish and stupid. Furthermore, how should exile be an obstacle to the cultivation

16 Cf. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* V, 37, 108.

24 f. *Frag.* 1034 (*ed.* Nauck). Ovid has an interesting Latin version:
Omne solum forti patria est, ut piscibus aequor,
Ut volucris, vacuo quidquid in orbe patet. (*Fasti* I, ll. 493 f.)

μήτε μαθήσεως μήτε ἀσκήσεως ὧν χρὴ εἴργεται τις διὰ τὴν φυγὴν. πῶς μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἡ φυγὴ καὶ συνεργοίη πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον, παρέχουσά γε σχολὴν καὶ ἐξουσίαν τοῦ μαθάνειν τε τὰ καλὰ καὶ πράττειν μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον, ἅτε μήθ' ὑπὸ πατρίδος τῆς δοκούσης περιελκο-
 5 μένοις εἰς ὑπηρεσίας πολιτικὰς μήτε ὑπὸ φίλων τῶν δοκούντων ἢ συγγενῶν ἐνοχλουμένοις, οἳ τινες ἐμποδίσαι δεινοὶ καὶ ἀποσπάσαι τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ κρείττω ὁρμῆς; ἤδη δέ τισι καὶ παντάπασι τὸ φεύγειν συνήνεγκεν, ὥσπερ Διογένης, ὃς ἐκ μὲν ἰδιώτου φιλόσοφος ἐγένετο φυγῶν, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ καθῆσθαι εἰς Σινώπην διέτριψεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι,
 10 ἀσκήσει δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἀρετὴν τῶν φιλοσόφων διήνεγκεν. ἄλλοις δέ γε κακῶς τὰ σώματα διακειμένοις ὑπὸ μαλακίας καὶ τρυφῆς ἔρρωσεν ἡ φυγὴ, βιασθεῖσιν ἀνδρικώτερον διαιτᾶσθαι καὶ ἴσμεν τινὰς χρονίων νοσημάτων ἐν τῷ φεύγειν ἀπολυθέντας, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει Σπαρτιατικὸς οὗτος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος, ὃς ἀπὸ πολλοῦ ἔχων
 15 τὸ πλευρὸν κακῶς κακ τούτου πολλάκις νοσῶν διὰ τὴν τρυφήν, ἐπειδὴ ἐπαύσατο τρυφῶν, ἐπαύσατο καὶ νοσηλευόμενος. ἄλλους δέ γε τῶν ἀβροδιαίτων ποδάγρας ἀπολυθῆναι φασι, πάντῃ δὴ κατατεινομένους πρότερον ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ πάθους, οὓς ἡ φυγὴ σκληρότερον διαιτᾶσθαι συνεθίσασα κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὑγιεῖς
 20 γενέσθαι παρεσκεύασεν. οὕτως ἄρα τῷ διακείσθαι κρείττον αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν καὶ σώμα καὶ ψυχὴν συνεργεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀντιπράττει ἡ φυγὴ.

Ἄλλ' οὐδ' ἀπορεῖν τῶν ἀναγκαίων πάντως ὑπάρχει τοῖς φεύγουσιν. ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἀργοὶ καὶ ἀμήχανοι καὶ οὐχ οἰοί τε ἀνδρί-
 25 ζεσθαι, οὗτοι μὲν κὰν τῇ πατρίδι ὄντες ἀποροῦσιν ὥς τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀμηχανοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ γεννικοὶ καὶ φιλόπονοι καὶ συνετοί, κὰν ὅποι ποτὲ ἔλθωσιν, εὐποροῦσι καὶ διάγουσιν ἀνενδεῶς· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ δεόμεθα πολλῶν, ἂν μὴ βουλόμεθα τρυφᾶν·

30 ἐπεὶ τί δει βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυοῖν μόνον,
 Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματός θ' ὕδρηχόν,
 ἅπερ πάρεστι καὶ πέφυχ' ἡμᾶς τρέφειν;

λέγω δὲ τοὺς γε λόγον ἀξίους ἀνδρας οὐ τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων μόνον πρὸς τὸν βίον ῥαδίως ἂν εὐπορεῖν ἔξω τῆς οἰκείας ὄντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ περιποιήσεσθαι χρήματα πολλάκις. ὁ γοῦν
 35 Ὀδυσσεὺς παντὸς φυγάδος ὥς ἂν τις εἴποι ἀθλιώτερον διακείμενος

8 Cf. Diogenes Laertius *Lives*. VI, 49.

24 Spartiacus, of whom Musonius speaks as a contemporary, was a conspicuous figure in the age of Nero. Hence the situation must refer to Musonius' first banishment. Cf. Introduction note 21.

of the things that are one's own and to the acquisition of virtue, when no one was ever hindered from the knowledge and practice of what is needful because of exile? May it not even be true that exile contributes to that end, since it furnishes men leisure and a greater opportunity for learning the good and practicing it than formerly, in that they are not forced by what only seems to be their fatherland into performing political duties, and they are not annoyed by their kinsmen nor by men who only seem to be their friends, who are skilful in fettering them and dragging them away from the pursuit of better things? In fact, there have been cases where exile was an absolute blessing as it was to Diogenes, who by his exile was transformed from an ordinary citizen into a philosopher, and instead of sitting idly in Sinope, he busied himself in Greece, and in the pursuit of virtue came to surpass the philosophers. To others who were in poor health as the result of overindulgence and high living, exile has been a source of strength because they were forced to live a more manly life. We even know of some who were cured of chronic ailments in exile, as for instance, in our day Spartiacus, the Lacedaemonian, who suffered long from a weak chest and for this reason was often ill from high living, but when he stopped living a life of luxury, he ceased to be ill. They say that others addicted to high living have got rid of gout, although they were previously completely bed-ridden by the disease—people whom exile compelled to become accustomed to living more simply and by this very thing were brought back to health. Thus it appears that by treating them better than they treat themselves, exile helps rather than hinders health both of body and of spirit.

It is not true, moreover, that exiles lack the very necessities of life. To be sure men who are idle and unresourceful and unable to play the part of a man are generally in want and without resources even when they are in their own country, but energetic and hard working and intelligent men, no matter where they go, fare well and live without want. We do not feel the lack of many things unless we wish to live luxuriously:

“For what do mortals need beside two things only,
The bread of Demeter and a drink of the Water-carrier,
Which are at hand and have been made to nourish us?”

Let me add that men who are worth anything not only easily manage well so far as the necessities of life are concerned, when they are in exile, but often acquire great fortunes. At any rate

- καὶ μόνος ὦν καὶ γυμνὸς καὶ ναυαγός, ὅμως ἀφικόμενος εἰς ἀνθρώ-
 πους ἀγνώτας τοὺς Φαίακας ἐδυνήθη χρηματίσασθαι ἀφθόνης.
 Θεμιστοκλῆς δ' ἐπεὶ ἔφηνεν οἴκοθεν, οὐ παρὰ μὴ φίλους μόνον,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ πολεμίους καὶ βαρβάρους ἔλθων τοὺς Πέρσας, τρεῖς
 5 ἔλαβε πόλεις δῶρον, Μνῶντα καὶ Μαγνησίαν καὶ Λάμψακον, ὥστ'
 ἀπὸ τούτων βιοῦν. Δίῳν δὲ ὁ Συρακούσιος, ἀφαιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ
 Διονυσίου τοῦ τυράννου τὴν οὐσίαν πᾶσιν, ὅτ' ἐξέπιπτε τῆς πατρί-
 δος, οὕτως ἐν τῇ φυγῇ χρημάτων εὐπόρησεν, ὥστε καὶ ξενικὸν
 10 αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τυράννου. τίς ἂν οὖν εὖ φρονῶν εἰς ταῦτ' ἀφορῶν, ἔτι
 τὴν φυγὴν ἀπορίας αἰτίαν εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς φεύγουσιν ὑπολαμβάνοι;
 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κακοδοξεῖν πάντως ἀνάγκη τοὺς φυγόντας διὰ τὴν φυγὴν,
 γνωρίμου γε πᾶσιν ὄντος, ὅτι καὶ δίκαι πολλαὶ δικάζονται κακῶς,
 καὶ ἐκβάλλονται πολλοὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀδίκως, καὶ ὅτι ἤδη τινὲς
 15 ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες ἐξηλάθησαν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ὥσπερ Ἀθή-
 νηθεν μὲν Ἀριστείδης ὁ δίκαιος, ἐξ Ἐφέσου δὲ Ἑρμόδωρος, ἐφ'
 ᾧ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι ἔφηνεν ἡβηδὸν ἐκέλευεν Ἐφεσίους ἀπάγ-
 ξασθαι. ἔνιοι δέ γε καὶ ἐνδοξότατοι φεύγοντες ἐγένοντο, καθάπερ
 Διογένης ὁ Σινωπεὺς καὶ Κλέαρχος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ὁ μετὰ Κύρου
 20 στρατεύσας ἐπ' Ἀρταξέρξην καὶ ἄλλους <δ'> ἂν τις ἔχοι βουλό-
 μενος λέγειν πολλοὺς. καίτοι πῶς ἂν εἴη τοῦτο κακοδοξίας αἴτιον,
 ἐν ᾧ τινες ἐνδοξότεροι γεγόνασιν, ἢ πρότερον ἦσαν;
 Νῆ Δί' ἄλλ' Εὐριπίδης φησὶν ἐλευθερίας στέρεσθαι τοὺς
 25 πυνθανομένην Πολυνείκους τοῦ υἱέος, τίνα δυσχερὴ τῷ φεύγοντί
 ἐστὶν ὁ δ' ἀποκρίνεται ὅτι

ἐν μὲν μέγιστον, οὐκ ἔχει παρρησίαν,

ἢ δ' αὖ πρὸς αὐτὸν

δούλου τόδ' εἶπας, μὴ λέγειν ἃ τις φρονεῖ.

- 30 ἐγὼ δὲ φαίην ἂν πρὸς τὸν Εὐριπίδην ὅτι, ὦ Εὐριπίδη, τοῦτο μὲν
 ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνεις, ὡς δούλου ἐστίν, ἃ φρονεῖ μὴ λέγειν, ὅταν
 γε δέῃ λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ πρὸς ὄντινούν λεκτέον
 ἃ φρονούμεν. ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ μοι δοκεῖς εὖ εἰρηκέναι, τὸ μὴ μετεῖναι
 τοῖς φεύγουσι παρρησίας, εἴπερ παρρησία σοι δοκεῖ τὸ μὴ σιγᾶν
 35 ἃ φρονῶν τυγχάνει τις. οὐ γὰρ οἱ φεύγοντες ὁκνοῦσι λέγειν ἃ

3 Cornelius Nepos testifies to this. Cf. *Themistocles* 10.3.

13 Cicero deplores this unfortunate fact in a letter of consolation to a friend in exile. Cf. *Ep. ad Fam.* V, 17, 3.

Odysseus, in worse plight than any exile one may say, since he was alone and naked and shipwrecked, when he arrived among strangers, the Phaeacians, was nevertheless able to enrich himself abundantly. And when Themistocles was banished from home, going to people who were not only not friendly, but actual enemies and barbarians, the Persians, he received a gift of three cities, Myus, Magnesia, and Lampsacus, as a source of livelihood. Dio of Syracuse too, deprived by Dionysius the tyrant of all his possessions, when he was banished from his country waxed so rich in exile that he raised a mercenary army, went with it to Sicily, and freed the island of the tyrant. Who, then, if he were in his right mind, looking at these cases would still maintain that banishment is the cause of want for all exiles? Furthermore, it is not at all necessary for exiles to suffer ill-repute because of their banishment, since everyone knows that many trials are badly judged and many people are unjustly banished from their country, and that in the past there have been cases of good men who have been exiled by their countrymen, as for example from Athens Aristides the Just and from Ephesus Hermodorus, because of whose banishment Heraclitus bade the Ephesians, every grown man of them, go hang themselves. In fact some exiles even became very famous, as Diogenes of Sinope and Clearchus, the Lacedaemonian, who with Cyrus marched against Artaxerxes, not to mention more. How, pray, could this condition in which some people have become more renowned than before be responsible for ill-repute?

But, you insist, Euripides says that exiles lose their personal liberty when they are deprived of their freedom of speech. For he represents Jocasta asking Polynices her son what misfortunes an exile has to bear. He answers,

“One greatest of all, that he has not freedom of speech.”

She replies,

“You name the plight of a slave, not to be able to say what one thinks.”

But I should say in rejoinder: “You are right, Euripides, when you say that it is the condition of a slave not to say what one thinks when one ought to speak, for it is not always, nor everywhere, nor before everyone that we should say what we think. But that one point, it seems to me, is not well-taken, that exiles do not have freedom of speech, if to you freedom of speech means not suppressing whatever one chances to think. For it is not as exiles that men fear to say what they think, but as men

20 Cf. Xenophon, *Anabasis* I, 1, 9.

27, 29 *Phoenissae* 391 f.

- φρονούσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ δεδιότες μὴ ἐκ τοῦ εἰπεῖν γένηται αὐτοῖς πόνος ἢ θάνατος ἢ ζημία ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δέος μὰ Δία οὐχ ἡ φυγὴ ποιεῖ. πολλοῖς γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ πατρίδι ὄντων, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις, τὰ δοκοῦντα δεινὰ δεδιέναι. ὁ
- 5 δὲ ἀνδρείος οὐδὲν ἤττον φυγὰς ὧν ἤπερ οἶκοι θαρρεῖ πρὸς ἅπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, διὸ καὶ λέγει ἃ φρονεῖ θαρρῶν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ ὅταν ἦ μὴ φυγὰς, ὅταν φεύγων τύχῃ. ταῦτα μὲν πρὸς Εὐριπίδην εἶποι τις ἄν' σὺ δ' εἶπέ μοι, ὦ ἐταῖρε, ὅτε Διογένης φεύγων ἦν Ἀθήνησιν, ἢ ὅτε πραθεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ληστών ἦλθεν εἰς Κόρινθον, ἄρα τότε πλείω
- 10 παρρησίαν ἄλλος τις ἐπεδείξατο Διογένης ἢ Ἀθηναῖος ἢ Κορίνθιος; τί δ'; ἐλευθεριώτερος ἄλλος τις ἢ Διογένης τῶν τότε ἀνθρώπων ἦν; ὅς καὶ Ξενιάδου τοῦ πριαμένου αὐτὸν ὡς δεσπότης δούλου ἦρχεν. καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ παλαιὰ λέγειν; ἀλλ' ἐγὼ σοι οὐ δοκῶ εἶναι φυγὰς; ἄρ' οὖν ἐστέρημαι παρρησίας; ἄρα ἀφήρημαι τὴν
- 15 ἐξουσίαν τοῦ ἃ φρονῶ λέγειν; ἤδη δέ με εἶδες ἢ σὺ ἢ ἕτερος ὑποπτήσσοντά τω ὅτι φεύγω; ἢ χεῖρον ἔχειν τὰ πράγματα νομίζοντα νῦν ἢ πρότερον; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὰ Δία λυπούμενον ἢ ἀθυμοῦντα διὰ τὴν φυγὴν φαίης ἂν ἑωρακέσαι με. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὴν πατρίδα τις ἡμᾶς ἀφήρηται, τό γε δύνασθαι φέρειν φυγὴν οὐκ ἀφήρηται.
- 20 Οἷς δὲ λογισμοῖς χρῶμαι πρὸς ἐμάντόν, ὥστε μὴ ἄχθεσθαι τῇ φυγῇ, τούτους καὶ πρὸς σέ εἵπομαι ἄν. δοκεῖ μοι ἡ φυγὴ στερίσκειν μὲν ἄνθρωπον οὐ πάντως οὐδ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν ἀγαθῶν, καθάπερ ἄρτι ἐδείκνυν. εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ στερίσκοι ἢ τινος ἢ πάντων τούτων, τῶν γε ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν οὐ στερίσκει· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνδρείαν ἢ
- 25 δικαιοσύνην ὁ φεύγων ἔχειν κωλύεται, διὸ φεύγει, οὔτε σωφροσύνην ἢ φρόνησιν, οὐδ' αὖ ἀρετὴν ἄλλην ἡντιοῦν, αἱ παροῦσαί τε κοσμεῖν καὶ ὠφελεῖν πεφύκασι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν ἀποφαίνειν καὶ εὐκλεῖ, ἀποῦσαί τε βλάπτειν καὶ καταισχύειν κακὸν ἀποφαίνουσαι καὶ ἀκλεῖ. τούτων δὲ ταύτῃ ἐχόντων, εἰ μὲν ἀγαθὸς
- 30 εἶ οὗτος καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχεις, οὐκ ἂν σε βλάπτει ἡ φυγὴ οὐδ' ἂν ταπεινοίῃ, παρόντων γε τῶν ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐπαίρειν μάλιστα δυναμένων· εἰ δὲ τυγχάνεις κακὸς ὢν, ἡ κακία σε βλάπτει καὶ οὐχ ἡ φυγὴ· καὶ τὴν γε λύπην ἡ κακία σοι ἐπάγει, οὐχ ἡ φυγὴ· διὸ

10 Cf. Diogenes Laertius *Lives*, VI, 30.

13 Musonius was exiled to the barren island of Gyara, one of the Cyclades. Several writers have testified to his stoutheartedness in this trying situation. Cf. Introduction note 49.

18 f. Milton expressed a similar attitude when he said, "It is not so wretched to be blind, as it is not to be capable of enduring blindness."

afraid lest from speaking pain or death or punishment or some such other thing shall befall them. Fear is the cause of this, not exile. For to many people, nay to most, even though dwelling safely in their native city, fear of what seem to them dire consequences of free speech is present. However, the courageous man, in exile no less than at home, is dauntless in the face of all such fears; for that reason also he has the courage to say what he thinks equally at home or in exile." Such are the things one might reply to Euripides. But tell me, my friend, when Diogenes was in exile at Athens, or when he was sold by pirates and came to Corinth, did anyone, Athenian or Corinthian, ever exhibit greater freedom of speech than he? And again, were any of his contemporaries freer than Diogenes? Why, even Xenocrates, who bought him, he ruled as a master rules a slave. But why should I employ examples of long ago? Are you not aware that I am an exile? Well, then, have I been deprived of freedom of speech? Have I been bereft of the privilege of saying what I think? Have you or anyone else ever seen me cringing before anyone just because I am an exile, or thinking that my lot is worse now than formerly? No, I'll wager that you would say that you have never seen me complaining or disheartened because of my banishment, for if I have been deprived of my country, I have not been deprived of my ability to endure exile.

The reflections which I employ for my own benefit so as not to be irked by exile, I should like to repeat to you. It seems to me that exile does not strip a man entirely, not even of the things which the average man calls goods, as I have just shown. But if he is deprived of some or all of them, he is still not deprived of the things which are truly goods. Certainly the exile is not prevented from possessing courage and justice simply because he is banished, nor self-control, nor understanding, nor any of the other virtues which when present serve to bring honor and benefit to a man and show him to be praiseworthy and of good repute, but when absent, serve to cause him harm and dishonor and show him to be wicked and of ill-repute. Since this is true, if you are that good man and have his virtues, exile will not harm or degrade you, because the virtues are present in you which are most able to help and to sustain you. But if you are bad, it is the evil that harms you and not exile; and the misery you feel in exile is the product of evil, not of exile. It is from this you must hasten to secure release rather than from exile. These things I

ταύτης ἀπολυθῆναι δεῖ σε σπεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς φυγῆς. ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν ἔλεγον αἰεὶ καὶ πρὸς σέ λέγω νῦν. σὺ δ', ἂν σωφρονῇς, οὐ τὴν φυγὴν δεινὸν ἡγήσῃ εἶναι, ἣν γε φέρουσιν ἕτεροι εὐπετῶς, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἧς ἐνούσης ἄθλιος πᾶς ὅστις ἂν ἔχῃ αὐτήν.
 5 καὶ γὰρ δὴ δυοῖν ἀνάγκη τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ ἀδίκως ἢ δικαίως σε φεύγειν· εἰ μὲν δὴ δικαίως, πῶς ποτε ὀρθὸν ἢ προσήκον ἄχθεσθαι τοῖς δικαίοις; εἰ δ' ἀδίκως, τῶν ἐξελασάντων τοῦτ' ἂν εἴῃ κακόν, οὐχ ἡμέτερον· εἴπερ νῆ Δία τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖν θεομισέστατόν ἐστιν, ὅπερ ἐκείνοις συμβέβηκε· τὸ δ' ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅπερ συμβέβηκεν ἡμῖν, καὶ
 10 παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώποις τοῖς ἐπικουρίας, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ μίσους ἄξιον εἶναι ὑπέιληπται.

X.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΕΙ ΓΡΑΦΗΝ ΤΩΡΕΩΣ ΓΡΑΨΕΤΑΙ ΤΙΝΑ

15

Ο ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΣ.

“Τῶρεως δὲ γραφὴν οὗτ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἔφη γράψασθαι τινά ποτε οὗτ' ἂν ἐτέρῳ συμβουλευσαι οὐδενὶ τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν ἀξιούντων. ἃ γὰρ πάσχοντές τινες ὑβρίζεσθαι δοκοῦσιν, τούτων οὐδὲν εἶναι ὕβριν ἢ αἰσχύνην τοῖς πάσχουσιν· οἷον λοιδορηθῆναι ἢ πληγῆναι
 20 ἢ ἐμπτυσθῆναι, ὧν τὸ χαλεπώτατον πληγαί. ὥς δὲ οὔτε αἰσχρὸν οὔτε ὑβριστικὸν ἔχουσιν οὐδέν, δηλοῦν Λακεδαιμονίων παῖδας δημοσίᾳ μαστιγουμένους καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἀγαλλομένους. ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος εἰ μὴ δύναίτο καταφρονεῖν πληγῶν ἢ λοιδορίας, τί ἂν ὄφελος αὐτοῦ εἴη, ὃν γε φαίνεσθαι δεῖ καὶ θανάτου καταφρονούντα;
 25 νῆ Δία, ἀλλ' ἡ διάνοια τοῦ δρῶντος αὐτὰ δεινὴ, τὸ ἐπεγγελῶντα καὶ ὑβρίζειν νομίζοντα ραπίσαι ἢ λοιδορῆσαι ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ποιῆσαι· Δημοσθένους γοῦν καὶ τῷ βλέμματι ὑβρίζειν τινάς, καὶ ἀφόρητα εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἐξίστασθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ταύτη ἢ ἐκείνη οἶεται. ταῦτα δὲ οἱ μὲν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὃ τι τῇ
 30 ἀληθείᾳ ἐστὶν ἀγνοοῦντες καὶ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν κεχηνότες, καὶ αὐτοὶ

14 This treatise seems to have been directed at the rude and ostentatious Cynics who invited ridicule and yet complained and threatened legal action when they were abused.

used to repeat to myself and I say them to you now. If you are wise, you will not consider that exile is a thing to be dreaded, since others bear it easily, but evil. It makes wretched every man in whom it is present. And neither of the two necessary alternatives is a just cause for repining. For either you were banished justly or unjustly. If justly, how can it be right or fitting to feel aggrieved at just punishment? If unjustly, the evil involved is not ours, but falls upon those who banished us,—if in fact you agree that doing a wrong (as they have done) is the most hateful thing in the world, while suffering a wrong (as has been our fate) in the eyes of the gods and of just men is held a ground not for hate but for help.

X

WILL THE PHILOSOPHER PROSECUTE ANYONE FOR PERSONAL INJURY?

He said that he himself would never prosecute anyone for personal injury nor recommend it to anyone else who claimed to be a philosopher. For actually none of the things which people fancy they suffer as personal injuries are an injury or a disgrace to those who experience them, such as being reviled or struck or spit upon. Of these the hardest to bear are blows. That there is nothing shameful or insulting about them however is clear from the fact that Lacedaemonian boys are whipped publicly, and they exult in it. If, then, the philosopher cannot despise blows and insults, when he ought obviously to despise even death, what good would he be? Well and good, you say, but the spirit of the man who does such things is monstrous, executing his purpose to insult by jeering and a slap in the face, or by abusive language or by some other such action. You know, of course, that Demosthenes holds that people can insult even by a glance and that such things are intolerable and that men in one way or another are driven mad by them. So it is that men who do not know what is really good and what is shameful, having regard only for common opinion, think they are insulted if someone gives them a malignant glance or laughs or strikes them or reviles

22 The scourging of the Spartan boys before the altar of Artemis is referred to by Epictetus, *Disc.* I, 2, 2; Cicero *Tusc. Disp.* II, 20, 46; Plutarch *Instituta Laconica* 40 (239D) (*Moralia* III, pp. 442-4, ed. Babbitt)

27 Κατὰ Μειδίον 72

ὑβρίζεσθαι νομίζουσιν, εἴ τις ἢ προσβλέποι αὐτοὺς πικρότερον ἢ
 καταγελῶν αὐτῶν ἢ πλήττοι ἢ λοιδοροίη. ἀνὴρ δὲ εὖ φρονῶν καὶ
 νοῦν ἔχων, οἷον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον, ὑπὸ οὐδενὸς τούτων
 ταραττεται, οὐδ' οἶεται τὸ πάσχειν αὐτὰ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ποιεῖν
 5 μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ τί καὶ ὁ πάσχων ἀμαρτάνει; ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτάνων εὐθὺς
 καὶ ἐν αἰσχύνη ἐστίν, ὁ μέντοι πάσχων ὡς οὖν οὐχ ἀμαρτάνει
 καθόσον πάσχει, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἐν αἰσχρῷ οὐδενὶ γίνεται. ὅθεν οὐδ'
 ἐπὶ δίκας οὐδ' ἐπ' ἐγκλήματα προέλθαι ἂν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων, ἐπεὶ περ
 οὐδ' ὑβρίσθαι ἂν δόξειεν· καὶ γὰρ μικρόψυχον τὸ ἀγανακτεῖν ἢ
 10 ἐπιτείνεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων· πράως δὲ καὶ ἡσύχως οἶσει τὸ
 συμβάν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρέπον τοῦτο τῷ βουλομένῳ εἶναι μεγαλόφρονι.
 Σωκράτης γοῦν οὕτω διακείμενος φανερὸς ἦν, ὃς δημοσίᾳ λοιδορη-
 θεὶς ὑπ' Ἀριστοφάνους, οὐχ ὅπως ἡγανάκτησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐντυχῶν
 ἡξίου αὐτὸν εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον βούλοιο χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.
 15 ταχύ γ' ἂν ἐκείνος ἐν ὀλίγοις λοιδορούμενος ἐχαλέπηεν, ὃς οὐδὲ
 ἐν θεάτρῳ λοιδορηθεὶς ἡγανάκτει. Φωκίων δὲ ὁ χρηστός, τῆς
 γυναικὸς αὐτοῦ προπηλακισθείσης πρὸς τινος, τοσοῦτον ἐδέησεν
 ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ προπηλακίσαντι, ὥστε ἐπεὶ δέισας ἐκείνος προσήλθέ
 τε καὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἡξίου τὸν Φωκίωνα, φάσκων ἡγνοηκέναι
 20 ὅτι ἦν ἐκείνου γυνή, εἰς ἣν ἐπλημμέλει· ἀλλὰ ἢ γε ἐμὴ γυνὴ οὐδέν'
 ἔφη· ὑπὸ σοῦ πέπονθεν, ἑτέρα δὲ τις ἴσως· ὥστε οὐδὲ χρὴ ἐμοὶ σὲ
 ἀπολογεῖσθαι.' καὶ ἄλλους δὲ πολλοὺς ἄνδρας ἔχοιμ' ἂν λέγειν
 πειραθέντας ὕβρεως, τοὺς μὲν ἔκ τινων γλώσση πλημμεληθέντας,
 25 τοὺς δὲ χερσὶν ὥστε αἰκισθῆναι τὸ σῶμα· καὶ οὔτε ἀμυνάμενοι
 φαίνονται τοὺς πλημμελήσαντας, οὔτε ἄλλον τρόπον ἐπεξελθόντες,
 ἀλλὰ πάννυ πρᾶως ἐνεγκόντες τὴν ἀδικίαν αὐτῶν. καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ
 μὲν σκοπεῖν, ὅπως ἀντιδίδεταί τις τὸν δακόντα, καὶ ἀντιποιήσῃ
 κακῶς τὸν ὑπάρξαντα, θηρίου τινὸς οὐκ ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν, ὡς οὐδὲ
 τοῦτο λογίσασθαι δύναται, ὅτι τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων ὑπ'
 30 ἀγνοίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀμαρτάνεται, ὧν ὁ μεταδι-
 δαχθεὶς εὐθὺς παύεται· τὸ δὲ δέχεσθαι τὰς ἀμαρτίας μὴ ἀγρίως,
 μηδὲ ἀνῆκεστον εἶναι τοῖς πλημμελήσασιν, ἀλλ' αἷτιον εἶναι αὐτοῖς
 ἐλπίδος χρηστῆς, ἡμέρου τρόπου καὶ φιλανθρώπου ἐστίν. πόσῳ
 δὴ κρεῖττον οὕτως ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὸν φιλόσοφον, ὥστε συγ-

12 Cf. Plutarch *De Liberis educandis* 10, C. D. (*Moralia* I, p. 48, ed. Babbitt).

18-22 Plutarch relates a similar incident about Peisistratus. Cf. *Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata* 189 (*Moralia* III, p. 117, ed. Babbitt). Plutarch's account of Phocion's unjust condemnation and his final message to his son that he should cherish no resentment against the Athenians

them. But the wise and sensible man, such as the philosopher ought to be, is not disturbed by any of these things. He does not think that disgrace lies in enduring them, but rather in doing them. For what does the man who submits to insult do that is wrong? It is the doer of wrong who forthwith puts himself to shame, while the sufferer, who does nothing but submit, has no reason whatever to feel shame or disgrace. Therefore the sensible man would not go to law nor bring indictments, since he would not even consider that he had been insulted. Besides, to be annoyed or racked about such things would be petty. Rather he will easily and silently bear what has happened, since this befits one whose purpose is to be noble-minded. Socrates, you remember, was clearly of this frame of mind who, though publicly ridiculed by Aristophanes, was not angry, but when he happened to meet him, asked him if he would like to use him for some other role. Can't you imagine how quickly he would have flared up in anger at some petty abuse, this man who showed no concern even when abused in the public theatre! And the good Phocion, when his wife had been reviled by someone, so far from prosecuting the fellow when he came in fear and asked forgiveness of Phocion, saying that he did not know it was his wife whom he had offended, merely replied, "But my wife has suffered nothing at your hands, though perhaps some other woman has, so you have no need to apologize to me." And I might mention many other men who have experienced insult, some wronged by word, others by violence and bodily harm, who do not appear to have defended their rights against their assailants nor to have proceeded against them in any other way, but very meekly bore their wrong. And in this they were quite right. For to scheme how to bite back the biter and to return evil for evil is the act not of a human being but of a wild beast, which is incapable of reasoning that the majority of wrongs are done to men through ignorance and misunderstanding, from which man will cease as soon as he has been taught. But to accept injury not in a spirit of savage resentment and to show ourselves not implacable toward those who wrong us, but rather to be a source of good hope to them is characteristic of a benevolent and civilized way of life. How much better a figure does the philosopher make so conducting himself as to deem worthy of forgiveness anyone who wrongs him, than to behave as if ready to defend himself with legal

bears out Musonius' estimate of his character. (*Phocion* XXXVI.)

30 Socrates' conviction that man does wrong because he does not know what is right is well expressed by Xenophon. Cf. *Cyropaedia* III, 1, 38.

γνώμης ἀξιούν εἴ τις πλημμελήσειεν εἰς αὐτόν, ἣ δοκεῖν μὲν ἀμύνειν ἑαυτῷ δικαζόμενον καὶ ἐγκαλοῦντα, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ ἀσχημονεῖν, ἀνακόλουθα τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ λόγοις πράττοντα. εἴ γε λέγει μὲν, ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἀδικηθεῖη ποτὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ κακοῦ ἀνδρός·
 5 ἐγκαλεῖ δ' ὥς ἀδικούμενος ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων πονηρῶν αὐτὸς ἀξιῶν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι.

XI.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΤΙΣ Ο ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΙ ΠΡΟΣΗΚΩΝ ΠΟΡΟΣ.

- 10 Ἔστι καὶ ἕτερος πόρος οὐδὲν τούτου κακίων, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἀμείνων νομισθεὶς ἂν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἀνδρὶ γ' εὐρώσῃ τὸ σῶμα, ὁ ἀπὸ γῆς, ἂν τ' οὖν ἰδίαν ἔχῃ τις ἂν τε καὶ μή. πολλοὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀλλοτρίαν γῆν γεωργοῦντες, ἢ δημοσίαν ἢ ἰδιωτικὴν, δύνανται τρέφειν οὐ μόνον αὐτούς, καὶ τέκνα δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας· ἐνιοὶ γε δὴ
 15 καὶ εἰς ἄγαν ἀπὸ τούτου εὐποροῦσιν, αὐτουργικοὶ καὶ φιλόπονοι ὄντες. ἀμείβεται γὰρ ἡ γῆ κάλλιστα καὶ δικαιοτάτα τοὺς ἐπιμελομένους αὐτῆς, πολλαπλάσια ὧν λαμβάνει διδούσα καὶ ἀφθονίαν παρέχουσα πάντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων πρὸς τὸν βίον τῷ βουλομένῳ πονεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν σὺν τῷ πρέποντι, σὺν αἰσχύνῃ δ' οὐδὲν
 20 αὐτῶν. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς μὴ θρυπτικός γε μηδὲ μαλακὸς ὧν, ὃς ἂν φαίη τῶν γεωργικῶν ἔργων <ὅτι>οὐν αἰσχροὺς ἢ ἀνάρμοστον ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι. πῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐ καλὸν τὸ φυτεύειν; πῶς δὲ τὸ ἀροῦν; πῶς δὲ τὸ ἀμπελουργεῖν; τὸ δὲ σπείρειν, τὸ δὲ θερίζειν, τὸ δὲ ἀλοᾶν, οὐ πάντ' ἐλευθέρια ταῦτα καὶ ἀνδράσιν
 25 ἀγαθοῖς πρέποντα; καὶ μὴν τὸ ποιμαίνειν ὥσπερ Ἡσίοδον οὐ κατήσχυεν οὐδ' ἐκάλυεν εἶναι θεοφιλεῖ τε καὶ μουσικόν, οὕτως οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλον οὐδένα κωλύσειεν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ἀρεστὸν τοῦτο πάντων τῶν ἐν γεωργίαις ἔργων, ὅτι τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει σχολὴν πλείονα διανοεῖσθαι τι καὶ ζητεῖν παιδείας ἐχόμενον. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ
 30 ἔργα πάνυ ἐντείνει τὸ σῶμα καὶ κάμπτει, ταῦτα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν

3 This, of course, is an echo of the famous saying of Socrates in Plato's *Apology* 30A.

10 The opening sentence indicates that this excerpt was taken from a larger discourse on the same subject. What the other occupations suitable

procedure and indictments, while in reality he is behaving in an unseemly manner and acting quite contrary to his own teaching. To be sure he says that a good man can never be wronged by a bad man; but nevertheless he draws up an indictment as having been wronged by bad men, while claiming to be accounted a good man himself.

XI

WHAT MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD IS APPROPRIATE FOR
A PHILOSOPHER?

There is also another means of livelihood in no way inferior to this, indeed, perhaps it would not be unreasonable to consider it even better for a strong person, namely earning a living from the soil, whether one owns his own land or not. For many who are farming land owned either by the state or by other private individuals are yet able to support not only themselves but their wives and children as well; and some in fact attain even a high degree of prosperity by hard work with their own hands. For the earth repays most justly and well those who cultivate her, returning many times as much as she received and furnishing an abundance of all the necessities of life to anyone who is willing to work; and this she does without violating one's dignity or self-respect. You may be sure that no one who was not demoralized by soft living would say that the labor of the farmer was degrading or unfit for a good man. How, I ask, could planting trees or ploughing or pruning vines not be honorable? Are not sowing seed and harvesting and threshing all occupations for free men and befitting good men? Even keeping flocks, as it did not disgrace Hesiod nor prevent him from being a poet and beloved of the gods, so it would not prevent anyone else. In fact to me this is the most agreeable of all aspects of farming, because it gives the spirit more leisure to reflect on and to investigate the things that have to do with our own development and training. For while, to be sure, the occupations which strain and tire the whole body compel the mind to share in concentration upon

for a philosopher were may, perhaps, be found in Cicero, *De Officiis* I, 42, 151.

13 Horace (*Satire* II, 2) shows what satisfaction Ofellus, once owner of the land, now tenant farmer, derives from a life of farming.

20 Columella (*De Re Rustica*, Praef. 10-11) considers farming the only suitable life for a free man.

ἀναγκάζει πρὸς αὐτοῖς εἶναι μόνοις ἢ μάλιστα συνεντευινομένην τῷ σώματι· ὅσα δὲ τῶν ἔργων ἐφίησι μὴ ἄγαν ἐντετάσθαι τὸ σῶμα, ταῦτ' οὐκ ἀπείργει τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκλογίζεσθαι τι τῶν κρειττόνων κακ τῶν τοιούτων λογισμῶν αὐτὴν αὐτῆς γίνεσθαι σοφωτέραν, οὐ δὴ
5 καὶ μάλιστα πᾶς φιλόσοφος ἐφίεται. διὰ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ τὴν ποιμενικὴν ἀσπάζομαι μάλιστα. εἴ γε μὴν ἅμα φιλοσοφεῖ τις καὶ γεωργεῖ, οὐκ ἄλλον ἢ παραβάλοισι τούτῳ βίον οὐδὲ πορισμὸν ἕτερον προτιμήσομαι ἄν. πῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον ἀπὸ γῆς, ἢ τροφός τε καὶ μήτηρ ἐστὶν ἡμῶν, ἢ ἀπ' ἄλλου του τρέφεσθαι;
10 πῶς δ' οὐκ ἀνδρικώτερον τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἐν πόλει, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφισταί, τὸ ζῆν ἐν χωρίῳ; πῶς δ' οὐχ ὑγιεινότερον τοῦ σκιατροφεῖσθαι τὸ ἔξω διαιτᾶσθαι; τί δέ; ἐλευθεριώτερον αὐτὸν αὐτῷ μηχανᾶσθαι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ παρ' ἑτέρων λαμβάνειν; ἀλλὰ φαίνεται τὸ μὴ δεῖσθαι ἄλλου πρὸς τὰς χρεῖας τὰς αὐτοῦ πολὺ σεμνότερον ἢ τὸ
15 δεῖσθαι. οὕτως ἄρα καλὸν καὶ εὐδαιμονικὸν καὶ θεοφιλὲς τὸ ζῆν ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἐστί, σὺν γε τῷ καλοκάγαθίας μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν, ὥστε Μύσωνα τὸν Χηναῖον ὁ θεὸς ἀνείπε σοφὸν καὶ τὸν Ψωφίδιον Ἀγλαὸν εὐδαίμονα προσηγόρευσε, χωριτικῶς ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν βιοῦντα καὶ αὐτουργία χρώμενον καὶ τῆς ἐν ἄστει διατριβῆς
20 ἀπεχόμενον. ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἄξιον ζηλοῦν τε καὶ μιμῆσθαι τούτους καὶ περιέχεσθαι σπουδῇ τοῦ γεωργεῖν;
Τί οὖν; οὐ δεινὸν φαίη τις ἢ ἴσως ἄνδρα παιδευτικὸν καὶ δυνάμενον προβιβάζειν νέους εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἐργάζεσθαι γῆν καὶ τῷ σώματι πονεῖν τοῖς χωρίταις παραπλησίως; ναί. δεινὸν ἢ
25 τοῦτο τῷ ὄντι ἦν, εἴπερ ἐκώλυνεν ἢ ἐργασία τῆς γῆς φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ ἄλλους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ὠφελεῖν. νῦν δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ μοι δοκοῦσιν ὠφελεῖσθαι οἱ νέοι οὐκ ἐν πόλει τῷ διδασκάλῳ συνόντες οὐδ' ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ ἀκούοντες αὐτοῦ λέγοντος, ἀλλ' ἐργαζόμενον ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγροικίας ὀρῶντες καὶ ἔργῳ ἐνδεικνύμενον ἅπερ ὑφηγεῖται
30 ὁ λόγος, ὅτι χρὴ πονεῖν καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τῷ σώματι μᾶλλον ἢ ἑτέρου δεῖσθαι τοῦ τρέφοντος. τί δὲ τὸ κωλύον ἐστὶ καὶ ἐργαζόμενον τοῦ διδασκάλου τὸν μαθητὴν ἀκούειν τι ἅμα περὶ σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης ἢ καρτερίας λέγοντος; πολλῶν μὲν γὰρ λόγων οὐ δεῖ τοῖς φιλοσοφήσουσι καλῶς, οὐδὲ τὸν ὄχλον τοῦτον τῶν θεωρημά-
35 των ἀναληπτέον πάντως τοῖς νέοις, ἐφ' ᾧ φυνσωμένους τοὺς σοφιστὰς ὀρῶμεν· ταῦτα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ὄντι ἱκανὰ κατατρῖψαι βίον ἀνθρώπου ἐστί. τὰ δ' ἀναγκαιότατα καὶ χρησιμώτατα μαθεῖν οὐκ ἀδύνατον

17 Cf. Diogenes Laertius *Lives*. I, 9, 106.18 Cf. Pliny *Nat. Hist.* VII, 46 (151).

them, or at all events, upon the body, yet the occupations which require not too much physical exertion do not hinder the mind from reflecting on some of the higher things and by such reasoning from increasing its own wisdom—a goal toward which every philosopher earnestly strives. For these reasons I recommend particularly the life of a shepherd. But, speaking generally, if one devotes himself to the life of philosophy and tills the land at the same time, I should not compare any other way of life to his nor prefer any other means of livelihood. For is it not “living more in accord with nature” to draw one’s sustenance directly from the earth, which is the nurse and mother of us all, rather than from some other source? Is it not more like the life of a man to live in the country than to sit idly in the city, like the sophists? Who will say that it is not more healthy to live out of doors than to shun the open air and the heat of the sun? Tell me, do you think it is more fitting for a free man by his own labor to procure for himself the necessities of life or to receive them from others? But surely it is plain that not to require another’s help for one’s need is more dignified than asking for it. How very good and happy and blessed of heaven is the life of the soil, when along with it the goods of the spirit are not neglected, the example of Myson of Chen may show, whom the god called “wise,” and Aglaus of Psophis whom he hailed as “happy,” both of whom lived on the land and tilled the soil with their own hands, and held aloof from the life of the town. Is not their example worthy of emulation and an incentive to follow in their footsteps and to embrace the life of husbandry with a zeal like theirs?

What, perhaps someone may say, is it not preposterous for an educated man who is able to influence the young to the study of philosophy to work the land and to do manual labor just like a peasant? Yes, that would be really too bad if working the land prevented him from the pursuit of philosophy or from helping others to its attainment. But since that is not so, pupils would seem to me rather benefited by not meeting with their teacher in the city nor listening to his formal lectures and discussions, but by seeing him at work in the fields, demonstrating by his own labor the lessons which philosophy inculcates—that one should endure hardships, and suffer the pains of labor with his own body, rather than depend upon another for sustenance. What is there to prevent a student while he is working from listening to a teacher speaking about self-control or justice or endurance? For those who teach philosophy well do not need many words, nor is there any need that pupils should try to master all this current

- καὶ πρὸς ἐργασίᾳ γεωργικῇ ὄντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὐ διὰ παντὸς ἐργασομένους, ἀλλὰ ἀναπαύλαις χρησομένους. ὀλίγοι μὲν οὖν τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ἐβελήσουσι μαρθάνειν, οἷδ' ἀκριβῶς ἐγώ· ἔστι δὲ ἅμεινον μηδὲ προσίεναι τῷ φιλοσόφῳ τοὺς πλείονας τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν λεγόντων νέων, ὅσοι σαθροὶ τε καὶ μαλακοί, δι' οὓς προσιόντας ἀναπίμπλαται κηλίδων φιλοσοφία. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθινῶν ἐραστῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεὶς, ὃς οὐκ ἂν ἐβελήσειε μετ' ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ διάγειν ἐν χωρίῳ, καὶ εἰ χαλεπώτατον τύχοι ὃν τὸ χωρίον, μέλλων γε ἀπολαύειν μεγάλα ταύτης τῆς διατριβῆς
- 10 τῷ συνείναι τῷ διδασκάλῳ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, τῷ ἀπείναι τῶν ἀστικῶν κακῶν, ἅπερ ἐμπόδιον τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν, τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι λανθάνειν εἴ ἢ κακῶς τι ποιῶν, ὃ δὴ μέγιστον τοῖς παιδευομένοις ὄφελος· καὶ ἐσθίειν δὲ καὶ πίνειν καὶ καθεύδειν ἐφορώμενον ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ μέγα ὄφελος. ἃ δὲ γένοιντ' ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐν τῇ
- 15 συνουσίᾳ τῇ κατ' ἀγρόν, ταῦτα ἐπαινεῖ καὶ Θεογνίς ἐν οἷς φησι

καὶ μετὰ τῶν σύ γε πίνει καὶ ἔσθιε, καὶ μετὰ τοῖσιν
ἴξε, καὶ ἄνδανε τοῖς, ὧν μεγάλη δύναμις.

- ὅτι γε μὴν οὐκ ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας λέγει μεγάλην ἔχειν δύναμιν πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ὠφέλειαν, εἰ συνεσθίοι καὶ συμπίνοι
- 20 τις αὐτοῖς καὶ συγκαθέζοιτο, δεδήλωκεν·

ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεται· ἦν δὲ κακοῖσι
† συμμυγῆς, ἀπολείς καὶ τὸν ἔοντα νόον.

- μὴ δὴ λεγέτω τις ὅτι τῷ μαρθάνειν ἢ τῷ διδάσκειν ἃ χρὴ τὸ γεωργεῖν ἐμπόδιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν, εἰ δὴ μάλιστ' ἂν
- 25 οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστον ὁ μὲν μαρθάνων συνείη τῷ διδάσκοντι, ὁ δὲ διδάσκων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχοι τὸν μαρθάνοντα. τούτου δὲ τοιούτου ὄντος, ὁ πόρος ἐκ γεωργίας φαίνεται ὧν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ πρεπωδέστατος.

XII.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΤ

30

ΠΕΡΙ ΑΦΡΟΔΙΣΙΩΝ.

Μέρος μέντοι τρυφῆς οὐ μικρότατον κἂν τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις ἐστίν, ὅτι ποικίλων δέονται παιδικῶν οἱ τρυφῶντες οὐ νομίμων μόνον ἀλλὰ

mass of precepts on which we see our sophists pride themselves; they are enough to consume a whole life-time. But the most necessary and useful things it is not impossible for men to learn in addition to their farm work, especially if they are not kept at work constantly but have periods of rest. Now I know perfectly well that few will wish to learn in this way, yet it would be better if the majority of young men who say they are studying philosophy did not go near a philosopher, I mean those spoiled and effeminate fellows by whose presence the good name of philosophy is stained. For of the true lovers of philosophy, there is not one who would not be willing to live with a good man in the country, even if the place be very rude, since he would be bound to profit greatly from this sojourn by living with his teacher night and day, by being away from the evils of the city, which are an obstacle to the study of philosophy, and from the fact that his conduct, whether good or bad, cannot escape observation—a great advantage to those who are learning. Also to eat and drink and sleep under the supervision of a good man is a great benefit. All these things, which would come about inevitably from living together in the country, Theognis praised in the verses where he says,

“Drink and eat and sit down with good men, and win the approval of those whose influence and power is great.”

That he means that none others but good men have great power for the good of men, if one eats and drinks and sits down with them, he has shown in the following:

“From good men you will learn good, but if you mingle with the bad you will destroy even such soul as you had.”

Therefore let no one say that farming is an obstacle to learning or to teaching the lessons of duty, for it can scarcely be such an obstacle, if we realize that under these conditions the pupil lives in closest association with the teacher, and the teacher has the pupil constantly at hand. And where this is the case, earning a living by farming seems to be most suitable for a philosopher.

XII

ON SEXUAL INDULGENCE

Not the least significant part of the life of luxury and self-indulgence lies also in sexual excess; for example those who lead

16 f., 21 f. *Elegies* 33-36.

25 Persius' description of his very happy relationship with his teacher Cornutus bears out Musonius' contention. Cf. *Sat.* V, 41-44.

- καὶ παρανόμων, οὐδὲ θηλειῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρρένων, ἄλλοτε ἄλλους θηρώντες ἐρωμένους, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐν ἐτοίμῳ οὖσιν οὐκ ἀρκοῦμενοι, τῶν δὲ σπανίων ἐφιέμενοι, συμπλοκὰς δ' ἀσχήμονας ζητοῦντες, ἅπερ ἅπαντα μεγάλα ἐγκλήματα ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν. 5 χρῆ δὲ τοὺς μὴ τρυφῶντας ἢ μὴ κακοὺς μόνον μὲν ἀφροδίσια νομίζειν δίκαια τὰ ἐν γάμῳ καὶ ἐπὶ γενέσει παιδῶν συντελούμενα, ὅτι καὶ νόμιμά ἐστιν· τὰ δέ γε ἡδονὴν θηρώμενα ψιλὴν ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα, καὶ ἐν γάμῳ ἤ. συμπλοκαὶ δ' ἄλλαι αἱ μὲν κατὰ μοιχείαν παρανομώταται, καὶ μετριώτεράι τούτων οὐδὲν αἱ πρὸς ἄρρενας 10 τοῖς ἄρρεσιν, ὅτι παρὰ φύσιν τὸ τὸλμημα· ὅσαι δὲ μοιχείας ἐκτὸς συνουσίαι πρὸς θηλείας εἰσὶν ἐστερημέναι τοῦ γίνεσθαι κατὰ νόμον, καὶ αὐταὶ πᾶσαι αἰσχυραί, αἱ γὰρ πράττονται δι' ἀκολασίαν. ὥς μετὰ γε σωφροσύνης οὐτ' ἂν ἐταίρα πλησιάζειν ὑπομείναι τις, οὐτ' ἂν ἐλευθέρῳ γάμου χωρὶς οὔτε μὰ Δία θεραπεύῃ τῇ αὐτοῦ.
- 15 τὸ γὰρ μὴ νόμιμον μηδ' εὐπρεπὲς τῶν συνουσιῶν τούτων αἰσχυρὸς τε καὶ ὄνειδος μέγα τοῖς θηρωμένοις αὐτάς· ὅθεν οὐδὲ πράττειν φανερώς οὐδὲν ἀνέχεται τῶν τοιούτων οὐδεῖς, καὶ ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἐρυθριᾷ οἷός τε ἡ, ἐπικρυπτόμενοι δὲ καὶ λάθρῳ οἱ γὰρ μὴ τελῶς ἀπερρωγότες ταῦτα τολμῶσιν. καίτοι τό γε πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν 20 ἐφ' οἷς πράττει τις ὁμολογούντος ἁμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. νῆ Δία, φησὶν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥσπερ ὁ μοιχεύων ἀδικεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς διεφθαρμένης γυναικός, οὐχ οὕτως καὶ ὁ τῇ ἐταίρᾳ συνῶν ἀδικεῖ τινὰ ἢ νῆ Δία τῇ μὴ ἐχούσῃ ἄνδρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐλπίδα παιδῶν οὐδενὸς διαφθείρει οὗτος. ἐγὼ δ' ἐπέχω μὲν λέγειν, ὥς πᾶς ὅστις ἁμαρτάνει καὶ 25 ἀδικεῖ εὐθύς, εἰ καὶ μηδένα τῶν πέλας, ἀλλ' αὐτόν γε πάντως χείρονα ἀποφαίνων καὶ ἀτιμότερον· ὁ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνων, παρ' ὅσον ἁμαρτάνει, χείρων καὶ ἀτιμότερος. ἵνα οὖν ἐὼ τὴν ἀδικίαν, ἀλλ' ἀκολασίαν γε πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πάντως προσεῖναι τῷ ἡττωμένῳ αἰσχυρᾷ ἡδονῆς καὶ χαίροντι τῷ μολύνεσθαι, ὥσπερ αἱ ὕες· οἷος 30 οὐχ ἥκιστα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ δούλῃ ἰδίᾳ πλησιάζων, ὅπερ νομίζουσιν τινες μάλιστά πως εἶναι ἀναίτιον, ἐπεὶ καὶ δεσπότης πᾶς αὐτεξούσιος εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅτι βούλεται χρῆσθαι δούλῳ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ. πρὸς τοῦτο δὲ ἀπλοῦς μοι ὁ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ τῷ δοκεῖ μὴ αἰσχυρὸν μηδ' ἄτοπον εἶναι δούλῃ δεσπότῃν πλησιάζειν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ μάλιστα εἰ τύχοι 35 οὔσα χήρα, λογισάσθω ποῖόν τι καταφαίνεται αὐτῷ, εἰ δέσποινα δούλῳ πλησιάζοι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι ἀνεκτόν, οὐ μόνον εἰ κεκτημένη ἄνδρα νόμιμον ἢ γυνὴ προσοίτο δούλον, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἄναδρος οὔσα τοῦτο πράττοι; καίτοι τοὺς ἄνδρας οὐ δῆπου τῶν γυναικῶν ἀξιώσει τις εἶναι χείρους, οὐδ' ἡττον δύνασθαι τὰς 40 ἐπιθυμίας παιδαγωγεῖν τὰς ἑαυτῶν, τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους τὴν γνώμην

such a life crave a variety of loves not only lawful but unlawful ones as well, not women alone but also men; sometimes they pursue one love and sometimes another, and not being satisfied with those which are available, pursue those which are rare and inaccessible, and invent shameful intimacies, all of which constitute a grave indictment of manhood. Men who are not wantons or immoral are bound to consider sexual intercourse justified only when it occurs in marriage and is indulged in for the purpose of begetting children, since that is lawful, but unjust and unlawful when it is mere pleasure-seeking, even in marriage. But of all sexual relations those involving adultery are most unlawful, and no more tolerable are those of men with men, because it is a monstrous thing and contrary to nature. But, furthermore, leaving out of consideration adultery, all intercourse with women which is without lawful character is shameful and is practiced from lack of self-restraint. So no one with any self-control would think of having relations with a courtesan or a free woman apart from marriage, no, nor even with his own maid-servant. The fact that those relationships are not lawful or seemly makes them a disgrace and a reproach to those seeking them; whence it is that no one dares to do any of these things openly, not even if he has all but lost the ability to blush, and those who are not completely degenerate dare to do these things only in hiding and in secret. And yet to attempt to cover up what one is doing is equivalent to a confession of guilt. "That's all very well," you say, "but unlike the adulterer who wrongs the husband of the woman he corrupts, the man who has relations with a courtesan or a woman who has no husband wrongs no one for he does not destroy anyone's hope of children." I continue to maintain that everyone who sins and does wrong, even if it affects none of the people about him, yet immediately reveals himself as a worse and a less honorable person; for the wrong-doer by the very fact of doing wrong is worse and less honorable. Not to mention the injustice of the thing, there must be sheer wantonness in anyone yielding to the temptation of shameful pleasure and like swine rejoicing in his own vileness. In this category belongs the man who has relations with his own slave-maid, a thing which some people consider quite without blame, since every master is held to have it in his power to use his slave as he wishes. In reply to this I have just one thing to say: if it seems neither shameful nor out of place for a master to have relations with his own slave, particularly if she happens to be unmarried, let him consider how he would like it if his wife had relations with a male slave. Would it not seem completely intolerable not only if the woman who

τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων, τοὺς ἄρχοντας τῶν ἀρχομένων. πολὺ γὰρ κρείττονας εἶναι προσήκει τοὺς ἄνδρας, εἴπερ καὶ προεστάναι ἀξιούνται τῶν γυναικῶν ἂν μέντοι ἀκρατέστεροι φαίνονται ὄντες, <φανοῦνται ὄντες> καὶ κακίονες. ὅτι δ' ἀκρασίας ἔργον καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄλλου ἐστὶ τὸ δεσπότην δούλῃ πλησιάζειν, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; γνώριμον γάρ.

ΧΙΠ^Α.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΤ

ΤΙ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΓΑΜΟΤ.

- 10 [Βίου καὶ γενέσεως παίδων κοινωνίαν κεφάλαιον εἶναι γάμου.]
Τὸν γὰρ γαμοῦντα, ἔφη, καὶ τὴν γαμουμένην ἐπὶ τούτῳ συνιέναι χρὴ ἐκάτερον θατέρῳ, ὥσθ' ἅμα μὲν ἀλλήλοις βιοῦν, ἅμα δὲ <παιδο>ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ κοινὰ δὲ ἡγέισθαι πάντα καὶ μηδὲν ἴδιον, μηδ' αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα. μεγάλη μὲν γὰρ γένεσις ἀνθρώπου, ἣν ἀποτελεῖ
15 τοῦτο τὸ ζεύγος. ἀλλ' οὐπω τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τῷ γαμοῦντι, ὃ δὴ καὶ δίχα γάμου γένοιτ' ἂν συμπλεκόμενων ἄλλως, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ζῶα συμπλέκεται αὐτοῖς. δεῖ δὲ ἐν γάμῳ πάντως συμβίωσιν τε εἶναι καὶ κηδεμονίαν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς περὶ ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐρρωμένους καὶ νοσοῦντας καὶ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ, ἧς ἐφείμενος ἐκάτερος ὥσπερ
20 καὶ παιδοποιίας εἰσιν ἐπὶ γάμον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἡ κηδεμονία αὕτη τέλειός ἐστι, καὶ τελέως αὐτὴν οἱ συνόντες ἀλλήλοις παρέχονται, ἀμιλλώμενοι νικᾶν ὁ ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον, οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ γάμος ἢ προσήκει ἔχει καὶ ἀξιοζήλωτός ἐστι· καλὴ γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη κοινωνία· ὅπου δ' ἐκάτερος σκοπεῖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μόνον ἀμελῶν θατέρου, ἢ καὶ
25 νῇ Δί' ὁ ἕτερος οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ οἰκίαν μὲν οἰκεῖ τὴν αὐτήν, τῇ δὲ γνώμῃ βλέπει ἔξω, μὴ βουλόμενος τῷ ὁμόζυγι συντείνειν τε καὶ συμπνεῖν, ἐνταῦθ' ἀνάγκη φθείρεσθαι μὲν τὴν κοινωνίαν, φαύλως δὲ ἔχειν τὰ πράγματα τοῖς συνοικοῦσιν, καὶ ἡ διαλύονται τέλεον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἢ τὴν συμμονὴν χεῖρῳ ἐρμίας ἔχουσιν.

4 φανοῦνται ὄντες coniecit Meineke

10 βίου . . . γάμου interpolatio mihi videtur

13 παιδοποιεῖσθαι coniecit Peerlkamp ποιεῖσθαι Hense

had a lawful husband had relations with a slave, but even if a woman without a husband should have? And yet surely one will not expect men to be less moral than women, nor less capable of disciplining their desires, thereby revealing the stronger in judgment inferior to the weaker, the rulers to the ruled. In fact, it behooves men to be much better if they expect to be superior to women, for surely if they appear to be less self-controlled they will also be baser characters. What need is there to say that it is an act of licentiousness and nothing less for a master to have relations with a slave? Everyone knows that.

XIIIA

WHAT IS THE CHIEF END OF MARRIAGE?

[That the primary end of marriage is community of life with a view to the procreation of children.] The husband and wife, he used to say, should come together for the purpose of making a life in common and of procreating children, and furthermore of regarding all things in common between them, and nothing peculiar or private to one or the other, not even their own bodies. The birth of a human being which results from such a union is to be sure something marvelous, but it is not yet enough for the relation of husband and wife, inasmuch as quite apart from marriage it could result from any other sexual union, just as in the case of animals. But in marriage there must be above all perfect companionship and mutual love of husband and wife, both in health and in sickness and under all conditions, since it was with desire for this as well as for having children that both entered upon marriage. Where, then, this love for each other is perfect and the two share it completely, each striving to outdo the other in devotion, the marriage is ideal and worthy of envy, for such a union is beautiful. But where each looks only to his own interests and neglects the other, or, what is worse, when one is so minded and lives in the same house but fixes his attention elsewhere and is not willing to pull together with his yoke-mate nor to agree, then the union is doomed to disaster and though they live together, yet their common interests fare badly; eventually they separate entirely or they remain together and suffer what is worse than loneliness.

10 The first sentence seems to be an interpolation.

22 This fine passage, reminiscent of the Pauline "in honour preferring one another" (*Rom. XII, 10*) recalls Tacitus' description of the relationship between Agricola and his wife. Cf. *Agricola* 6.

XIII^B.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΤΙ ΚΕΦΑΛΑΙΟΝ ΓΑΜΟΥ.

Διὸ χρὴ τοὺς γαμοῦντας οὐκ εἰς γένος ἀφορᾶν εἰ ἐξ εὐπατριδῶν,
 5 οὐδ' εἰς χρήματα εἰ πολλὰ κέκτηνται τινες, οὐδ' εἰς σώματα εἰ
 καλὰ ἔχουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ πλοῦτος οὔτε κάλλος οὔτ' εὐγένεια
 κοινωνίαν μᾶλλον αὔξειν πέφυκεν, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁμόνοιαν, οὐδ' αὖ
 τὴν παιδοποιίαν κρείττω ταῦτα ἀπεργάζεται· ἀλλὰ σώματα μὲν
 πρὸς γάμον ἀποχρῶντα τὰ ὑγιή καὶ τὴν ιδέαν μέσα καὶ αὐτουργεῖν
 10 ἱκανά, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀκολάστων ἦττον, καὶ
 ἐργάζοιτο μᾶλλον ὅσα σώματος ἔργα, καὶ παιδοποιεῖτο μὴ ενδεῶς.
 ψυχὰς δὲ ἐπιτηδαιοτάτας εἶναι νομιστέον τὰς πρὸς σωφροσύνην
 καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ὅλως πρὸς ἀρετὴν εὐφροσύνης. ποῖος μὲν
 γὰρ γάμος χωρὶς ὁμοιοῦς καλός; ποία δὲ κοινωνία χρηστή; πῶς
 15 δ' ἂν ὁμονόησειαν ἀνθρώποι πονηροὶ ὄντες ἀλλήλοις; ἢ πῶς ἀγαθὸς
 πονηρῷ ὁμονόησειεν <ἄν>; οὐδέν γε μᾶλλον ἢ ὀρθῶ ξύλῳ στρεβλὸν
 συναρμόσειεν ἄν, ἢ στρεβλὰ ἄμφω ὄντα ἀλλήλοις. τὸ γὰρ δὴ
 στρεβλὸν τῷ τε ὁμοίῳ τῷ στρεβλῷ ἀνάρμοστον καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τῷ
 εὐθείῳ ἔτι μᾶλλον. ἔστι δὴ καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς τῷ τε πονηρῷ οὐ φίλος οὐδ'
 20 ὁμονοεῖ καὶ πολὺ ἦττον τῷ χρηστῷ.

XIV.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΤΙ ΕΜΠΟΔΙΟΝ ΤΩΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΕΙΝ ΓΑΜΟΣ.

* Ἄλλου δέ τινος φήσαντος, ὅτι ἐμπόδιον αὐτῷ δοκοίη εἶναι τῷ
 25 φιλοσοφεῖν γάμος καὶ ὁ σὺν γυναικὶ βίος, Πυθαγόρα μὲν, εἶπεν
 ὁ Μουσώνιος, οὐκ ἐμπόδιον ἦν, οὐδὲ Σωκράτει, οὐδὲ Κράτητι, ὧν
 ἕκαστος συνώκησε γυναικί· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις εἰπεῖν ἄμεινον

16 ἄν Wendland

1 Undoubtedly this is a part of the same large discourse from which XIII^A was taken.

XIIIB

WHAT IS THE CHIEF END OF MARRIAGE?

Therefore those who contemplate marriage ought to have regard neither for family, whether either one be of high-born parents, nor for wealth, whether on either side there be great possessions, nor for physical traits, whether one or the other have beauty. For neither wealth nor beauty nor high birth is effective in promoting partnership of interest or sympathy, nor again are they significant for producing children. But as for the body it is enough for marriage that it be healthy, of normal appearance, and capable of hard work, such as would be less exposed to the snares of tempters, better adapted to perform physical labor, and not wanting in strength to beget or to bear children. With respect to character or soul one should expect that it be habituated to self-control and justice, and in a word, naturally disposed to virtue. <These qualities should be present in both man and wife.> For without sympathy of mind and character between husband and wife, what marriage can be good, what partnership advantageous? How could two human beings who are base have sympathy of spirit one with the other? Or how could one that is good be in harmony with one that is bad? No more than a crooked piece of wood could be fitted to a straight one, or two crooked ones be put together. For the crooked one will not fit another crooked one, and much less the opposite, a crooked with a straight one. So a wicked man is not friendly to a wicked one, nor does he agree with him, and much less with a good man.

XIV

IS MARRIAGE A HANDICAP FOR THE PURSUIT
OF PHILOSOPHY?

Again when someone said that marriage and living with a wife seemed to him a handicap to the pursuit of philosophy, Musonius said that it was no handicap to Pythagoras, nor to Socrates, nor to Crates, each of whom lived with a wife, and one could not

13 A connecting sentence seems to have dropped out of the Greek text at this point.

19 f. Cf. Plato *Lysis* 214D.

ἐκείνων ἐτέρους φιλοσοφήσαντας. καίτοι γε Κράτης ἄοικός τε καὶ ἀσκευῆς καὶ ἀκτῆμων τέλεον ἦν, ἀλλ' ὅμως ἔγγωμεν· εἴτα μὴδ' ὑπόδυσιν ἔχων ἰδίαν ἐν ταῖς δημοσίαις Ἀθήνησι στοαῖς διημέρευε καὶ διενυκτέρευε μετὰ τῆς γυναικός· ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀπ' οἰκίας ὁρμώμενοι, 5 καὶ οἰκέτας τοὺς ὑπηρετοῦντας ἔχοντες ἔνιοι, τολμῶμεν ὅμως λέγειν ἐμπόδιον εἶναι φιλοσοφίᾳ γάμον; καὶ μὴν ὃ γε φιλόσοφος διδάσκαλος δῆπου καὶ ἡγεμὼν πάντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπῳ προσηκόντων· κατὰ φύσιν δ', εἴ τι ἄλλο, καὶ τὸ γαμεῖν φαίνεται ὄν. ἐπεὶ τοῦ χάριν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργὸς πρῶτον 10 μὲν ἔτεμε δίχα τὸ γένος ἡμῶν, εἴτ' ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ διττὰ αἰδοῖα, τὸ μὲν εἶναι θήλεος τὸ δὲ ἄρρενος, εἴτα δὲ ἐνεποίησεν ἐπιθυμίαν ἰσχυρὰν ἑκατέρῳ θατέρου τῆς θ' ὁμιλίας καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας καὶ πόθον ἰσχυρὸν ἀμφοῖν ἀλλήλων ἐνεκέραςεν, τῷ μὲν ἄρρενι τοῦ θήλεος τῷ δὲ θήλει τοῦ ἄρρενος; ἀρ' οὖν <οὐ> γινώριμον, ὅτι ἐβού- 15 λετο συνείναι τε αὐτῶ καὶ συζῆν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀλλήλοις συμμηχανᾶσθαι, καὶ γένεσιν παιδῶν καὶ τροφὴν ἅμα ποιεῖσθαι, ὥς ἂν τὸ γένος ἡμῶν αἰδίδιον ᾖ; τί δ'; εἰπέ μοι, πότερα προσήκει ἕκαστον ποιεῖν καὶ τὰ τοῦ πέλας, καὶ ὅπως οἰκοὶ ὧσιν ἐν τῇ πόλει αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅπως ἡ πόλις μὴ ἔρημος ᾖ, καὶ ὅπως τὸ κοινὸν ἔξει 20 καλῶς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ φῆς, ὥς τὸ αὐτοῦ σκεπτέον μόνον, ἀποφαίνεις τὸν ἀνθρώπου λύκου μὴδὲν διαφέροντα μὴδ' ἄλλου θηρίου τῶν ἀγριωτάτων μὴδενός, ἅπερ ἀπὸ βίας καὶ πλεονεξίας πέφυκε ζῆν, μὴ φειδόμενα μὴδενός ἀφ' ὅτου μέλλει καρποῦσθαι τι ἡδύ, ἅμοιρα μὲν κοινωνίας ὄντα, ἅμοιρα δὲ συνεργίας τῆς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, ἅμοιρα 25 δὲ δικαίου παντός. εἰ δ' ὁμολογήσεις τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν μελίσσῃ μάλιστα προσεοικέναι, ἢ μὴ δύναται μόνῃ ζῆν, ἀπόλλυται γὰρ μονωθείσα, πρὸς ἓν δὲ καὶ κοινὸν ἔργον τῶν ὁμοφύλων συν- νέενυκε καὶ συμπράττει καὶ συνεργάζεται τοῖς πλησίον· εἰ ταῦτα ταύτῃ ἔχει, καὶ ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις κακία μὲν ἀνθρώπου εἶναι 30 ὑπέληπται ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀγριότης καὶ τὸ τοῦ πλησίον πράττοντος κακῶς ἀφροντιστεῖν, ἀρετὴ δὲ φιλανθρωπία καὶ χρηστότης καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ εὐεργετικὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ κηδεμονικὸν εἶναι τοῦ πέλας· οὕτω καὶ πόλεως ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ φροντιστέον καὶ τῇ πόλει οἶκον περιβλητέον. ἀρχὴ δὲ οἴκου περιβολῆς γάμος. 35 ὥστε ὁ ἀναιρῶν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γάμον ἀναιρεῖ μὲν οἶκον, ἀναιρεῖ δὲ πόλιν, ἀναιρεῖ δὲ σύμπαν τὸ ἀνθρώπειον γένος. οὐ γὰρ ἂν διαμένει μὴ γενέσεως οὔσης, οὐδ' ἂν γένεσις εἴη μὴ γάμου ὄντος, ἢ γε δικαία καὶ νόμιμος. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οἶκος ἢ πόλις οὗτ' ἐκ γυναικῶν

1 Cf. Epictetus *Disc.* III, 22, 76.

mention better philosophers than these. Crates, although homeless and completely without property or possessions, was nevertheless married; furthermore, not having a shelter of his own, he spent his days and nights in the public porticoes of Athens together with his wife. How, then, can we, who have a home to start with and some of us even have servants to work for us, venture to say that marriage is a handicap for philosophy? Now the philosopher is indeed the teacher and leader of men in all the things which are appropriate for men according to nature, and marriage, if anything, is manifestly in accord with nature. For, to what other purpose did the creator of mankind first divide our human race into two sexes, male and female, then implant in each a strong desire for association and union with the other, instilling in both a powerful longing each for the other, the male for the female and the female for the male? Is it not then plain that he wished the two to be united and live together, and by their joint efforts to devise a way of life in common, and to produce and rear children together, so that the race might never die? Tell me, then, is it fitting for each man to act for himself alone or to act in the interest of his neighbor also, not only that there may be homes in the city but also that the city may not be deserted and that the common good may best be served? If you say that each one should look out for his own interests alone, you represent man as no different from a wolf or any other of the wildest beasts which are born to live by violence and plunder, sparing nothing from which they may gain some advantage, having no part in a life in common with others, no part in cooperation with others, no share of any notion of justice. If you will agree that man's nature most closely resembles the bee which cannot live alone (for it dies when left alone), but bends its energies to the one common task of his fellows and toils and works together with his neighbors; if this is so, and in addition you recognize that for man evil consists in injustice and cruelty and indifference to a neighbor's trouble, while virtue is brotherly love and goodness and justice and beneficence and concern for the welfare of one's neighbor—with such ideas, I say, it would be each man's duty to take thought for his own city, and to make of his home a rampart for its protection. But the first step toward making his home such a rampart is marriage. Thus whoever destroys human marriage destroys the home, the city, and the whole human race. For it would not last if there were no procreation of children and there would be no just and lawful procreation of children without marriage. That the home or the city does not depend upon women alone or upon men alone, but upon their

- συνίσταται μόνον οὐτ' ἐξ ἀνδρῶν μόνον, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίας, δηλον· ἀνδρῶν δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν κοινωνίας ἄλλην οὐκ ἂν εὔροι τις οὐτ' ἀναγκαιοτέραν οὔτε προσφιλεστέραν. ποῖος γὰρ ἑταῖρος ἑταίρῳ οὕτω προσηγῆς ὡς γυνὴ καταθύμιος τῷ γεγαμηκότι;
- 5 ποῖος δ' ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ; ποῖος δὲ γονεὺσιν υἱός; τίς δὲ ἀπῶν οὕτω ποθεινὸς ὡς ἀνὴρ γυναικὶ καὶ γυνὴ ἀνδρί; τίνος δὲ παρουσία μᾶλλον ἢ λύπην ἐλαφρύνειεν ἢ ἡ χαρὰν ἐπανξήσειεν ἢ συμφορὰν ἐπανορθώσειεν; τίσι δὲ νερόμισται κοινὰ εἶναι πάντα, καὶ σώματα καὶ ψυχὰι καὶ χρήματα, πλὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός; ταῦτά τοι καὶ
- 10 πάντες ἀνθρώποι πρεσβυτάτην νομίζουσι πασῶν τὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς φιλίαν· καὶ οὐδὲ μήτηρ ἢ πατὴρ νοῦν ἔχων οὐδεὶς ἀξιοῖ φίλτερος <εἶναι> τῷ ἑαυτοῦ τέκνῳ τοῦ συνεζευγμένου γάμῳ. καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ ἐκείνος φαίνεται δηλοῦν, ὅσον προτερὲι τῆς γονέων πρὸς τέκνα φιλίας ἢ γυναικὸς πρὸς ἄνδρα, ὅτι "Ἀδμητος δόσιν ταύτην
- 15 λαβὼν παρὰ θεῶν, εἰ παράσχοι τὸν ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ τεθηξόμενον, ζῆσαι διπλασίῳ χρόνον τοῦ τεταγμένου αὐτῷ, τῶν μὲν γονέων οὐκ ἔτυχεν ἐθελόντων προαποθανεῖν αὐτοῦ καίτοι γεγενηράκῳ" ἢ γυνὴ δὲ ἢ γαμετὴ "Ἀλκηστις, κομιδῇ νέα οὔσα, ἐδέξατο ἐτοίμως τὸν θάνατον πρὸ τοῦ ἀνδρός.
- 20 "Οτι δὲ μέγα καὶ ἀξιοσπούδαστον ὁ γάμος ἐστί, καὶ ταύτη δηλον. θεοὶ γὰρ ἐπιτροπεύουσιν αὐτόν, καθὼ νομίζονται παρ' ἀνθρώποις, μεγάλοι· πρώτη μὲν Ἥρα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ζυγίαν αὐτὴν προσαγορεύομεν· εἴτα Ἔρως, εἴτα Ἀφροδίτη· πάντας γὰρ τούτους ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἔργον πεποιῆσθαι τοῦτο, συνάγειν ἀλλήλοις πρὸς
- 25 παιδοποιῶν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα. ποῦ μὲν γὰρ Ἔρως παραγένειτ' ἂν δικαιότερον ἢ ἐπὶ νόμιμον ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ὁμιλίαν; ποῦ δὲ Ἥρα; ποῦ δὲ Ἀφροδίτη; πότε δ' ἂν εὐκαιρότερον εὔξαιτό τις τοῖς θεοῖς τούτοις ἢ πρὸς γάμον ἰών; τί δὲ καλοῦντες ἀφροδίσιον ἔργον προσηκόντως ἂν μᾶλλον καλοῖμεν ἢ τὴν γαμετῆς τῷ γεγα-
- 30 μηκότι σύνοδον; διὰ τί τοιγαροῦν φαίη τις ἂν θεοὺς μὲν οὕτω μεγάλους ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιτροπεύειν γάμον καὶ παιδοποιῶν, μὴ προσήκειν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ ταῦτα; διὰ τί δὲ προσήκειν μὲν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ταῦτα, μὴ προσήκειν δὲ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ; πότερον <ὅτι> κακίῳ εἶναι χρὴ τῶν ἄλλων τὸν φιλόσοφον; ἀλλ' οὐ χρὴ, κρείττω δὲ καὶ δικαιο-
- 35 τερον καὶ καλοκάγαθικώτερον. ἢ ὅτι κακίων οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἀδικώτερος ἀνὴρ τοῦ μὲν κηδομένου τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πόλεως ὁ μὴ κηδόμενος, τοῦ δὲ τὸ κοινὸν σκοποῦντος ὁ τὸ αὐτοῦ μόνον ὀρώων; ἢ ὅτι φιλόπολις καὶ φιλόανθρωπος καὶ κοινωνικὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ὁ μονήρη βίον

14 He refers particularly to lines 282-298 of Euripides' *Alcestis*.

union with each other is evident. One could find no other association more necessary nor more pleasant than that of men and women. For what man is so devoted to his friend as a loving wife is to her husband? What brother to a brother? What son to his parents? Who is so longed for when absent as a husband by his wife, or a wife by her husband? Whose presence would do more to lighten grief or increase joy or remedy misfortune? To whom is everything judged to be common, body, soul, and possessions, except man and wife? For these reasons all men consider the love of man and wife to be the highest form of love; and no reasonable mother or father would expect to entertain a deeper love for his own child than for the one joined to him in marriage. Indeed how much the love of a wife for her husband surpasses the love of parents for their children is clearly illustrated by the familiar story of how Admetus, receiving from the gods the privilege of living twice the time allotted to him if he could get someone else to die in his place, found his parents unwilling to die for him although they were old, but his wedded wife Alcestis, though still very young, readily accepted death in her husband's place.

How great and worthy an estate is marriage is plain from this also, that gods watch over it, great gods, too, in the estimation of men; first Hera (and for this reason we address her as the patroness of wedlock), then Eros, then Aphrodite, for we assume that all of these perform the function of bringing together man and woman for the procreation of children. Where, indeed, does Eros more properly belong than in the lawful union of man and wife? Where Hera? Where Aphrodite? When would one more appropriately pray to these divinities than when entering into marriage? What should we more properly call the work of Aphrodite than the joining of wife and husband? Why, then, should anyone say that such great divinities watch over and guard marriage and the procreation of children, unless these things are the proper concern of man? Why should one say that they are the proper concern of man but not the concern of the philosopher? Can it be because the philosopher is worse than other men? Certainly he ought not to be worse, but better and more just and more truly good. Or could one say that the man who does not take an interest in his city is not worse and more unjust than the man who does, the man who looks out only for his own interests is not worse than the one who looks out for the common good? Or can it be that the man who chooses the single life is more patriotic, more a friend and partner of his fellow-man, than the man who maintains a home and rears

αἱρούμενος τοῦ νέμοντος οἶκον καὶ ποιουμένου παῖδας καὶ πόλιν αὔξοντος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ, ἅπερ ὑπάρχει τῷ γαμουντι; ὅτι μὲν οὖν προσήκει τὸν φιλόσοφον γάμου καὶ παιδοποιίας ἐπιμελείσθαι, δῆλον. εἰ δὲ προσήκει τοῦτο, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχοι, ὃ νεανίσκε, ὁ
 5 λόγος ἐκεῖνος, ὃν σὺ ἀρτίως ἔλεγες, ὥς ἐμπόδιόν ἐστι τῷ φιλοσόφῳ γάμος; οὐ γὰρ δὴ φιλοσοφεῖν ἕτερόν τι φαίνεται ὃν ἢ τὸ ἅ πρέπει καὶ ἅ προσήκει λόγῳ μὲν ἀναζητεῖν, ἔργῳ δὲ πράττειν. Τότε μὲν δὴ τοιαυτὰ τινα εἶπεν.

XV.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

10

ΕΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΤΑ ΓΙΝΟΜΕΝΑ ΤΕΚΝΑ ΘΡΕΠΤΕΟΝ.

Οἱ δὲ νομοθέται, οἷς αὐτὸ τοῦτο γέγονεν ἔργον ζητεῖν καὶ σκοπεῖν, τί μὲν ἀγαθὸν πόλει τί δὲ κακόν, καὶ τί μὲν ὠφελεί τί δὲ βλάπτει τὸ κοινόν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι πάντες συμφορώτατον μὲν
 15 ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνόμισαν τὸ πληθύνεσθαι τοὺς τῶν πολιτῶν οἴκους, βλαβερώτατον δὲ τὸ μειοῦσθαι; καὶ ἀπαιδίαν μὲν ἢ ὀλιγοπαιδίαν τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι ἀλυσιτελές, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν παῖδας καὶ νῆ Δία πολλοὺς ἔχειν εἶναι λυσιτελές; τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἀμβλίσκειν ἀπεῖπον ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ ταῖς ἀπειθούσαις ζημίαν ἐπέθεσαν, τοῦτο
 20 δ' ἀτοκίᾳ προστίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν κύησιν εἶργειν ἀπηγόρευσαν αὐταῖς, τοῦτο δὲ πολυπαιδίας ἔταξαν γέρα καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικί, καὶ τὴν ἀπαιδίαν ἐπιζήμιον κατέστησαν. πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἡμεῖς ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα δρῶμεν ἐναντία δρῶντες τῇ βουλήσῃ τῶν νομοθετῶν, θείων καὶ θεοφιλῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷς ἔπεσθαι νομίζεται
 25 καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον; δρῶμεν δ' ἂν ἐναντία τὴν πολυπαιδίαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν κωλύοντες. πῶς δ' οὐχὶ καὶ εἰς τοὺς πατρώους θεοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοιμεν ἂν καὶ εἰς τὸν ὁμόγνιον Δία ταῦτα πράττοντες; ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ περὶ ξένους ἄδικος εἰς τὸν ξένιον ἀμαρτάνει Δία, καὶ ὁ περὶ φίλους εἰς τὸν φίλιον, οὕτως ὅστις εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ γένος
 30 ἄδικος, εἰς τοὺς πατρώους ἀμαρτάνει θεοὺς καὶ εἰς τὸν ὁμόγνιον Δία, τὸν ἐπόπτην τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων τῶν περὶ τὰ γένη· ὁ δὲ γε

11 This fragmentary treatise deals with the problem of limiting the size of families by destroying unwanted children.

12-22 Aristotle (*Pol.* II, 9) gives an account of Lycurgus' legislation on the subject. Aulus Gellius (*Noct. Att.* II, 15) comments also upon Augustus's laws. He refers to the *Lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus* which

children and contributes to the growth of his city, which is exactly what a married man does? It is clear, therefore, that it is fitting for a philosopher to concern himself with marriage and having children. And if this is fitting, how, my young friend, could that argument of yours that marriage is a handicap for a philosopher ever be sound? For manifestly the study of philosophy is nothing else than to search out by reason what is right and proper and by deeds to put it into practice. Such, then, were the words he spoke at that time.

XV

SHOULD EVERY CHILD THAT IS BORN BE RAISED?

Is it not true that the lawgivers, whose special function it was by careful search to discern what is good for the state and what is bad, what promotes and what is detrimental to the common good, all considered the increase of the homes of the citizens the most fortunate thing for the cities and the decrease of them the most shameful thing? And when the citizens had few or no children did they not regard it as a loss, but when they had children, yes, plenty of them, did they not regard it as a gain? So it was for this reason that they forbade women to suffer abortions and imposed a penalty upon those who disobeyed; for this reason they discouraged them from choosing childlessness and avoiding parenthood, and for this reason they gave to both husband and wife a reward for large families, and set a penalty upon childlessness. How, then, can we avoid doing wrong and breaking the law if we do the opposite of the wish of the lawgivers, godlike men and dear to the gods, whom it is considered good and advantageous to follow? And certainly we do the opposite if we avoid having many children. How can we help committing a sin against the gods of our fathers and against Zeus, guardian of the race, if we do this? For just as the man who is unjust to strangers sins against Zeus, god of hospitality, and one who is unjust to friends sins against Zeus, god of friendship, so whoever is unjust to his own family sins against the gods of his fathers and against Zeus, guardian of the family, from whom

was passed in 18 B. C. and the *Lex Papia Poppaea* passed in 9 A. D. Cf. Suetonius, *Aug.* XXXIV.

- περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀμαρτάνων ἀσεβής. καὶ μὴν ὅτι καλὸν καὶ λυσι-
 τελὲς παίδων ἀνατροφή πολλῶν μάθοι τις ἂν λογισάμενος, ὥς μὲν
 ἔντιμος ἐν πόλει πολύπαις ἀνὴρ, ὥς δ' αἰδῶ παρέχει τοῖς πλησίον,
 ὥς δὲ δύναται πλεον πάντων τῶν ὁμοίων, ἂν γε μὴ ὁμοίως παίδων
 5 εὐπορώσιν. καθάπερ γάρ, οἶμαι, πολύφίλος ἀφίλου ἀνδρὸς
 δυνατώτερος, οὕτω καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ πολύπαις τοῦ μὴ ἔμπαιδος
 ἢ τοῦ ὀλίγου κεκτημένου παίδας, καὶ τοσούτῳ γε μᾶλλον, ὅσῳ περ
 ἐγγύτερον υἱὸς ἐκάστω ἢ φίλος. ἄξιον δὲ νοῆσαι ποῖόν τι καὶ
 10 θεάμᾳ ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ πολύπαις ἢ γυνή σὺν ἀθρώοις ὁρώμενοι τοῖς
 ἑαυτῶν παισίν· οὐτε γὰρ πομπὴν πεμπομένην θεοῖς οὕτω καλὴν
 θεάσασθαι ἂν τις οὐτε χορείαν ἐπὶ ἱεροῖς κόσμῳ χορευόντων οὕτως
 ἀξιοθέατον, ὥς χορὸν παίδων πολλῶν προηγούμενων ἐν πόλει
 πατρὸς τοῦ ἑαυτῶν ἢ μητρός, <καὶ> χειραγωγούντων τοὺς γονεῖς ἢ
 15 τὸν ἑτερον περιεπόντων κηδεμονικῶς. τί μὲν τούτου κάλλιον
 τοῦ θεάματος; τί δὲ τῶν γονέων τούτων ζηλωτότερον, ἄλλως τε
 καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ὦσι; τίσι δ' ἂν ἄλλοις οὕτω προθύμως ἢ συνεύξαιτό
 τις ἀγαθὰ παρὰ θεῶν, ἢ συμπράξειεν αὐτοῖς εἰς ὃ τι δέοιντο; νῆ
 Δία, φησὶν, ἀλλ' ἂν πέν<η>ς ὦ καὶ χρημάτων ἀπορῶ, <κε>κτῆται
 δέ μοι πολλὰ τέ<κνα>, πόθεν ἂν αὐτὰ θρέψαιμα<ι πάν>τα; πόθεν
 20 δὲ τὰ μικρὰ τα<ῦτα ὀρ>νίθια, πολὺ σοῦ ἀπορώτερα, <αἱ> χελιδόνες
 καὶ ἀηδόνες <καὶ> κορυδοὶ καὶ κόσσυφοὶ τρέ<φου>σι τοὺς νεοττοὺς
 τοὺς ἑαν<τῶν>; περὶ ὧν καὶ Ὁμηρος λέγ<ει οὐ>τως·

ὥς δ' ὄρνις ἀπτῇσι <νεο>σοῖσιν προφέρηται
 μά<στακ'> ἐπεὶ κε λάβῃσι, κακῶς <δ' ἄρα> οἱ πέλει αὐτῇ.

- 25 πότερον <συν>έσει τὰ ζῶα ταῦτα τοῦ ἀν<θρώ>που προτέρ<ε>ι;
 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν <εἵποισ>. τί δέ; ῥώμη καὶ ἰσχὺι; ἀ<λλὰ πολὺ> ἔτι
 τοῦτο ἦττον. τί δ'; ἀποτί<θε>ται καὶ φυλάσσει τροφήν; . . .
 Ὁ δέ μοι δοκεῖ δεινότατον, οὐδὲ πενίαν ἔνιοι προφασίζεσθαι
 ἔχοντες, ἀλλ' εὐποροὶ χρημάτων ὄντες, τινὲς δὲ καὶ πλούσιοι,
 30 τολμῶσιν ὅμως τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τέκνα μὴ τρέφειν, ἵνα τὰ προγενό-
 μενα εὐπορῇ μᾶλλον, ἐξ ἀνοσίου μηχανώμενοι τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῖς

18 πέν<η>ς ὦ Snell πέν<σ>ω Powell <κε>κτῆται Körte <κέ>κτῆται Snell,
 Powell

19 <πάν>τα Snell <ταῦ>τα Powell

24 μά<στακ'> Snell μά<στακα> Powell

18 The Greek text of the older editions of Musonius breaks off abruptly at this point, but a recently discovered papyrus fragment (*The Rendel Harris Papyri* I) supplies the text for lines 18-27. Cf. Introduction note 12.

23 f. *Iliad* IX, 323 f.

wrongs done to the family are not hidden, and surely one who sins against the gods is impious. And that raising many children is an honorable and profitable thing one may gather from the fact that a man who has many children is honored in the city, that he has the respect of his neighbors, that he has more influence than his equals if they are not equally blest with children. I need not argue that a man with many friends is more powerful than one who has no friends, and so a man who has many children is more powerful than one without any or with only a few children, or rather much more so, since a son is closer than a friend. One may remark what a fine sight it is to see a man or woman surrounded by their children. Surely one could not witness a procession arrayed in honor of the gods so beautiful nor a choral dance performed in order at a religious celebration so well worth seeing as a chorus of children forming a guard of honor for their father or mother in the city of their birth, leading their parents by the hand or dutifully caring for them in some other way. What is more beautiful than this sight? What is more enviable than these parents, especially if they are good people? For whom would one more gladly join in praying for blessings from the gods, or whom would one be more willing to assist in need? Very true, you say, but I am a poor man and quite without means, and if I have many children, from what source should I find food for them all? But pray, whence do the little birds, which are much poorer than you, feed their young, the swallows and nightingales and larks and blackbirds? Homer speaks of them in these words:

“Even as a bird carries to her unfledged young whatever morsels she happens to come upon, though she fares badly herself—”

Do these creatures surpass man in intelligence? You certainly would not say that. In strength and endurance, then? No, still less in that respect. Well, then, do they put away food and store it up? <Not at all, and yet they rear their young and find sustenance for all that are born to them. The plea of poverty, therefore, is unjustified.>

But what seems to me most monstrous of all, some who do not even have poverty as an excuse, and in spite of prosperity and even riches are so inhuman as not to rear later-born offspring

27 A transitional sentence between the end of the new text and the beginning of the second part (XVB) of the traditional text seems to be missing.

- παισίν· οἱ γε ἀναιροῦσιν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀδελφούς, ἔν' ἐκείνοι μερίδα
 μείζω τῶν πατρῶων ἔχωσι· κακῶς εἰδότες, ὅσῳ κρείττον <τὸ>
 πολλοὺς ἔχειν ἀδελφούς τοῦ πολλὰ ἔχειν χρήματα. χρήματα μὲν
 γὰρ ἐπιβουλὰς ἐγείρει παρὰ τῶν πλησίων· οἱ δ' ἀδελφοὶ τοὺς
 5 ἐπιβούλους ἀνείργουσι. καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ δέχεται βοηθείας· οἱ δ'
 ἀδελφοὶ βοηθοὶ εἰσι κράτιστοι. καὶ οὔτε φίλον ἀγαθὸν ἀδελφῷ
 παρα<βάλλειν ἐστί, οὔτε τὴν βοηθείαν> ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐτέρων
 ὁμοίων τε καὶ ἴσων τῇ ἀπ' ἀδελφῶν. τί δ' ἂν τις παραβάλοι καλὸν
 εὐνοίᾳ τῇ ἐξ ἀδελφοῦ εἰς ἀσφαλείας λόγον; τίνα δὲ κοινωνὸν
 10 ἀγαθῶν εὐμενέστερον σχοίη τις ἂν ἢ ἀδελφὸν ἐπιεικῇ; τίνος δὲ
 παρουσίαν ἐν συμφοραῖς μᾶλλον ποθήσειεν ἂν ἢ τοιούτου ἀδελφοῦ;
 ἐγὼ μὲν ἀξιοζηλότατον ἡγοῦμαι τὸν ἐπὶ πλήθει ἀδελφῶν ὁμο-
 νοούντων βιούντα· καὶ θεοφιλέστατον εἶναι νομίζω τὸν ἄνδρα
 τοῦτον οἴκοθεν ἔχοντα τὰγαθά. διὸ καὶ νομίζω δεῖν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν
 15 τοῖς αὐτοῦ παισὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρημάτων μᾶλλον ἀπολείπειν ἀδελφούς,
 ὥς ἀφορμὰς ἀγαθῶν ἀπολείψοντα μείζονας.

XVI.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΕΙ ΠΑΝΤΑ ΠΕΙΣΤΕΟΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΓΟΝΕΤΣΙΝ.

- 20 Νεανίας τις, ὃν ὁ πατὴρ φιλοσοφεῖν βουλόμενον ἐκώλυνε, ἤρετο
 αὐτὸν ὧδέ πως· Ἐγὼ γε, ὦ Μουσώνιε, χρὴ πάντα πείθεσθαι τοῖς
 γονεῦσιν, ἢ ἔστιν ἂ καὶ παρακουστέον αὐτῶν; Καὶ ὁ Μουσώνιος·
 Πείθεσθαι μὲν, ἔφη, μητρὶ ἢ πατρὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον φαίνεται
 καλόν, καὶ ἐπαινῶ ἔγωγε. τί μέντοι τὸ πείθεσθαί ἐστι, θεασώμεθα·
 25 μᾶλλον δὲ πρότερον τὸ ἀπειθεῖν ὁποῖόν τι, καὶ ὁ ἀπειθῆς ὅστις,
 καταμάθωμεν, εἴθ' οὕτως κρείττον ὀψόμεθα τὸ πείθεσθαι ὁποῖόν τί
 ἐστι. φέρε δὴ, εἰ υἱὸς νοσοῦντι ὁ πατὴρ οὐκ ὦν ἱατρός οὐδὲ ἔμπειρος
 ὑγιεινῶν τε καὶ νοσερῶν προστάττοι τι ὥς ὠφέλιμον, τὸ δὲ εἴη
 βλαβερὸν καὶ ἀσύμφορον, καὶ μὴ λανθάνοι τὸν νοσοῦντα τοιούτον
 30 ὄν, ἂρά γε μὴ πράττων ἐκείνος τὸ προσταχθὲν ἀπειθεῖ τε καὶ
 ἀπειθῆς ἐστιν; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔοικεν. τί δέ, εἰ τοῦ ὁ πατὴρ νοσῶν αὐτὸς

7 παρα<βάλλειν ἐστί, οὔτε τὴν βοηθείαν> ἀπ' coniecit Peerlkamp παρὰ τὸν
 † ἀπὸ Hense

in order that those earlier born may inherit greater wealth—by such a deed of wickedness planning prosperity for their surviving children. That these may have a greater share of their father's goods, their parents rob them of brothers, never having learned how much better it is to have many brothers than to have many possessions. For possessions inspire intrigue on the part of the neighbors, but brothers discourage intriguers. And possessions need support, but brothers are the strongest supporters. One cannot compare a good friend to a brother nor the help which others, friends and equals, give to that which a brother gives. What good would one compare to the good will of a brother as a pledge of security? What better disposed sharer of common goods could one find than a good brother? Whose presence in misfortune would one desire more than such a brother's? For my part I consider the man most enviable who lives amid a number of like-minded brothers, and I consider most beloved of the gods the man who has these blessings at home. Therefore I believe that each one of us ought to try to leave brothers rather than money to our children so as to leave greater assurances of blessings.

XVI

MUST ONE OBEY ONE'S PARENTS UNDER ALL
CIRCUMSTANCES?

A certain young man who wished to study philosophy, but was forbidden by his father to do so, put this question to him: "Tell me, Musonius, must one obey one's parents in all things, or are there some circumstances under which one need not heed them?" And Musonius replied, "That everyone should obey his mother and father seems a good thing, and I certainly recommend it. However, let us see what this matter of obedience is, or rather, first, what is the nature of disobedience, and let us consider who the disobedient person is, if in this way we may better understand what the nature of obedience is.

Now then, take this case. If a father who is not a physician and not experienced in matters of health or sickness should prescribe for his invalid son something which was harmful and injurious, and the son was aware of that fact, surely in not following his

20-23 Aulus Gellius (*Noct. Att.* II, 7) tells us that this was a favorite topic for discussion by the philosophers.

οἶνον ἢ τροφήν αἰτοίῃ παρὰ καιρόν, μέλλων εἰ λάβοι μείζω τὴν νόσον ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ παῖς τοῦτο εἰδὼς μὴ διδοίῃ, ἄρα γε ἀπειθεῖ τῷ πατρί; οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. καὶ πολὺ γε τούτου ἦττον ἐκείνον, οἶμαι, φαίῃ ἂν τις ἀπειθῇ εἶναι, ὅστις πατέρα φιλοκερδῇ ἔχων, 5 κελευόμενος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κλέπτειν ἢ παρακαταθήκην ἀποστερεῖν, οὐχ ὑπουργεῖ τῷ προστάγματι. ἢ οὐκ οἶει σὺ τινος εἶναι πατέρας, οἷ τοιαῦτα τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισὶ προστάττουσιν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶδά τινα οὕτω πονηρόν, ὅς γε υἱὸν ἔχων ὥραϊον τὴν ὥραν ἀπέδοτο αὐτοῦ. εἰ οὖν ἐκείνο τὸ μειράκιον τὸ πεπραμένον, πεμπόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ 10 πατρὸς ἐπὶ τὴν αἰσχύνην, ἀντέλεγε καὶ οὐκ ἀπῆει, πότερον ἀπειθὲς ἂν τὸ μειράκιον ἔφαμεν εἶναι ἢ σωφρονεῖν; ἢ οὐδὲ ἐρωτᾶν τοῦτό γε ἄξιον; καὶ γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἀπειθεῖν καὶ ὁ ἀπειθῆς λοιδορία ἔστι καὶ ὄνειδος· τὸ δὲ μὴ πράττειν ἢ μὴ χρῆ οὐκ ὄνειδος, ἀλλ' ἔπαινος. ὥστε εἴτε πατρὸς εἴτε ἄρχοντος εἴτε καὶ νῆ Δία δεσπότου προστάγ- 15 ματι μὴ ὑπουργεῖ τις κακὰ προστάττοντος ἢ ἄδικα ἢ αἰσχρά, οὐκ ἀπειθεῖ οὐδαμῶς, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀδικεῖ οὐδ' ἁμαρτάνει· ἀλλ' ἐκείνος ἀπειθεῖ μόνος ὁ τῶν εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ συμφερόντως προστατομένων ἀφροντιστῶν καὶ παρακούων. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπειθῆς τοιοῦτός τίς ἐστίν· ὁ δ' εὐπειθῆς ἔχει μὲν ἐναντίως τούτῳ καὶ ἔστιν ἐναντίος, 20 εἷη δ' ἂν ὁ τῷ τὰ προσήκοντα παραινούντι κατήκοος ὢν καὶ ἐπόμενος ἐκουσίως, οὗτος εὐπειθῆς. ὅθεν καὶ γονεῦσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ τότε πείθεται τις, ὅταν χρηστὰ παραινούντων αὐτῶν ταῦτα πράττῃ ἐκῶν. ἐγὼ μέντοι κἂν μὴ παραινούντων τῶν γονέων πράττῃ τις ἢ χρῆ καὶ συμφέρει αὐτῷ, φημὶ τοῦτον πείθεσθαι τοῖς γονεῦσιν· 25 καὶ ὅτι ὀρθῶς φημι, σκοπέει οὕτως. ὁ γὰρ δὴ πράττων ἢ βούλεται ὁ πατήρ καὶ τῇ βουλήσει τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπόμενος πείθεται, οἶμαι, τῷ πατρί· ὁ δὲ πράττων ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἢ κρείττον' ἐστὶ, τῇ βουλήσει ἔπεται τοῦ πατρός. τίνα τρόπον; ὅτι πάντες οἱ γονεῖς εὐνοοῦσι δήπου τοῖς ἑαυτῶν παισίν, εὐνοοῦντες δὲ βούλονται ἢ χρῆ καὶ 30 συμφέρει πράττεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν. ὅστις οὖν πράττει τὰ προσήκοντα καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα, πράττει οὗτος ἢ βούλονται οἱ γονεῖς. ὥστε πείθεται τοῖς γονεῦσι ταῦτα πράττων, κἂν μὴ τῷ λόγῳ κελεύωσιν αὐτὰ πράττειν οἱ γονεῖς. τοῦτο δὴ μόνον προσήκει σκοπεῖν, ὅστις βούλεται πείθεσθαι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἐφ' ἐκάστω τῶν πραττομένων, 35 εἰ καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον ὃ μέλλει πράξειν ἐστίν, ἕτερον δὲ οὐδέν. ὥς ἂν ὑπάρχῃ τοιοῦτον εὐθὺς καὶ τοῦ πράττοντος αὐτὸ πειθομένου τοῖς γονεῦσιν. μὴ τοίνυν σὺ γε δείσης, ὦ νεανίσκε, ὥς ἀπειθήσεις τῷ πατρί, ἂν ἢ ἢ <μὴ> προσήκει δρᾶν κελεύοντος τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπέχῃ τοῦ ταῦτα δρᾶν, ἢ ἢ προσήκει ἀπαγορεύοντος, <τοῦ> ταῦτα 40 μὴ δρᾶν. μῆδέ σοι πρόφασις ἔστω τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν ὁ πατήρ ἢ

father's prescription he is not disobeying and is not disobedient, is he? It would not seem so. Or again, suppose the father himself were ill and should demand wine and food which he ought not to have, and which probably would aggravate his illness if he took it, and his son, realizing this, would not give it to him, surely he is not disobeying his father, is he? Certainly one cannot think so. And yet I fancy one would consider far less disobedient than in this case, the man who, having a money-loving father, is ordered by him to steal or make away with money entrusted to him, but does not carry out the order. Or do you think that there are no fathers who give such orders to their children? Well, I know a father so depraved that, having a son conspicuous for youthful beauty, he sold him into a life of shame. If, now, that lad who was sold and sent into such a life by his father had refused and would not go, should we say that he was disobedient or that he was showing purity of character? Surely even to ask the question is scarcely necessary. To be sure, disobedience and the disobedient person are terms of reproach and shame, but refusing to do what one ought not to do merits praise rather than blame. Therefore whether one's father or the archon or even the tyrant orders something wrong or unjust or shameful, and one does not carry out the order, he is in no way disobeying, inasmuch as he does no wrong nor fails of doing right. He only disobeys who disregards and refuses to carry out good and honorable and useful orders. Such is the disobedient man.

But the obedient person behaves in just the opposite way and is completely different from him; he would be the kind of man who listens to anyone who counsels what is fitting and follows it voluntarily. That is the obedient man. Thus in relation to his parents also, one is obedient when he does voluntarily whatever they counsel that is good and fitting. For my part, moreover, I should say that anyone who did what was right and expedient, even when his parents did not counsel it, was obeying his parents, and in support of my reasoning, consider this. In my opinion the man who does what his father desires and follows his father's wishes is obeying his father; and he who does what he ought and pursues the better course is following the wish of his father. How is that? Because surely all parents have the interests of their children at heart, and because of that interest they wish them to do what is right and advantageous. Consequently one who does what is right and useful is doing what his parents wish and so is obedient to his parents in doing it, even if his parents do not order him in so many words to do these things. This one thing only and nothing else should he take into consideration

- κελεύων τι τῶν πράττεσθαι μὴ καλῶν ἢ ἀπαγορεύων τι τῶν καλῶν. οὐδεμία γὰρ ἀνάγκη σοι τὰ μὴ εἶ προσταττόμενα ὑπουργεῖν· καὶ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἀγνοεῖν. οὐκουν ἀνέξῃ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν μουσικοῖς, ἐὰν ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἐπαῖων μουσικῆς προστάτῃ κρούειν
- 5 ἀμούσως τὴν λύραν, ἢ ἐπιστάμενον γράμματα οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος κελεύῃ σε γράφειν καὶ ἀναγινώσκειν μὴ ὡς ἔμαθες, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως· οὐδέ γε ἂν ἐπιστάμενον κυβερνᾶν οὐκ ὦν κυβερνητικὸς κελεύῃ σε κινεῖν τὸ πηδάλιον ὡς οὐ προσήκει, οὐ προσέξεις αὐτῷ. τί οὖν; ταῦτα μὲν ταύτῃ ἔχει· ἂν δέ σε κωλύῃ φιλοσοφεῖν ὁ πατὴρ εἰδότα
- 10 καὶ ἀκηκοότα ὁποῖόν τι φιλοσοφία ἐστίν, αὐτὸς ἀγνοῶν, ἄρα γε προσεκτέον αὐτῷ, ἢ μεταδιδασκτέον μᾶλλον αὐτὸν ὡς οὐκ εἶ σοι παραινέι; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτω δοκεῖ. τάχα μὲν οὖν τις καὶ λόγῳ χρώμενος μόνῳ πείσειεν ἂν τὸν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ πατέρα διανοεῖσθαι ἢ προσήκει περὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἂν γε μὴ τέλεον ἢ σκληρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὁ πατήρ.
- 15 εἰ δ' οὖν μὴ πείθοιτο τῷ λόγῳ μηδὲ ἔπειτο, ἀλλὰ τά γε ἔργα πάντως τὰ τοῦ παιδὸς ὑπάξεται αὐτόν, εἰ φιλοσοφεῖ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὁ παῖς. ἔσται γὰρ δὴ φιλοσοφῶν προθυμώτατος μὲν θεραπεύειν τὸν πατέρα θεραπείαν ἅπασαν, κοσμιώτατος δὲ καὶ πράτατος, ἐν τῇ συνουσίᾳ ἡκιστα φίλερις ὦν ἢ φίλαντος καὶ οὔτε προπετῆς οὔτε ταραχώδης
- 20 οὐτ' ὀργίλος· ἐτι δὲ ἐγκρατὴς μὲν εἴη ἂν γλώσσης, γαστροῦ, ἀφροδισίων, καρτερικὸς δὲ πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τοὺς πόνους· καὶ νοῆσαι μὲν ὅ τι καλὸν ἱκανώτατος, οὐχ ὑπερβαίνων δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον καλόν. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν μὲν ἡδέων ὑφήσεται τῷ πατρὶ πάντων ἐκῶν· τὰ δὲ ἐπίπονα πρὸ ἐκείνου δέξεται αὐτός. τοιοῦτον οὖν υἱὸν τίς
- 25 μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν εὖξαιτο τοῖς θεοῖς; τίς δὲ ἔχων οὐκ <ἂν> ἀγαπήσειεν, δι' ὃν ὑπάρξειεν αὐτῷ ζηλωτὸν εἶναι καὶ μακαριστὸν πατέρα παρὰ τοῖς εἰς φρονούσι πᾶσιν; εἰ δ' οὖν, ὦ νεανίσκε, καὶ τοιοῦτος ὦν, ὁποῖος ἔση πάντως ἂν γε ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφῆς, οὐχ ὑπάξῃ τὸν πατέρα τὸν σὸν οὐδὲ πείσεις ἐπιτρέπειν σοι καὶ συγχωρεῖν ταῦτα
- 30 πράττειν, ἐκεῖνο λόγισαι· ὁ πατήρ ὁ σὸς κωλύει σε φιλοσοφεῖν· ὁ δέ γε κοινὸς ἀπάντων πατήρ ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν Ζεὺς κελεύει σε καὶ προτρέπει. πρόσταγμά τε γὰρ ἐκείνου καὶ νόμος ἐστὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι δίκαιον, χρηστόν, εὐεργετικόν, σώφρονα, μεγαλόφρονα, κρείττω πόνων, κρείττω ἡδονῶν, φθόνου παντὸς καὶ
- 35 ἐπιβουλῆς ἀπάσης καθαρὸν· ἵνα δὲ συντεμῶν εἴπω, ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κελεύει τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ νόμος ὁ τοῦ Διός. τὸ δέ γε εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τῷ φιλοσοφῶν εἶναι ταῦτόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὴ τῷ πείθεσθαι <τῷ> πατρὶ

37 Saint Thomas Aquinas (*Summa Theologiae* II, 189, 6) treats similarly the problem of the boy who wishes to enter the religious life in opposition to his father's will.

who wishes to obey his parents in each act—whether what he plans to do is good and advantageous. Thus if such a conviction be entertained, whatever a man's action may be, it is the act of one obedient to his parents.

And so you, my young friend, do not fear that you will disobey your father, if when your father bids you do something which is not right, you refrain from doing it, or when he forbids you to do something which is right you do not refrain from doing it. Do not let your father be an excuse to you for wrong-doing whether he bids you do something which is not right or forbids you to do what is right. For there is no necessity for you to comply with evil injunctions, and you yourself seem not unaware of this. You would certainly not submit to your father in musical matters if, with no knowledge of music, he should order you to play the lyre incorrectly, or if he knew nothing of grammar and you did, he should order you to write and read, not as you had learned but otherwise; and if, finally, with no knowledge of how to steer a ship, he should order you who did understand to handle the helm in the wrong way, you would not heed him. Well, then, enough of that.

Now if your father, knowing nothing about the subject, should forbid you who had learned and comprehended what philosophy is to study philosophy, would you be bound to heed him, or would you not rather be obligated to teach him better, since he is giving bad advice? That seems to me to be the answer. Perhaps by using reason alone one might persuade his father to adopt the attitude he ought in regard to philosophy if the father's disposition is not too obstinate. If, however, he should not be persuaded by argument and would not yield, yet even then the conduct of his son will win him over if his son is truly putting his philosophy into practice. For, as a student of philosophy he will certainly be most eager to treat his father with the greatest possible consideration and will be most well-behaved and gentle; in his relations with his father he will never be contentious or self-willed, nor hasty or prone to anger; furthermore he will control his tongue and his appetite whether for food or for sexual temptations, and he will stand fast in the face of danger and hardships; and finally with competence in recognizing the true good, he will not let the apparent good pass without examination. As a result he will willingly give up all pleasures for his father's sake, and for him he will accept all manner of hardships willingly. To have such a son who would not offer prayers to the gods? Who, having one, would not love him because of whom he had become an envied and most blessed father in the eyes of all men of sound judgment?

- τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἔπεσθαι μέλλεις, εἰ δὲ φιλοσοφοίης, τῷ Διὶ, δῆλον ὡς φιλοσοφητέον σοι μᾶλλον, ἢ οὐ. ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία εἴρξει σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ κατακλείσας ἔξει, ἵνα δὴ μὴ φιλοσοφῇς. ταῦτα μὲν ποιήσει ἴσως, τοῦ δέ γε φιλοσοφεῖν οὐκ ἀπείρξει σε μὴ βουλόμενον· οὐ
- 5 γὰρ χειρὶ ἢ ποδὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν οὐδὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι, ψυχῇ δὲ καὶ ταύτης ὀλίγῳ μέρει, ὃ δὴ διάνοιαν καλοῦμεν. ταύτην γε μὴν ἐν ὀχυρωτάτῳ ἰδρυσεν ὁ θεὸς ὥστε ἀόρατον εἶναι καὶ ἄληπτον, καὶ ἀνάγκης πάσης ἐκτὸς ἐλευθέραν καὶ αὐτεξούσιον. ἄλλως τε
- 10 ἐὰν τύχῃ οὐσα χρηστή, οὐ δυνήσεται σε κωλύειν ὁ πατήρ οὔτε χρῆσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ οὔτε ἂ χρῆ διανοεῖσθαι οὔτε ἀρέσκεσθαι μὲν τοῖς καλοῖς, μὴ ἀρέσκεσθαι δὲ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς· οὐδ' αὖ τὰ μὲν αἰρεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἐκκλίνειν. ταῦτα μὲν ποίων εὐθὺς φιλοσοφοίης ἂν, καὶ οὔτε τρίβωνα πάντως ἀμπέχεσθαι δεήσει σε οὔτε ἀχίτωνα διατελεῖν, οὐδὲ κομᾶν, οὐδ' ἐκβαίνειν τὸ κοινὸν τῶν πολλῶν. πρέπει
- 15 μὲν γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα τοῖς φιλοσόφοις· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τούτοις τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν ἂ χρῆ καὶ διανοεῖσθαι.

XVII.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΤΙ ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ ΓΗΡΩΣ ΕΦΟΔΙΟΝ.

- 20 Αἰθίς δέ, ἐπεὶ πρεσβύτης τις ἐπύθετο, τί ἂν εἴη γήρως ἐφόδιον ἄριστον, ταῦτόν, εἶπεν, ὅπερ καὶ νεότητος, τὸ ζῆν ὁδῶ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν. τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ἂν οὕτω μάθοις ὁποῖόν τί ἐστίν, εἰ ἐννοήσῃς τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσιν ὡς οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὴν γέγονεν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἵππος οὐδὲ κύων οὐδὲ βοῦς, ἅπερ ἀτιμότερα πολὺ ἀνθρώ-
- 25 πον ἐστίν, οὐ πρὸς ἡδονὴν γέγονεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ νομισθεῖν ἂν τυγχάνειν τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τέλους ἵππος ἐσθίων μὲν καὶ πίνων καὶ ὀχεύων ἀνέδην, πράττων δὲ μηδὲν ὦν ἵπῳ προσήκει· οὐδέ γε κύων ἡδόμενος μὲν ὥσπερ ὁ ἵππος ἀπάσας ἡδονάς, πράττων δὲ μηδὲν ἀφ' ὧν ἀγαθοὶ νομίζονται εἶναι κύνης· οὐδὲ μὴν ἄλλο ζῶον
- 30 ὁτιοῦν ἔργου μὲν τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ στερόμενον, ἡδονῶν δ'

12-16 Seneca (*Ep.* V, 1-6) warns his pupil Lucilius against attaching any importance to the conspicuous dress and mannerisms of the group of men who sought to gain attention as philosophers.

If, then, my young friend, with a view to becoming such a man, as you surely will if you truly master the lessons of philosophy, you should not be able to induce your father to permit you to do as you wish, nor succeed in persuading him, reason thus: your father forbids you to study philosophy, but the common father of all men and gods, Zeus, bids you and exhorts you to do so. His command and law is that man be just and honest, beneficent, temperate, high-minded, superior to pain, superior to pleasure, free of all envy and all malice; to put it briefly, the law of Zeus bids man be good. But being good is the same as being a philosopher. If you obey your father, you will follow the will of a man; if you choose the philosopher's life, the will of God. It is plain, therefore, that your duty lies in the pursuit of philosophy rather than not. But, you say, your father will restrain you and actually shut you up to prevent your study of philosophy. Perhaps he will do so, but he will not prevent you from studying philosophy unless you are willing; for we do not study philosophy with our hands or feet or any other part of the body, but with the soul and with a very small part of it, that which we may call the reason. This God placed in the strongest place so that it might be inaccessible to sight and touch, free from all compulsion and in its own power. Particularly if your mind is good your father will not be able to prevent you from using it nor from thinking what you ought nor from liking the good and not liking the base; nor again from choosing the one and rejecting the other. In the very act of doing this, you would be studying philosophy, and you would not need to wrap yourself up in a worn cloak nor go without a chiton nor grow long hair nor deviate from the ordinary practices of the average man. To be sure, such things are well enough for professional philosophers, but philosophy does not consist in them, but rather in thinking out what is man's duty and meditating upon it."

XVII

WHAT IS THE BEST VIATICUM FOR OLD AGE?

At another time when an old man asked him what was the best viaticum for old age, he said, the very one that is best for youth too, namely to live by method and in accord with nature. You would best understand what this means if you would realize that mankind was not created for pleasure. For that matter, neither was the horse or dog or cow created for pleasure, and all of these creatures are much less valuable than man. Certainly a

ἐμπιπλάμενον· οὐδὲν οὖν οὕτως ζῆν ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἂν μάλιστα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐμφανίζῃ δι' ὧν πρᾶττει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν. ἄγει γὰρ ἡ ἐκάστων φύσις ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν τὴν ἐκείνου· ὥστε καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰκὸς οὐχ ὅταν ἐν ἡδονῇ βιοί, 5 τότε κατὰ φύσιν βιοῦν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν ἀρετῇ. τότε γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινέισθαι δικαίως ὑπάρχοι ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐφ' αὐτῷ καὶ εὐελπιν καὶ θαρραλέον εἶναι, οἷς εὐφροσύνην τε καὶ χαρὰν βεβαίαν ἔπεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον. καθόλου δὲ ἄνθρωπος μίμημα μὲν θεοῦ μόνον τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ παραπλησίας ἔχει τὰς ἀρετάς· ἐπεὶ 10 μὴδ' ἐν θεοῖς μὴδὲν ὑπονοῆσαι κρείττον ἔχομεν φρονήσεως καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἔτι δὲ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ θεὸς διὰ τὴν παρουσίαν τούτων τῶν ἀρετῶν ἀήτητος μὲν ἡδονῆς, ἀήτητος δὲ πλεονεξίας, κρείττων δὲ ἐπιθυμίας, κρείττων δὲ φθόνου καὶ ζηλοτυπίας, μεγαλόφρων δὲ καὶ εὐεργετικὸς καὶ φιλόανθρωπος· 15 τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἐπινοοῦμεν τὸν θεόν· οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡγητέον, ὅταν ἔχῃ κατὰ φύσιν, ὁμοίως ἔχειν, καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντα εἶναι ζηλωτόν· ὧν δὲ ζηλωτὸς εὐθὺς ἂν εἴῃ καὶ εὐδαίμων· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλους γέ τινας ἢ τοὺς εὐδαίμονας ζηλοῦμεν. καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἐτέ- 20 ρωθέν ποθεν ταύτας ἐπινοῆσαι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἔχομεν ἢ ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως, ἐντυχόντες ἀνθρώποις τοιοῖσδε τισιν, οἷους ὄντας αὐτοὺς θεῖους καὶ θεοειδεῖς ὠνόμαζον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τις τύχει πρότερον ἔτι νέος ὧν παιδείας ὀρθῆς ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένος, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅσα μαθημάτων ἔχεται καλῶν μεμαθηκὼς οὐκ ἐνδεὼς, 25 τὰ δὲ ἀσκητὰ ἡσκηκὼς ἱκανῶς, οὗτος ἂν ἐν γῆρα ταῖς ἐνούσαις ἑαυτῷ χρώμενος ἀφορμαῖς ζῷ κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ ἀλύπως μὲν φέροι τὴν στέρησιν τῶν ἡδονῶν τῶν ἐπὶ νεότητος, ἀλύπως δ' ἔχοι τῇ παρούσῃ τοῦ σώματος ἀδυναμίᾳ, δυσκολαῖνοι δ' οὐκ ἂν οὔτε καταφρονούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πλησίον οὔτ' ἀμελούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν 30 οἰκείων καὶ φίλων, ἅτε πρὸς ταῦτα πάντα ἀλεξιφάρμακον ἔχων καλὸν ἐπὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, τὴν παιδείαν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν. εἰ δέ τις εἴῃ παιδείας μὲν ἐνδεέστερον μετεσχηκὼς, προθυμίαν δὲ παρέχοιτο πρὸς τὰ κρείττω, καὶ πείθεσθαι δύναιτο τοῖς εὖ λεγομένοις, οὗτος ἂν εὖ ποιούῃ ζητῶν λόγων ἀκούειν ὑποθετικῶν παρὰ 35 τῶν πεποιημένων ἔργων εἰδέναι τίνα μὲν βλαβερά, τίνα δὲ ὠφέλιμα ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τίνα δὴ τρόπον τὰ μὲν ἐκφεύγει, τὰ δὲ κτῶτο, καὶ πῶς ἂν τὰ μὴ ὄντα μὲν κακά, δοκοῦντα δέ, προσιόντα πρᾶως δέχοιτο. τούτων δὲ ἀκούων καὶ πειθόμενος (ὥς τό γε ἀκούειν ἀπειθῶς ἀκερδέστατον) διαθείτ' ἂν τὸ γῆρας καλῶς τά τε ἄλλα

horse would not be considered to have fulfilled its purpose by eating and drinking and mating at will, and doing none of the things which are the proper work of a horse; no more would a dog if it simply enjoyed all kinds of pleasures like the horse and did none of the things for which dogs are considered good; nor would any other animal if kept from the functions proper to it and allowed to have its fill of pleasures; in short, according to this, nothing would be said to be living according to nature but what by its actions manifests the excellence peculiar to its own nature. For the nature of each guides it to its own excellence; consequently it is not reasonable to suppose that when man lives a life of pleasure that he lives according to nature, but rather when he lives a life of virtue. Then, indeed, it is that he is justly praised and takes pride in himself and is optimistic and courageous, characteristics upon which cheerfulness and serene joy necessarily follow. In general, of all creatures on earth man alone resembles God and has the same virtues that He has, since we can imagine nothing even in the gods better than prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. Therefore, as God, through the possession of these virtues, is unconquered by pleasure or greed, is superior to desire, envy, and jealousy; is high-minded, beneficent, and kindly (for such is our conception of God), so also man in the image of Him, when living in accord with nature, should be thought of as being like Him, and being like Him, being enviable, and being enviable, he would forthwith be happy, for we envy none but the happy. Indeed it is not impossible for man to be such, for certainly when we encounter men whom we call godly and god-like, we do not have to imagine that these virtues came from elsewhere than from man's own nature. If, then, by good fortune while still young, one had taken pains to get right instruction, and had mastered thoroughly all those lessons which are considered good, as well as their practical application, such a man in old age using these inner resources would live according to nature, and he would bear without complaint the loss of the pleasures of youth, nor would he fret at the weakness of his body, and he would not be irked even when slighted by his neighbors or neglected by his relatives and friends, since he would have a good antidote for all these things in his own mind, namely his past training. If, however, one should have shared less abundantly in early instruction but should show an eagerness for better things and a capacity for following words well-spoken, he would do well if he sought to hear relevant words from those who have made it their business to know what things are harmful and what helpful to men, and in what way one should avoid the former and obtain

- καὶ τὸν τοῦ θανάτου φόβον ἐξαιρεθείη ἄν, ὃς μάλιστα θορυβεῖ τε καὶ πιέζει τοὺς γέροντας, ὥσπερ ἐπιλεησμένους ὅτι παντὶ θνητῷ θάνατος ὀφείλεται. καὶ τό γε ἀθλιώτατον ποιοῦν τὸν βίον τοῖς γέρονσιν αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φόβος· ὥσπερ ἀμέλει
- 5 καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ Ἰσοκράτης ἀνωμολογήσατο. φασὶ γὰρ ἐκείνον, ἐρωτήσαντός τινος ὅπως διάγει, εἰπεῖν, ὅτι οὕτως ὥσπερ εἰκὸς τὸν ἐνενήκοντα μὲν γεγονότα ἔτη, κακῶν δὲ ἔσχατον νομίζοντα εἶναι τὸν θάνατον. καὶ τοι πῶς ἐκείνῳ τι παιδείας μετὴν ἢ γνώσεως τῶν ἀληθῶς ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, ὃς ὑπελάμβανε εἶναι κακὸν τὸ ἐξ
- 10 ἀνάγκης ἐπόμενον βίῳ τῷ ἀρίστῳ; εἰ γε ἄριστος βίος ὁ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρός, πέρας δὲ καὶ τούτου θάνατος. ὁ δ' οὖν εἶπον, εἰ τοῦτο περιποιήσαιο τις ἐν γήρᾳ, τὸ προσδέχεσθαι τὸν θάνατον ἀφόβως καὶ θαρραλέως, οὐ μικρὸν ἂν μέρος τοῦ ζῆν ἀλύπως καὶ κατὰ φύσιν εἴη πεπορισμένον· κτήσαιο δ' ἂν τοῦτο συνὼν τοῖς οὐκ ὀνόματι
- 15 μόνον ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφοις, ἂν γε καὶ πείθεσθαι θέλῃ αὐτοῖς. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν φημὶ γήρως ἐφόδιον εἶναι κράτιστον, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου εἶπον, τὸ ζῆν κατὰ φύσιν ἂν χρὴ πράττοντα καὶ διανοοῦμενον. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν καὶ εὐθυμότατος εἴη ὁ γέρον καὶ ἐπαινετώτατος, ταῦτα δὲ ἔχων εὐπότμως καὶ ἐντίμως βιώῃ ἄν. εἰ
- 20 δέ τις οἶεται μέγιστον εἶναι παραμύθιον τοῖς γέρονσι τὸν πλοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον αὐτοῖς παρέχειν ἀλύπως βιοῦν, κακῶς οἶεται· πλοῦτος γὰρ ἡδονὰς μὲν οἶός τε παρέχειν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τὰς ἀπὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν καὶ ἀφροδισίων καὶ ἄλλων ὁμοίων, οὔτε δὲ εὐθυμίαν οὔτε ἀλυπίαν οὐδαμῶς τῷ κεκτημένῳ παράσχει ἄν. μάρτυρες δὲ
- 25 πολλοὶ τῶν πλουσίων λυπούμενοι καὶ ἀθυμοῦντες καὶ ἀθλίους νομίζοντες εἶναι αὐτούς. διόπερ οὐδὲ ἐπικούρημα γήρως καλὸν ὁ πλοῦτος εἴη ἄν.

1 Cicero devotes a large part of his *De Senectate* (XIX-XXII) to a discussion of this subject.

2 This is a paraphrase of Sophocles' *Electra* 1173 (Cf. also Euripides *Alcestis* 782).

the latter, and how one should patiently accept things which befall him that seem to be evils, but are not really so. If he heard these things and acted upon them (for to hear them without acting upon them would be most unprofitable), he would manage old age very well, and in particular he would rid himself of the fear of death which more than all else terrifies and oppresses the aged, as though they had forgotten that death is a debt which every man owes. Yet it is certain that that which renders life most miserable for the aged is this very thing, the fear of death, as even the orator Isocrates confessed. For they tell that when someone asked how he was getting on, he replied that he was doing as well as was reasonable for a man of ninety, but that he considered death the worst of evils. And yet how could there have been any smattering of knowledge or of acquaintance with true good and evil in the man who thought that an evil which is the necessary sequel even to the best life? The best life, you will agree, is that of a good man, and yet the end even of such a man is death. Therefore, as I said before, if one in old age should succeed in mastering this lesson, to wait for death without fear and courageously, he would have acquired no small part of how to live without complaint and in accordance with nature. He would acquire this by associating with men who were philosophers not in name only but in truth, if he were willing to follow their teachings. So it is that I tell you that the best viaticum for old age is the one I mentioned in the beginning, to live according to nature, doing and thinking what one ought. For so an old man would himself be most cheerful and would win the praise of others, and being thus, he would live happily and in honor. But if anyone thinks that wealth is the greatest consolation of old age, and that to acquire it is to live without sorrow, he is quite mistaken; wealth is able to procure for man the pleasures of eating and drinking and other sensual pleasures, but it can never afford cheerfulness of spirit nor freedom from sorrow in one who possesses it. Witnesses to this truth are many rich men who are full of sadness and despair and think themselves wretched—evidence enough that wealth is not a good protection for old age.

10 Cf. Demosthenes *De Corona* 97.

21 This theme is frequently elaborated by the Stoics. Cf. Epictetus *Disc.* III, 22, 27.

XVIII.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΡΟΦΗΣ.

- Περὶ δὲ τροφῆς εἰώθει μὲν πολλάκις λέγειν καὶ πάνυ ἐντεταμένως
 5 ὥς οὐ περὶ μικροῦ πράγματος οὐδ' εἰς μικρὰ διαφέροντος· ᾤετο
 γὰρ ἀρχὴν καὶ ὑποβολὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν εἶναι τὴν ἐν σίτοις καὶ
 ποτοῖς ἐγκράτειαν. ἅπαξ δέ ποτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀφόμενος λόγων, οὓς
 ἐκάστοτε διεξήει, τοιάδε τινα εἶπεν· ὥς χρή καθάπερ τὴν εὐτελῆ
 10 τῆς πολυτελοῦς τροφῆς προτιμᾶν καὶ τὴν εὐπόριστον τῆς δυσπο-
 ρίστου, οὕτω καὶ τὴν σύμφυλον ἀνθρώπῳ τῆς μὴ τοιαύτης· εἶναι
 δὲ σύμφυλον ἡμῖν τὴν ἐκ τῶν φυομένων ἐκ γῆς, ὅσα τε σιτώδη
 ὄντα καὶ ὅσα μὴ τοιαῦτα ὄντα δύναται τρέφειν οὐ κακῶς τὸν
 ἀνθρώπον· καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ζώων οὐκ ἀναιρουμένων, ἄλλως δὲ
 15 χρησιμεύοντων. τούτων δὲ τῶν βρωμάτων ἐπιτηδειότατα μὲν οἷς
 αὐτόθεν χρήσθαι ὑπάρχει δίχα πυρός, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐτοιμότατα· οἷα δὴ
 τὰ τε ὠραῖα καὶ τῶν λαχάνων ἔνια καὶ γάλα καὶ τυρὸς καὶ κηρία.
 καὶ ὅσα μέντοι δεῖται πυρὸς ἢ σιτώδη ἢ λαχανώδη ὄντα, καὶ ταῦτ'
 οὐκ ἀνεπιτήδεια, ἀλλὰ σύμφυλα ἀνθρώπῳ πάντα. τὴν μέντοι
 20 προσφορωτέραν· εἶναι δὲ ταύτην ἔλεγε καὶ βαρυντέραν καὶ τῷ νοεῖν
 τι καὶ φρονεῖν ἐμπόδιον· τὴν γὰρ ἀναθυμίασιν τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῆς θολω-
 δεστέραν οὖσαν ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ· παρὸ καὶ βραδυντέρους
 φαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν τοὺς πλείονι ταύτῃ χρωμένους. δεῖν δὲ τὸν
 25 ἀνθρώπον, ὥσπερ συγγενέστατον τοῖς θεοῖς τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐστίν,
 οὕτω καὶ ὁμοιότατα τρέφεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς. ἐκείνοις μὲν οὖν ἀρκεῖν
 τοὺς ἀπὸ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος ἀναφερομένους ἀτμούς, ἡμᾶς δ' ὁμοιοτάτην
 ταύτῃ προσφέρεισθαι τροφὴν ἃν εἶπεν τὴν κουφοτάτην καὶ καθαρω-
 τάτην· οὕτω δ' ἃν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν καθαρὰν τε καὶ
 30 ἁγρὰν, ὁποῖα οὖσα ἀρίστη καὶ σοφωτάτη εἴη ἃν, καθάπερ
 Ἡρακλείτῳ δοκεῖ λέγοντι οὕτως· αὐγὴ ξερὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ
 ἀρίστη· νῦν δέ, ἔφη, πολὺ χεῖρον ἡμεῖς τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων τρεφό-
 μεθα. τὰ μὲν γάρ, εἰ καὶ σφόδρα τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ὥσπερ μᾶστιγί τινη
 ἐλαυνόμενα φέρεται πρὸς τὴν τροφήν, ὅμως τοῦ γε πανουργεῖν

XVIII

ON FOOD

On the subject of food he used to speak frequently and very emphatically too, as a question of no small significance, nor leading to unimportant consequences; indeed he believed that the beginning and foundation of temperance lay in self-control in eating and drinking. Once, putting aside other themes such as he habitually discussed, he spoke somewhat as follows. As one should prefer inexpensive food to expensive and what is abundant to what is scarce, so one should prefer what is natural for men to what is not. Now food from plants of the earth is natural to us, grains and those which though not cereals can nourish man well, and also food (other than flesh) from animals which are domesticated. Of these foods the most useful are those which can be used at once without fire, since they are also most easily available; for example fruits in season, some of the green vegetables, milk, cheese, and honey. Also those which require fire for their preparation, whether grains or vegetables, are not unsuitable, and are all natural food for man. On the other hand he showed that meat was a less civilized kind of food and more appropriate for wild animals. He held that it was a heavy food and an obstacle to thinking and reasoning, since the exhalations rising from it being turbid darkened the soul. For this reason also the people who make larger use of it seem slower in intellect. Furthermore, as man of all creatures on earth is the nearest of kin to the gods, so he should be nourished in a manner most like the gods. Now the vapors rising from the earth and water are sufficient for them, and so, he said, we ought to be nourished on food most like that, the lightest and purest; for thus our souls would be pure and dry, and being so, would be finest and wisest, as it seemed to Heraclitus when he said, "The clear dry soul is wisest and best." But now, he said, we feed ourselves much worse than the unreasoning brutes. For even if they, driven by appetite as by a lash, fall upon their food, nevertheless they are not guilty of making a fuss about their food and exercising ingenuity about it, but they are satisfied with what comes their way, seeking satiety only, nothing more. But we contrive all kinds of arts and devices to give relish to eating and to make more enticing the act of swallowing. We have come to such a point of delicacy in eating and gourmanderie that as some people have written books on

- περὶ τὰ βρώματα καὶ τοῦ τεχνιτεύειν ἀπήλλακται, ἀρκούμενα τοῖς
 παραπεσοῦσι καὶ πλησμονὴν θηρώμενα μόνον, προσωτέρω δ'
 οὐδέν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τέχνας καὶ μηχανὰς ποικίλας ἐπινοοῦμεν,
 ὥστε τὴν ἐδωδὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐφηδύνειν καὶ τὴν κατάποσιν κολα-
 5 κεύειν μειζόνως. εἰς τοῦτο δὲ προεληλύθαμεν λιχνείας καὶ ὀσφο-
 γίας, ὥστε καθάπερ μουσικὰ καὶ ἰατρικὰ οὕτω καὶ μαγειρικὰ
 πεποιήνται τινες συγγράμματα, ἃ τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν καὶ πάνυ αὔξει
 τὴν ἐν τῷ φάρνγῳ, τὴν δ' ὑγίειαν διαφθείρει. πολὺ γοῦν κάκιον
 διακειμένους ὁρᾶν ἔστι τὰ σώματα τοὺς περὶ τὰ βρώματα τρυ-
 10 φώντας, ὧν εἰσιν ἔνιοι παραπλήσιοι ταῖς κιττώσαις γυναιξίν· καὶ
 γὰρ οὗτοι, καθάπερ ἐκεῖνοι, τὰ συνηθέστατα τῶν βρωμάτων δυσχε-
 raίνουσι καὶ τοὺς στομάχους διεφθαρμένους ἔχουσιν. ὅθεν ὥσπερ
 ὁ ἀχρεῖος σίδηρος συνεχῶς δέλται στομώσεως, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἐκείνων
 στόμαχοι ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν συνεχῆς στομούσθαι θέλουσιν ἢ ὑπὸ
 15 ἀκράτου ἢ ὑπὸ ὄξους ἢ ὑπὸ βρώματός τινος στρυφνοῦ. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ
 ὁ Λάκων τοιοῦτος, ὃς ἰδὼν τινα, παρακειμένου αὐτῷ ὀρνιθίου τῶν
 πίωνων καὶ πολυτελῶν, ὑπὸ τρυφῆς ἀναινόμενον φαγεῖν αὐτὸ καὶ
 φάσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι, 'ἀλλ' ἐγώ' ἔφη 'καὶ γυπὸς δύναμαι καὶ
 τόργου.' Ζήνων δέ γε ὁ Κιτιεὺς οὐδὲ νοσῶν ᾤετο δεῖν τροφήν
 20 προσφέρεσθαι τρυφερωτέραν, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ὁ θεραπεύων ἰατρὸς ἐκέ-
 λευεν αὐτὸν φαγεῖν νεοττὸν περιστερᾶς, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος 'ὡς
 Μάνην' ἔφη 'με θεράπευε.' ἡξίου γάρ, οἶμαι, μηδὲν μαλακώτερον
 ἐν τῇ θεραπείᾳ γίνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν δούλων τινὶ νοσοῦντι· καὶ γὰρ
 εἰ ἐκεῖνοι θεραπεύεσθαι δύνανται δίχα τοῦ τροφήν λαμβάνειν
 25 πολυτελεστέραν, δύνασθαι ἂν καὶ ἡμᾶς. δεῖ γὰρ μηδαμῶς τὸν
 ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα δούλου μηδενὸς εἶναι μαλακώτερον. διόπερ ὁ Ζήνων
 εἰκότως ἡξίου εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὴν πολυτέλειαν ἐν τῇ τροφῇ καὶ μηδ'
 ἐπ' ὀλίγον ἐνδιδόναι πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπείπερ ὁ ἐνδοὺς ἅπαξ
 30 προέλθοι ἂν ἐπὶ πλείστον, ἅτε τῆς ἡδονῆς πολλὴν ἐχούσης αὔξησιν
 ἢν τε πόμασι καὶ βρώμασι. Ταῦτα μὲν τότε καινότερα ἔδοξεν
 ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν περὶ τροφῆς, ὧν εἰώθει λέγειν ἐκάστοτε.

6 He has in mind Apicius, a celebrated gourmet. Cf. Seneca *Ad Helviam* X, 8 and Columella *De Re Rustica* Praef. 5.

music and medicine, so some have even written books on cooking which aim to increase the pleasure of the palate, but ruin the health. It is at all events a common observation that those who are luxurious and intemperate in food have much less vigorous health. Some, in fact, are like women who have the unnatural cravings of pregnancy; these men, like such women, refuse the most common foods and have their digestion utterly ruined. Thus, as worn-out iron constantly needs tempering, their appetites continually demand being sharpened either by neat wine or a sharp sauce or some sour relish. But no such man was the Laconian who, on seeing a man refuse to eat a young peacock or other expensive bird that was placed before him, and complain that he could not eat because of lack of appetite, remarked, "But I could eat a vulture or a buzzard." Zeno of Citium even when he was ill thought that no unusually delicate food should be brought him, and when the attending physician ordered him to eat squab, he would not allow it, and said, "Treat me as you would treat my slave Manes." For I imagine that he thought there should be nothing more delicate in his treatment than for one of his slaves if he were ill; for if they can be cured without receiving more delicate fare, so can we. Surely a good man should be no more delicate than a slave; and for that reason Zeno very likely thought he ought to beware of delicacy in diet and not yield to it in the least, for if he once yielded he would go the whole way, since in the matter of food and drink, pleasure accelerates its pace alarmingly. The words spoken on that occasion concerning food and nourishment seemed to us more unusual than the customary discourses day by day.

22 Manes was a stock name for a slave. Cf. Epictetus *Disc.* III, 26, 37.

XVIII^B.

ΜΟΥΣΩΝΙΟΥ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΡΟΦΗΣ.

Αἰσχιστον, ἔφη, γαστριμαργία καὶ ὀψοφαγία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἀντερῆ
 5 οὐδέϊς· σκοποῦντας δὲ ὅπως διαφεύζονται ταῦτα, πάνν ὀλίγους
 ἦσθηναι ἐγώ, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ὁρῶ καὶ ἀπόντων ὀρεγομένους
 τῶν τοιούτων βρωμάτων, καὶ παρόντων ἀπέχεσθαι μὴ δυναμένους,
 καὶ χρωμένους αὐτοῖς, ὅταν χρώνται, ἀφειδῶς, ὡς καὶ πρὸς βλάβην
 χρῆσθαι τὴν τοῦ σώματος. καίτοι γαστριμαργία τί ἂν εἴη ἄλλο ἢ
 10 ἀκρασία περὶ τροφήν, δι' ἣν ἄνθρωποι τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν σίτῳ τοῦ
 ὠφελίμου προτιμῶσιν; καὶ ὀψοφαγία δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ
 ἀμετρία περὶ χρήσιν ὄψου. πανταχοῦ δὲ κακὸν οὐσα ἢ ἀμετρία ἐν
 τοῖς μάλιστα τῇδε τὴν ἐαυτῆς ἐπιδείκνυται φύσιν, παρεχομένη
 τοὺς ὀψοφάγους ἀντὶ ἀνθρώπων ὑσὶν ἢ κυσὶν ὁμοιοιμένους τὴν
 15 λαβρότητα καὶ εὐσχημονεῖν μὴ δυναμένους, οὐ ταῖς χερσίν, οὐ τοῖς
 ὄμμασιν, οὐ τῇ καταπόσει· οὕτως ἄρα αὐτοὺς ἐξίστησιν ἢ ἐπιθυμία
 τῆς ἐν ὄψῳ ἡδονῆς. ὅτι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τροφήν αἰσχιστόν
 ἐστὶ, γνώριμον, ἐν ᾧ γε ζώοις ἄφροσι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρώποις φρονί-
 μοις ὁμοιούμεθα. αἰσχίστου δὲ τούτου ὄντος, κάλλιστον ἂν εἴη
 20 τοῦναντίον, τάξει καὶ κοσμίως ἐσθίειν, καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην
 ἐνταῦθα ἐπιδείκνυσθαι πρῶτον, οὐκ ὃν ῥάδιον, ἀλλὰ δεόμενον
 πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως. διὰ τί δὴ τοῦτο; ὅτι πολλῶν
 ἡδονῶν οὐσῶν, αἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀναπείθουσιν ἀμαρτάνειν καὶ
 ἐνδιδόναι αὐταῖς βιάζονται παρὰ τὸ συμφέρον, δυσμαχωτάτῃ εἶναι
 25 κινδυνεύει πασῶν ἢ περὶ τροφήν ἡδονή. ταῖς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαις
 ἡδοναῖς σπανιώτερον ὁμιλοῦμεν, καὶ ἐνίων γε μῆρας καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς
 ὅλους ἀπέχεσθαι δυνάμεθα, ταύτης δὲ ἀνὰ πᾶσαν ἡμέραν πάντως
 πειρᾶσθαι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τά γε πολλὰ δις ἐκάστης ἡμέρας· οὐ
 γὰρ ἐνὶ ζῆν ἄλλως τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ὥσθ' ὅσῳ πλεονάκεις τῆς ἐν
 30 βρώσει ἡδονῆς πειρώμεθα, τοσούτῳ πλείους οἱ ἐνταῦθα κίνδυνοι.
 καὶ μὴν καθ' ἐκάστην προσφορὰν τροφῆς, οὐχ εἰς κίνδυνος ἀμαρτή-
 ματος, ἀλλὰ πλείονες. καὶ γὰρ ὁ παρὰ πλεόν ἢ δεῖ ἐσθίων,
 ἀμαρτάνει, καὶ ὁ κατασπύδων ἐν τῷ ἐσθίειν οὐδὲν ἥττον, καὶ ὁ
 μολυνόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄψου μᾶλλον ἢ χρή, καὶ ὁ τὰ ἡδίω τῶν
 35 ὑγιεινοτέρων βρώματα προτιμῶν, καὶ ὁ μὴ νέμων τὰ ἴσα τοῖς

XVIII B

ON FOOD

Thoroughly shameful, he used to say, are gluttony and high living, and no one will dare deny it; yet I have observed very few aiming to shun these vices. On the contrary I notice that the majority of people strive to obtain these same foods when they are not available and when they are at hand are unable to refrain from them, and they use them so lavishly when they have them that they make for the detriment of their health. And yet what else is gluttony but intemperance in the matter of nourishment, causing men to prefer what is pleasant in food to what is beneficial? And high living is nothing but excess in table luxury. Now excess is always evil, but here particularly it reveals its true nature in these people since it makes them greedy like swine or dogs rather than men, and incapable of behaving properly with hands, or eyes, or gullet, so completely does the desire for pleasure in dainties of the table pervert them. How shameful it is to behave toward food in this way we may learn from the fact that we liken them to unreasoning animals rather than to intelligent human beings. Now if this is shameful, the opposite must be altogether good; that is, exercising moderation and decorum in eating, demonstrating one's self-control there first of all, not an easy thing to do, but one which requires much attention and practice. Why should this be? Because although there are many pleasures which lure man into wrong-doing and force him to yield to them contrary to what is good, pleasure in eating is probably the hardest of all to combat. For other pleasures we encounter less often, and we can refrain from some of them for months and whole years, but of necessity we are tempted by this one every day and usually twice a day, since it is not possible for man to live otherwise. Thus the oftener we are tempted by pleasure in eating, the more dangers there are involved. And indeed at each meal there is not one hazard for going wrong, but many. First of all, the man who eats more than he ought does wrong, and the man who eats in undue haste no less, and also the man who wallows in the pickles and sauces, and the man who prefers the sweeter foods to the more healthful ones, and the man who does not serve food of the same kind or amount to his guests as to himself. There is still another wrong in connection with eating, when we indulge in it at an

συννεσθίουσιν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις ἀμαρτία περὶ τροφήν, ὅταν
 παρὰ καιρὸν προσφερώμεθα αὐτήν, καὶ δέον ἄλλο τι πράττειν
 ἀφέμενοι τούτου ἐσθίωμεν. τοσούτων δὴ καὶ ἔτι ἄλλων ἀμαρτιῶν
 οὐσῶν περὶ τροφήν, δεῖ μὲν ἀπασῶν καθαρεύειν αὐτῶν καὶ μηδεμιᾷ
 5 ἔνοχον εἶναι τὸν μέλλοντα σωφρονήσειν. καθαρεύοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ
 ἀναμάρτητος εἴη ἀσκῶν καὶ ἐθίζων αὐτὸν αἰρεῖσθαι σίτον οὐχ ἵνα
 ἡδῇται ἀλλ' ἵνα τρέφῃται, οὐδ' ἵνα λεαίνηται τὴν κατάποσιν ἀλλ'
 ἵνα ῥωννύηται τὸ σῶμα. καὶ γὰρ γέγονεν ἡ μὲν κατάποσις διόδος
 εἶναι τροφῆς, οὐχ ἡδονῆς ὄργανον, ἡ δὲ γαστήρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ χάριν
 10 οὐπερ ἔνεκα καὶ φυτῷ παντὶ ρίζα γέγονεν. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖ
 τρέφει τὸ φυτὸν ἡ ρίζα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς τὴν τροφήν λαμβάνουσα,
 οὕτω τρέφει τὸ ζῶον ἡ γαστήρ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰσφερομένων σίτων καὶ
 ποτῶν. ὥσπερ τε αὖ τούτοις διαμονῆς ἔνεκα συμβαίνει τρέφεσθαι
 καὶ οὐχ ἡδονῆς, παραπλησίως καὶ ἡμῖν ζωῆς καὶ φάρμακον ἡ
 15 τροφή ἐστι. διὸ καὶ προσήκει ἐσθίειν ἡμῖν ἵνα ζῶμεν, οὐχ ἵνα
 ἡδόμεθα, εἰ γε μέλλομεν στοιχεῖν ἀρίστῳ ὄντι τῷ λόγῳ Σωκράτους,
 ὃς ἔφη τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους ζῆν ἵνα ἐσθίωσιν, αὐτὸς δὲ
 ἐσθίειν ἵνα ζῇ. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιεικὴς τις βουλόμενος εἶναι ἄνθρωπος
 ἀξιώσει παραπλησίος τις εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ζῆν ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσθίειν,
 20 ὥσπερ ἐκείνοι, θηρώμενος ἐξ ἅπαντος τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς ἡδονήν.
 Ὅτι δὲ καὶ θεὸς ὁ ποιήσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ σφῆξσθαι χάριν,
 οὐχὶ τοῦ ἡδεσθαι, σίτα καὶ ποτὰ παρεσκεύασεν αὐτοῖς, μάθοι τις
 ἂν ἐκείθεν μάλιστα. ἡ γὰρ δὴ τροφή ὅτε ἐργάζεται μάλιστα τὸ
 ἑαυτῆς ἔργον, τότε οὐδαμῶς ἡδεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τε τὴν πέψιν
 25 καὶ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν, ἀλλὰ τρεφόμεθα μὲν τότε ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ῥωννύ-
 μεθα, ἡδόμεθα δὲ τότε οὐδεμίαν ἡδονήν, καίτοι πλείων ὁ χρόνος
 οὗτός ἐστιν ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐσθίομεν. ἔδει δέ γε, εἴπερ ὁ θεὸς ἡδονῆς χάριν
 τὴν τροφήν ἐμηχανήσατο ἡμῖν, τὸν πλείω τοῦτον χρόνον ἡδεσθαι
 ἡμᾶς ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ οὐ τὸν ἐλάχιστον ἐκείνον ἐν ᾧ καταπίνομεν.
 30 ἀλλ' ὅμως χάριν ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐλάχιστου χρόνου, ὃν ἡδόμεθα,
 παρασκευὴ μὲν ὅψων γίνεται μυρίων, πλείεται δ' ἡ θάλαττα μέχρι
 περάτων· μάγειροι δὲ γεωργῶν περισπουδαστότεροί εἰσι· δέλπνα
 δὲ παρατίθενται τινες ἀγρῶν ἀναλίσκοντες τιμάς, καὶ ταῦτ' οὐδαμῶς
 35 πᾶν γὰρ τοῦναντίον οἱ ταῖς εὐτελεστάταις χρώμενοι τροφαῖς
 ἰσχυρότατοί εἰσι. τοὺς γοῦν οἰκέτας τῶν δεσποτῶν καὶ τοὺς χωρί-

1 Martial (*Ep.* III, 60) and Juvenal (*Sat.* V) complain bitterly
 about the ungracious hosts who serve inferior food to guests of lower
 social standing at the same time that they and their peers gorge them-
 selves upon the finest delicacies. Cf. also Pliny *Ep.* II, 6.

unseasonable time, and although there is something else we ought to do, we put it aside in order to eat. Since, then, these and even more vices are connected with eating, if a man wishes to show self-control, he must be free of all of them and not be guilty of any of them. To keep himself blameless and free from such errors one should by constant practice accustom himself to choosing food not for enjoyment but for nourishment, not to tickle his palate but to strengthen his body. Indeed the throat was designed to be a passage for food, not an organ of pleasure, and the stomach was made for the same purpose as the root was created in plants. For just as the root nourishes the plant by taking food from without, so the stomach nourishes the living being from the food and drink which are taken into it. And again just as plants receive nourishment that they may survive, and not for their pleasure, so in like manner food is to us the medicine of life. Therefore it is fitting for us to eat in order to live, not in order to have pleasure, if, at all events, we wish to keep in line with the wise words of Socrates, who said that the majority of men live to eat but that he ate in order to live. Certainly no reasonable being, whose ambition is to be a man, will think it desirable to be like the majority who live to eat, and like them, to spend his life in the chase after pleasure derived from food.

That God who made man provided him food and drink for the sake of preserving his life and not for giving him pleasure, one can see very well from this: when food is performing its real function, it does not produce pleasure for man, that is in the process of digestion and assimilation. At that time we are being nourished and renew our strength, but we feel no sensation of pleasure; and yet there is a longer time involved in this process than in eating. Surely if God had planned eating as a pleasure for us, He would have had us enjoy it a longer time and not merely the brief moment when we are swallowing. And yet for the sake of that brief moment when we do experience pleasure, countless dainties are prepared, the sea is sailed from end to end, cooks are more in demand than farmers; some even squander the value of their estates to spread their tables, though their bodies are not at all benefited by the costliness of the food. Quite the contrary, people who eat the cheapest food are the strongest. Indeed you may notice that slaves are usually stronger than their masters, country men than city men, the poor than the rich, better able to do hard work, less fatigued by their labor, less

18 This saying is frequently attributed to Socrates, though sometimes to Diogenes. Cf. Aulus Gellius *Noct. Att.* XIX, 2, 7 and Diogenes Laertius *Lives* II, 34.

τας τῶν ἀστικῶν καὶ τοὺς πένητας τῶν πλουσίων ἴδοις ἂν ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πλήθος ῥωμαλεωτέρους ὄντας καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν πονεῖν δυναμένους, ἦττον δὲ κάμνοντας ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις, νοσοῦντας δὲ σπανιώτερον, ἀνεχομένους δὲ εὐκολώτερον κρίους, θάλπος, ἀγρυπνίαν, πᾶν εἴ τι
 5 τοιοῦτον. καίτοι καὶ ἐπ' ἴσον ἢ τε πολυτελὲς καὶ ἢ εὐτελὲς τροφὴ ῥωννύη τὸ σῶμα, ὅμως αἰρετέον ἐστὶ τὴν εὐτελεῖ, ὅτι αὕτη σωφρονικωτέρα καὶ πρέπει ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ καὶ τὸ εὐπόριστον τοῦ δυσπορίστου, καὶ τὸ ἀπραγμάτευτον τοῦ μετὰ πραγμάτων, καὶ τὸ ἔτοιμον τοῦ ἀνετοίμου πρὸς τροφὴν πρεπωδέστερον τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν.
 10 ἵνα δὲ συνελὼν εἰπῶ περὶ τροφῆς τὸ πᾶν, φημὶ δεῖν σκοπὸν μὲν αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι ὑγίειάν τε καὶ ἰσχύν, ὥς τούτων μόνον ἔνεκα βρωτέον, ἃ δὴ δεῖται πολυτελείας οὐδεμιᾶς· ἐσθίοντα δ' ἐπιμελίσθαι κόσμου τε καὶ μέτρου τοῦ προσήκοντος καὶ τοῦ διαφέρειν πλείστον τῷ τε ἀμολύντῳ καὶ τῷ σχολαίῳ.

XIX.

15

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΣΚΕΠΗΣ.

Ταῦτα μὲν περὶ τροφῆς εἶπεν. ἡξίου δὲ καὶ σκέπην τὴν σώφρονα τῷ σώματι ζητεῖν, οὐ τὴν πολυτελεῖ καὶ περιττῇ· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἐσθῆτι
 20 καὶ ὑποδέσσει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔφη εἶναι χρηστέον, ὅνπερ πανοπλία, φυλακὴς ἔνεκεν τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπιδείξω. ὥσπερ οὖν ὅπλα κάλλιστα τὰ ἰσχυρότατα καὶ σφύζειν μάλιστα δυνάμενα τὸν χρώμενον, οὐ τὰ περίβλεπτα καὶ λαμπρά, οὕτως ἀμπεχόνῃ καὶ ὑπόδεσις ἢ χρησιμωτάτῃ τῷ σώματι κρατίστη καὶ
 25 οὐχ ἢ δυναμένη τὰς τῶν ἀνοήτων ὄψεις ἐπιστρέφειν. δεῖ γὰρ τὴν σκέπην αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ κρεῖττον ἀποφαίνειν τὸ σκεπόμενον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσθενέστερόν τε καὶ χεῖρον. οἱ μὲν οὖν λειότρητά τε καὶ ἀπαλότητα σαρκὸς διὰ τῶν σκεπασμάτων μηχανώμενοι χεῖρον τὰ σώματα ποιοῦσιν, εἴ γε τὸ τεθρυμμένον σῶμα καὶ μαλακὸν
 30 πολὺν κάκιον τοῦ σκληροῦ τε καὶ διαπεποιημένου ἐστίν· οἱ δὲ ῥωννύντες καὶ κρατύνοντες τῇ σκέπῃ, οὗτοι τὰ σκεπόμενα μόνοι ὠφελοῦσιν. διὰ τοῦτο οὐδαμῶς καλὸν οὔτε ἐσθῆσι πολλαῖς κατασκέπειν τὸ σῶμα οὔτε ταινίαις κατελεῖν οὔτε χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας περιδέσει πύλων ἢ ὑφασμάτων τινῶν μαλακύνειν, τοὺς γε μὴ νοσοῦντας· οὐδ'

frequently ill, enduring more cheerfully cold, heat, lack of sleep, and every such hardship. Furthermore, even if expensive and cheap food strengthened the body equally well, nevertheless one ought to choose the cheaper food because it is more conducive to temperance and more fitting for a good man. In general for men of sense and reason, in respect of food, what is easy to procure is better than what is hard to obtain, what requires no work than what requires it, what is available than what is not at hand. But to sum up the question of food, I maintain that its purpose should be to produce health and strength, that one should for that purpose eat only that which requires no great outlay, and finally that at table one should have regard for a fitting decorum and moderation, and most of all should be superior to the common vices of filth and greedy haste.

XIX

ON CLOTHING AND SHELTER

Such were his opinions on food. He also thought it best to provide moderate covering for the body, not expensive and superfluous, for he said that one ought to use clothing and shoes in exactly the same way as armour, that is for the protection of the body and not for display. Therefore just as the most powerful weapons and those best calculated to protect the bearer are the best, and not those which attract the eye by their sheen, so likewise the garment or shoe which is most useful for the body is best, and not one which causes the foolish to turn and stare. For the covering should at once render the thing covered better and stronger than its natural condition, rather than weaker and worse. Those, then, who acquire smoothness and delicacy of skin by their clothing make their bodies worse, inasmuch as plainly the pampered and soft body is much worse than one that is sturdy and bears evidence of hard work. But those who strengthen and invigorate the body by the clothing they wear, those, I say, are the only ones who benefit the parts of the body so covered. It does not improve the appearance of the body to cover it completely with many garments, to smother it with tight wrappings, and to soften the hands and feet by close fitting gloves or shoes unless perhaps in case of illness. It is not good to be entirely without experience of cold and heat, but one ought in some degree to feel the cold in winter and likewise the heat of the

ὅλως εἶναι ἀγεύστους καλὸν ψύχους τε καὶ θάλπους, ἀλλὰ ῥιγοῦν
 χρῆ τὰ μέτρια χειμῶνος καὶ ἡλιουῖσθαι θέρους καὶ σκιατροφεῖσθαι
 ἡκιστα. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐνὶ χρήσθαι χιτῶνι τοῦ δεῖσθαι δυοῖν προτι-
 μητέον, τοῦ δ' ἐνὶ χρήσθαι χιτῶνι τὸ μηδενί, ἀλλὰ ἱματίῳ μόνον.
 5 καὶ τοῦ γε ὑποδεδέσθαι τὸ ἀνυποδετεῖν τῷ δυναμένῳ κρεῖττον
 κινδυνεύει γὰρ τὸ μὲν ὑποδεδέσθαι τῷ δεδέσθαι ἐγγὺς εἶναι, ἢ δ'
 ἀνυποδησία πολλὴν εὐλυσίαν τινὰ καὶ εὐκολίαν παρέχει τοῖς
 ποσίν, ὅταν ἡσκημένοι ᾧσιν. ὅθεν καὶ τοὺς ἡμεροδρόμους ὁρᾶν
 ἔστιν οὐ χρωμένους ὑποδήμασιν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς καὶ τῶν ἀθλούντων
 10 τοὺς δρομεῖς οὐκ ἂν δυναμένους σφῆζειν τὸ τάχος, εἰ δέοι τρέχειν
 αὐτοὺς ἐν ὑποδήμασιν.

ἐπεὶ δὲ σκέπησ ἔνεκα καὶ τὰς οἰκίας ποιούμεθα, φημὶ καὶ ταύτας
 δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ τῆς χρείας ἀναγκαῖον, ὥς ἀπερύκειν μὲν
 κρύους, ἀπερύκειν δὲ θάλπους τὸ σφοδρόν, εἶναι δ' ἡλίου καὶ ἀνέ-
 15 μων ἐπικουρήματα τοῖς δεομένοις. καθόλου δὲ ὅπερ ἂν παρέχοι
 σπήλαιον αὐτοφύες, ἔχον μετρίαν ὑπόδυσιν ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῦτο χρῆ
 παρέχειν ἡμῖν τὴν οἰκίαν, τοσοῦτον εἴπερ ἄρα περιττεύουσιν, ὅσον
 καὶ ἀπόθεσιν τροφῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπιτηδεῖαν ἔχειν. τί δ' αἰ
 περίστυλοι αὐλαί; τί δ' αἰ ποικίλαι χρίσεις; τί δ' αἰ χρυσόροφοι
 20 στέγαι; τί δ' αἰ πολυτέλειαι τῶν λίθων, τῶν μὲν χαμαὶ συν-
 ηρμοσμένων, τῶν δ' εἰς τοίχους ἐγκειμένων, ἐνίων καὶ πάνν
 πόρρωθεν ἡγμένων καὶ δι' ἀναλωμάτων πλείστων; οὐ ταῦτα πάντα
 περιττὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα, ὧν γε χωρὶς καὶ ζῆν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν ἔστι,
 πραγματεῖαν δ' ἔχει πλείστην, καὶ διὰ χρημάτων γίνεται πολλῶν,
 25 ἀφ' ὧν ἂν τις ἐδυνήθη καὶ δημοσίᾳ καὶ ἰδίᾳ πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους
 εὐεργετῆσαι; καὶ τοι πόσῳ μὲν εὐκλεέστερον τοῦ πολυτελῶς οἰκεῖν
 τὸ πολλοὺς εὐεργετεῖν; πόσῳ δὲ καλοκάγαθικώτερον τοῦ ἀναλίσκειν
 εἰς ξύλα καὶ λίθους τὸ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀναλίσκειν; πόσῳ δὲ ὠφε-
 λιμώτερον τοῦ περιβεβληῖσθαι μεγάλῃν οἰκίαν τὸ κεκτηῖσθαι φίλους
 30 πολλοὺς, ὃ περιγίνεται τῷ προθύμως εὐεργετοῦντι; τί δ' ἂν ὄναιτό
 τις τηλικούτον ἀπ' οἰκίας μεγέθους τε καὶ κάλλους, ἡλίκον ἀπὸ
 τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι πόλει καὶ πολίταις ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ;

sun in summer and to seek the shelter of shade as little as possible. Wearing one chiton is preferable to needing two, and wearing none but only a cloak is preferable to wearing one. Also going barefoot is better than wearing sandals, if one can do it, for wearing sandals is next to being bound, but going barefoot gives the feet great freedom and grace when they are used to it. It is for this reason that one sees couriers wearing no sandals on the highways and the runners in a contest unable to make the best speed if they have to run in sandals.

Since we make houses too for a shelter, I argue that they ought to be made to satisfy bare necessity, to keep out the cold and extreme heat and to be a protection from the sun and the winds for those who need it. In general, whatever a natural cave would offer, furnishing a moderate shelter for man, this our houses ought to furnish for us, with just enough to spare to make a convenient place for storing away man's food. What good are courtyards surrounded by colonnades? What good are all kinds of colored paints? What good are gold-decked rooms? What good are expensive stones, some fitted together on the floor, others inlaid in the walls, some brought from a great distance, and at the greatest expense? Are not all these things superfluous and unnecessary, without which it is possible not only to live but also to be healthy? Are they not the source of constant trouble, and do they not cost great sums of money from which many people might have benefited by public and private charity? How much more commendable than living a life of luxury it is to help many people. How much nobler than spending money for sticks and stones to spend it on men. How much more profitable than surrounding oneself with a great house to make many friends, the natural result of cheerfully doing good. What would one gain from a large and beautiful house comparable to what he would gain by conferring the benefits of his wealth upon the city and his fellow-citizens?

XX.

ΜΟΤΣΩΝΙΟΤ

ΕΚ ΤΟΥ

ΠΕΡΙ ΣΚΕΤΩΝ.

- Καὶ μὴν συνψδὰ καὶ συγγενῇ τῇ περὶ τὰς οἰκίας πολυτελεία καὶ
 5 τὰ τῶν σκευῶν τῶν κατ' οἰκίαν φαίνεται ὄντα, κλίνει καὶ τράπεζαι
 καὶ στρώματα καὶ ἐκπώματα καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον, πάντως τὴν χρείαν
 ὑπερβεβηκότα καὶ προσωτέρω τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐληλυθότα· κλίνει
 μὲν ἐλεφάντιναι καὶ ἀργυραὶ ἢ νῆ Δία χρυσαί, τράπεζαι δὲ
 10 παραπλησίας ὕλης, στρωμαὶ δὲ ἀλουργεῖς καὶ ἄλλων χρωμάτων
 δυσπορίστων, ἐκπώματα δὲ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου πεποιημένα, τὰ
 δὲ λίθων ἢ λιθοειδῶν τινων ἀμιλλωμένων τῇ πολυτελείᾳ τοῖς
 ἀργυροῖς καὶ χρυσοῖς. καὶ σπουδάζεται ταῦτα πάντα, τοῦ μὲν
 σκίμποδος οὐδὲν κακίω παρεχομένον κατὰ κλισιν ἡμῖν τῆς ἀργυρᾶς
 ἢ τῆς ἐλεφαντίνης κλίνης, τῆς δὲ σισύρας ἱκανωτάτης οὗσης
 15 ὑπεστρώσθαι ὥστε μὴ δεῖσθαι πορφυρίδος ἢ φοινικίδος· ἐσθίειν δ'
 ὑπάρχοντος ἡμῖν ἀβλαβῶς ἀπὸ τραπέζης ξυλίνης ὥς μὴ ποθεῖν
 μηδαμῶς τὴν ἀργυρᾶν, καὶ πίνειν γε νῆ Δία ἐκ κεραμεῶν ποτηρίων
 παρόν, ἃ τό τε δῦψος σβεννύνει παραπλησίως πέφυκε τοῖς χρυσοῖς,
 καὶ τὸν ἐγγερόμενον αὐτοῖς οἶνον οὐ λυμαίνεται, ὅσμην δὲ γε ἡδῶ
 20 τῶν χρυσῶν παρέχεται καὶ τῶν ἀργυρῶν. καθόλου δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ
 κακία σκευῶν κριθεῖν ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐκ τριῶν τούτων, τῆς τε κτήσεως
 καὶ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ τῆς τηρήσεως. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἢ κτήσασθαι
 δύσκολά ἐστιν ἢ χρῆσασθαι μὴ ἐπιτήδεια ἢ φυλάξαι μὴ ῥάδια,
 ταῦτα χεῖρω ἢ δὲ καὶ κτώμεθα μὴ χαλεπῶς καὶ χρώμενοι <εὐκόλως>
 25 ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ φυλάττομεν ῥαδίως, ταῦτα ἀμείνω. διόπερ τὰ
 κεραμεᾶ καὶ τὰ σιδηρᾶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, πολλῷ κρείττω τῶν
 ἀργυρῶν τε καὶ χρυσῶν, ὅτι ἢ κτήσις τούτων εὐμαρεστέρα, ὅσῳ
 καὶ εὐτελεστέρα, ἢ τε χρήσις πλείων, ὅτι καὶ πυρὶ ῥαδίως ταῦτ'
 ἐμβάλλομεν, ἐκεῖνα δὲ οὐ, ἢ τε φυλακὴ ἥττων τὰ γὰρ εὐτελῆ τῶν
 30 πολυτελῶν ἐπιβουλεύεται ἥττον. μέρος δέ τι τῆς φυλακῆς οὐσα
 καὶ ἢ ἐκκάθαρσις περὶ τὰ πολυτελῆ πλείων ἐστίν. ὥσπερ οὖν
 ἵππος ὁ τιμῆς μὲν ἑωνημένος ὀλίγης, χρείας δὲ παρεχόμενος
 πολλάς, αἰρετώτερος τοῦ ὀλίγα μὲν ὑπουργοῦντος, πολλοῦ δ'
 ἡγορασμένου κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ σκευὴ τὰ εὐτελέστερα καὶ
 35 πολυχρηστότερα κρείττω τῶν ἐναντίων. τί ποτ' οὖν διώκεται τὰ
 σπάνια καὶ πολυτελῆ πρὸ τῶν ἐν μέσῳ καὶ τῶν εὐτελῶν; ὅτι

XX

ON FURNISHINGS

Related to and in harmony with extravagance in houses is all the matter of furnishings within the house—couches, tables, coverlets, drinking cups, and similar objects—completely surpassing all needs and going far beyond necessity. There are ivory and silver, yes, even golden couches, tables of similar materials, coverlets of purple and other colors difficult to obtain, cups made of gold and silver, some of marble or some similar material rivalling gold and silver in costliness. All these things are eagerly sought for, although a pallet furnishes us a place to lie on no worse than a silver or ivory couch, and a rough cloak is quite as suitable to cover it as a purple or crimson coverlet; it is possible for us to eat quite safely from a wooden table without longing for one of silver. Yes, and one can drink from earthenware cups which are quite as good for quenching the thirst as goblets of gold; and the wine which is poured into them is not tainted, but yields a fragrance sweeter than from cups of gold or silver. In general, one would rightly judge what is good and bad in furnishings by these three criteria: acquisition, use, and preservation. Whatever is difficult to obtain or not convenient to use or not easy to protect is to be judged inferior; but what we acquire with no difficulty and use with satisfaction and find easy to keep is superior. For this reason earthenware and iron and similar vessels are much better than those of silver or gold, because their acquisition is less trouble since they are cheaper, their usefulness is greater since we can safely expose them to heat and fire (which cannot be done with others), and guarding them is less of a problem, for the inexpensive ones are less likely to be stolen than the expensive ones. No small part of preserving them too is keeping them clean, which is a more expensive matter with costly ones. Just as a horse which is bought for a small price but is able to fulfill many needs is more desirable than one which does little although he was bought for a great price, so in the matter of furnishings the cheaper and more serviceable are better than the more costly and less serviceable ones. Why is it, then, that the rare and expensive pieces are sought after rather than those which are available and cheap? It is because the things which are really good and fine are not recognized, and in place of them those which only seem good are eagerly sought by the foolish. As

- ἀγνοεῖται τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ γαθὰ, καὶ ἀντὶ τῶν ὄντων τὰ δοκοῦντα σπουδάζεται παρα τοῖς ἀνοήτοις· ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ οἱ μαινόμενοι πολλὰ κίς λευκὰ τὰ μέλανα νομίζουσιν· ἄνοια δὲ μανίας συγγενέστατον. ἐπεὶ τῶν γε νομοθετῶν τοὺς ἀρίστους, καὶ ἐν πρώτοις Λυκούργον
- 5 εὖροιμεν ἂν πολυτέλειαν μὲν ἐξελαύνοντα τῆς Σπάρτης, ἀντεισάγοντα δ' εὐτέλειαν καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς τῆς διαίτης τοῦ περιττοῦ προτιμῶντα πρὸς ἀνδρείαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν τρυφήν ὡς λύμην ἐκτρεπόμενον, τὸ δ' ἐθελόπονον ὡς σωτήριον ζηλοῦν ἀξιοῦντα. τεκμήρια δὲ τούτων αἱ τῶν ἐφήβων ἐκεῖ καρτερήσεις, ἐθιζομένων φέρειν λιμόν τε καὶ
- 10 διψος, καὶ μετὰ τούτων ῥίγος, ἔτι δὲ πληγὰς καὶ πόνους ἄλλους. <οὕτω καλοῖς καὶ> σεμνοῖς ἔθεσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τραφέντες ἄριστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἦσαν τε καὶ ἐνομίζοντο, καὶ τὴν πενίαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ζηλωτοτέραν τοῦ βασιλέως πλούτου κατέστησαν. ἐγὼ δ' οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς δεξαίμην ἂν νοσήσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τρυφήσαι.
- 15 τὸ μὲν γὰρ νοσεῖν μόνον βλάπτει τὸ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τρυφᾶν ἅμφω διαφθείρει, ψυχὴν τε καὶ σῶμα, σῶματι μὲν ἀσθένειαν καὶ ἀδυναμίαν, ψυχῇ δὲ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀνανδρίαν ἐμποιοῦν. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἀδικίαν τίκει τρυφή, ὅτι καὶ πλεονεξίαν. οὔτε γὰρ τρυφῶντά τινα δυνατὸν μὴ πολυτελὴ εἶναι, οὔτε πολυτελὴ ὄντα ὀλίγα βούλεσθαι
- 20 ἀναλίσκειν, βουλόμενον δὲ πολλὰ μὴ καὶ πορίζειν πολλὰ ἐπιχειρεῖν, οὐδ' αὖ πορίζειν ἐπιχειροῦντα πολλὰ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πορίσειέ τις ἐκ δικαίων πολλά. ἔτι καὶ ἄλλον τρόπον ἄδικος ἂν εἴη πάντως ὁ τρυφῶν καὶ γὰρ ὑπὲρ πόλεως τῆς αὐτοῦ πονεῖν τοὺς προσήκοντας πόνους ὀκνήσειεν ἂν ἢ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τρυφῶν,
- 25 κἂν ὑπὲρ φίλων ἢ συγγενῶν κακοπαθῆσαι δέον, οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείνειεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐάσει αὐτὸν ἢ τρυφή. καὶ μὴν καὶ διὰ θεοὺς ἔστιν ὅτε πονητέον τῷ δικαίῳ εἶναι βουλομένῳ πρὸς θεοὺς, ὅτι θυσίας ἢ τελετὰς ἢ τινα ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν τελέσει τοῖς θεοῖς, ὁ δὲ τρυφῶν ἐνδεήσει κἀνταῦθα. διόπερ ἄδικος ἂν εἴη πάντως καὶ περὶ πόλιν καὶ περὶ
- 30 φίλους καὶ περὶ θεοὺς, ἃ χρὴ πράττειν αὐτὸν οὐ πράττων. ὥς οὖν καὶ ἀδικίας αἰτίαν οὔσαν τὴν τρυφήν φευκτέον τρώφῃ παντί.

11 οὕτω καλοῖς καὶ coniecit Peerlkamp

3 He refers here to the famous Stoic paradox that all foolish men

madmen often think that black is white, so foolishness is next of kin to madness. Now we should find that the best lawgivers—and I think first of all of Lycurgus, who drove extravagance out of Sparta and substituted frugality, who preferred a life of deprivation as a means of producing courage to a life of excess, and who did away with luxury as a corrupting influence and considered the will to bear hardships the salvation of the state. Testimony to this is the endurance of the Spartan ephebes, who were made accustomed to bear hunger and thirst and cold, and even blows and other hardships. Trained in such noble and austere habits the ancient Lacedaemonians were the best of the Greeks and were so esteemed. Their very poverty they caused to be more envied than the King's wealth. For my part, then, I would choose sickness rather than luxury, for sickness harms only the body, but luxury destroys both body and soul, causing weakness and impotence in the body and lack of self-control and cowardice in the soul. Furthermore, luxury begets injustice because it also begets covetousness. For no man of extravagant tastes can avoid being lavish in expenditure, nor being lavish can he wish to spend little; but in his desire for many things he cannot refrain from acquiring them, nor again in his effort to acquire can he fail to be grasping and unjust; for no man would succeed in acquiring much by just methods. In still another way the man of luxurious habits would be unjust, for he would hesitate to undertake the necessary burdens for his city without abandoning his extravagant life, and if it seemed necessary to suffer deprivation on behalf of his friends or relatives he would not submit to it, for his love of luxury would not permit it. Nay more, there are times when duties to the gods must be undertaken by the man who would be just toward them, by performing sacrifices, initiatory rites, or some such other service. Here, too, the wastrel will be found wanting. Thus he would in all ways be unjust toward his city, toward his friends, and toward the gods, in failing to do what it is his duty to do. So, then, as being also the cause of injustice, luxury and extravagance must be shunned in every way.

are mad (*πάντες οἱ μωροὶ μάλιννται*). Cf. Cicero *Paradoxa* IV and *Tusc. Disp.* III, 5, 10.

4 Cf. Plutarch *Lycurgus* IX.

13 The King of Persia was proverbially the richest man on earth.

XXI.

ΕΚ ΤΟΤ ΠΕΡΙ ΚΟΤΡΑΣ.

*Ἐφη μὲν παραπλησίως τὸν ἄνδρα χρῆναι τῇ κεφαλῇ προσφέρειν
 κουράν, ὡς ἀμπέλῳ προσφέρομεν τομήν, τοῦ μόνον ἀφαιρεῖν χάριν
 τὸ ἄχρηστον . . . οὔτε γενεῖω πώγωνα, ἀλλ' εἶναι τινα καὶ ταύτην
 5 σκέπην ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῖν πεπορισμένην· τὸν δὲ πώγωνα καὶ
 σύμβολον γεγονέναι τοῦ ἄρρενος, ὥσπερ ἀλεκτρυνόνι λόφον καὶ
 λέοντι χαίτην· ὅθεν τῆς μὲν κόμης ἀφαιρετέον εἶναι τὸ ἐνοχλοῦν,
 τοῦ δὲ πώγωνος οὐδέν. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνοχλεῖν αὐτὸν οὐδέν, ἕως ἂν
 ὑγιαίνει τὸ σῶμα ἢ νόσον μὴ τοιαύτην νοσῇ, ἣς εἵνεκα γένοιτ'
 10 ἂν ἀφαίρεσις τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ γενείου τριχῶν. εὖ γὰρ εἴρηται, ἔφη, τὸ
 τοῦ Ζήνωνος, ὅτι τούτου ἕνεκα καρτέον οὐ καὶ κομητέον, τοῦ κατὰ
 φύσιν, ἵνα μὴ βαρούμενός τις ὑπὸ τῆς κόμης μὴδ' ἐνοχλούμενος ἢ
 πρὸς μηδεμίαν ἐνέργειαν. ἡ γὰρ δὴ φύσις τὸ μὲν ἐνδεὲς μᾶλλον
 φαίνεται φυλαξαμένη, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν ἥττον, ἐπὶ τε φυτῶν καὶ ἐπὶ
 15 ζώων, ὅτι τῆς προσθέσεως τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ἡ ἀφαίρεσις τοῦ περιττοῦ
 πολλὴ ῥᾶν καὶ εὐπετεστέρα ἐστίν. χρὴ δ' ἐφ' ἐκάτερα τὸν λογισμὸν
 τὸν ἀνθρώπινον τῇ φύσει βοηθεῖν, ὥστ' ἀναπιμπλάναι τὰς ἐνδείας
 ἐφ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ἀναπληροῦν, ἐλαττοῦν δὲ καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν τὰς περι-
 20 τότητας. ὅθεν καὶ καρτέον μόνης ἕνεκα τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως τοῦ περι-
 τοῦ καὶ οὐχὶ κόσμου χάριν, ὅπερ οἴονται δεῖν ἔνιοι τὰ μὲν γένεια
 λεαινόμενοι καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἀγενεῖους ἢ νῆ Δία τοὺς ἄρτι
 γενειάσκοντας, τὴν δὲ κεφαλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως κειρόμενοι διαφόρως
 δὲ τὰ πρόσω τῶν ὀπίσω. καὶ γὰρ τοι δοκῶν εἶναι κόσμος οὗτος
 πολλὴν ἀκοσμίαν ἔχει καὶ διαφέρει οὐδὲν τοῦ καλλωπισμοῦ τοῦ
 25 τῶν γυναικῶν. ἐκεῖναί τε γὰρ τὰ μὲν τινα μέρη πλέκουσι τῶν
 τριχῶν τὰ δὲ καθιᾶσι τὰ δὲ ἑτερόν τινα σκευάζουσι τρόπον, ἵνα
 φαίνωνται καλλίονες, οἳ τε κειρόμενοι οὕτως ἄνδρες κατάδηλοί
 εἰσι δι' ἐπιθυμίαν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι καλοὶ οἷς βούλονται ἀρέσκειν τὰς
 μὲν τέλεον ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν τριχῶν, τὰς δὲ πλάττοντες οὕτως ὡς
 30 ἂν εὐοπτότατα ἢ γυναιξί τε καὶ παισὶν ὑφ' ὧν ἐπαινέσθαι δέονται.
 ἥδη δέ τινες καὶ αὐτῷ τῷ βαρύνεσθαι τὰς τρίχας κείρονται, καὶ
 λεαίνουσι τὰ γένεια, σαφῶς οὐτοί γε κατεαγότες ὑπὸ τῆς τρυφῆς
 καὶ ἐκνευρισμένοι παντάπασιν, οἳ γε ἀνέχονται ἀνδρόγυνοι καὶ
 35 τῷ ὄντι ἄνδρες ἦσαν. τί γὰρ δὴ καὶ εἰσὶν αἱ τρίχες ἀνθρώποις
 βάρος; εἰ μὴ νῆ Δία καὶ τοῖς ὀρνέοις τὰ πτερὰ φαίη τις ἂν εἶναι
 βάρος.

1 This discourse is fragmentary and has many gaps which are not satisfactorily filled.

3 There is obviously a break in the text at this point.

XXI

ON CUTTING THE HAIR

He used to say that a man should cut the hair from the head for the same reason that we prune a vine, that is merely to remove what is useless. <But just as the eyebrows or eyelashes which perform a service in protecting the eyes should not be cut, so> neither should the beard be cut from the chin <for it is not superfluous>, but it too has been provided for us by nature as a kind of cover or protection. Moreover, the beard is nature's symbol of the male just as is the crest of the cock and the mane of the lion; so one ought to remove the growth of hair that becomes burdensome, but nothing of the beard; for the beard is no burden so long as the body is healthy and not afflicted with any disease for which it is necessary to cut the hair from the chin. The remark of Zeno was well made that it is quite as natural to cut the hair as it is to let it grow long, in order not to be burdened by too much of it nor hampered for any activity. For nature plainly keeps a more careful guard against deficiency than against excess, in both plants and animals, since the removal of excess is much easier and simpler than the addition of what is lacking. In both cases man's common sense ought to assist nature, so as to make up the deficiencies as much as possible and fill them out, and to lessen and eliminate the superfluous. Therefore the hair should be cut only to get rid of too much of it and not for looks, as some think they must, who shave their cheeks and imitate the beardless or, would you believe it, boys who are just beginning to grow a beard, and the hair on the head they do not cut all in the same way, but differently in front and behind. In fact that which seems to them good-looking is quite the opposite and does not differ from the efforts of women to make themselves beautiful. For they, you know, plait some parts of their hair, some they let fall free, and some they arrange in some other way in order to appear more beautiful. So men who cut their hair are obviously doing it out of a desire to appear handsome to those whom they wish to please, and so some of their hair they cut off completely, some they arrange so as to be most pleasing to the women and boys by whom they want to be admired. Nowadays there are even men who cut their hair to free themselves of the weight of it and they also shave their cheeks. Clearly such men have become slaves of luxurious living and are completely enervated, men who can endure being seen as womanish creatures, hermaphrodites, something which real men would avoid at all costs. How could hair be a burden to men? Unless, of course, one should say that feathers are a burden to birds also.

XXII.

Μουσωνίου.

Οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἐνεστηκυῖαν ἡμέραν καλῶς βιώναι μὴ προθέμενον αὐτὴν ὡς ἐσχάτην.

XXIII.

Μουσωνίου.

5 Τί προβαλλόμεθα τοὺς τυράννους μακρῶ χείρονες αὐτῶν καθεστῶτες; τὰς γὰρ ὁμοίας αὐτοῖς ἔχομεν ὁρμὰς ἐν ταῖς οὐχ ὁμοίαις τύχαις.

XXIV.

Μουσωνίου.

Κἂν ἡδονῇ κανονιστέον ἢ τὰ ἀρεστά, οὐδὲν τῆς σωφροσύνης
10 ἡδίων· κἂν πόνῳ κανονιστέον ἢ τὰ φευκτά, οὐδὲν τῆς ἀκρασίας ἐπιπονώτερον.

XXV.

Μουσωνίου.

Μουσώνιος ἔλεγεν ὑπερβολὴν ἀναισχυντίας εἶναι τὸ πρὸς μὲν
τὰς τῶν πόνων ὑπομονὰς μεμνήσθαι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενείας,
15 πρὸς δὲ τὰς τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκλανθάνεσθαι.

XXVI.

Μουσωνίου.

Ἀρχὴ τοῦ μὴ κατοκνεῖν τὰ ἀσχήμονα <πράττειν> τὸ μὴ κατοκνεῖν τὰ ἀσχήμονα λέγειν.

XXVII.

Μουσωνίου.

20 Καὶ ἂν τοῦ συμφέροντος μάλιστα προαιρῇ ἔχεσθαι, μὴ δυσχεραίνει ταῖς περιστάσεσιν, ἐνθυμούμενος πόσα ἤδη σοι τῶν ἐν βίῳ οὐχ ὡς σὺ ἐβούλου συνέπεσεν, ἀλλ' ὡς συνέφερεν.

2f. This sentiment has been expressed by a number of writers. Cf. Horace *Ep.* I, 4, 13; Seneca *Ep.* 93, 6; Marcus Aurelius *Eis éautόν* VII, 69.

FRAGMENTS

XXII Musonius

It is not possible to live well today unless one thinks of it as his last.

XXIII Musonius

What indictment can we make against tyrants when we ourselves are much worse than they? For we have the same impulses as theirs but not the same opportunity to indulge them.

XXIV Musonius

If one were to measure what is agreeable by the standard of pleasure, nothing would be pleasanter than self-control; and if one were to measure what is to be avoided by pain, nothing would be more painful than lack of self-control.

XXV Musonius

Musonius said that there was no more shameful inconsistency than to recall the weakness of the body under stress of pain, but to forget it in the enjoyment of pleasure.

XXVI Musonius

One begins to lose his hesitation to do unseemly things when one loses his hesitation to speak of them.

XXVII Musonius

And if you choose to hold fast to what is right, do not be irked by difficult circumstances, but reflect on how many things have already happened to you in life in ways that you did not wish, and yet they have turned out for the best.

5-7 Seneca (*De ira* II, 31, 3) makes a similar indictment of human nature. Cf. also Juvenal *Sat.* X, 96 f.

9-11 He is using the two Epicurean criteria to prove Stoic doctrine.

XXVIII.

Μουσωνίου.

Ἄρπαζε τὸ καλῶς ἀποθνήσκειν, ὅτε ἔξεστι, μὴ μετὰ μικρὸν τὸ μὲν ἀποθνήσκειν σοι παρή, τὸ δὲ καλῶς μηκέτι ἐξῇ.

XXIX.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

- 5 Οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπὶ πολλῶν συμφέροντι ζῶντα καθηκόντως ἀποθανεῖν, μὴ ἐπὶ πλείονων ἀποθνήσκοντα συμφέροντι.

XXX.

Μουσωνίου.

Αἰδοῦς παρὰ πᾶσιν ἄξιος ἔση, ἐὰν πρῶτον ἄρξῃ σαυτὸν αἰδέεσθαι.

XXXI.

- 10 Μουσωνίου.

Οὐ πολὺν διάγουσι χρόνον οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ὑπηκόους ὑπὲρ ὧν ἂν πράττωσι μὴ τὸ 'καθήκει μοι' λέγειν μεμελετηκότες, ἀλλὰ τὸ 'ἔξεστί μοι.'

XXXII.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

- 15 Μὴ θέλε ἐπιτάσσειν τὰ καθήκοντα τοῖς συγγιγνώσκουσί σοι τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα πράττοντι.

XXXIII.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

Πειρατέον καταπληκτικὸν μᾶλλον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις ἢ φοβερὸν θεωρεῖσθαι τῷ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότης, τῷ δὲ ἀπήνεια παρακολουθεῖ.

2f. Seneca elaborates the idea of dying nobly while one still has the mind and will to do so. Cf. *Ep.* 58, 34-36.

XXVIII Musonius

Choose to die well while it is possible, lest shortly it may become necessary for you to die, but it will no longer be possible to die well.

XXIX The same

One who by living is of use to many has not the right to choose to die unless by dying he may be of use to more.

XXX Musonius

You will earn the respect of all men if you begin by earning the respect of yourself.

XXXI Musonius

Those men do not live long who have become accustomed to say to their subjects in defence of whatever they do, not, "It is my duty," but, "It is my will."

XXXII The same

Do not expect to enjoin right-doing upon men who are conscious of your own wrong-doing.

XXXIII The same

Toward subjects one should strive to be regarded with awe rather than with fear. Reverence attends the one, bitterness the other.

11-13 He may have in mind the famous statement of Suetonius about Nero: "Negavit quemquam principum scisse quod sibi liceret." (*Nero* XXXVII).

XXXIV.

Μουσωνίου.

Τῶν μὲν Κροίσου καὶ Κινύρου θησαυρῶν πενίαν ἐσχάτην καταψυφιοῦμεθα, ἓνα δὲ καὶ μόνον πιστεύσομεν εἶναι πλούσιον τὸν δυνάμενον κτήσασθαι τὸ ἀνευδὲς πανταχοῦ.

XXXV.

5

Μουσωνίου.

Τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν ὁμοίως ἐπικεκλωσμένου πᾶσιν, οὐ τὸ βραδέως ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμφανῶς ἀποθανεῖν μακάριον.

XXXVI.

Καὶ μὴν ὧν γε μεμνήμεθα Μουσωνίου καλῶν ἐν ἔστιν, ᾧ Σύλλα, τὸ δεῖν αἰεὶ θεραπευομένους βιοῦν τοὺς σφύζεσθαι μέλλοντας. οὐ
 10 γὰρ ὡς ἐλλέβορον, οἶμαι, δεῖ θεραπεύσαντα συνεκφέρειν τῷ νοσήματι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' <ἐάν> ἐμμένοντα τῇ ψυχῇ συνέχειν τὰς κρίσεις καὶ φυλάσσειν. φαρμάκοις γὰρ οὐκ ἔοικεν ἀλλὰ σιτίοις ὑγιεινοῖς ἢ δύναμις αὐτοῦ, μεθ' ὑγιείας ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσα χρηστὴν
 15 οἷς ἂν γένηται συνήθης· αἱ δὲ πρὸς ἀκμάζοντα τὰ πάθη καὶ οἰδοῦντα παραινέσεις καὶ νουθεσίαι σχολῇ μὲν ἀνύτουσι καὶ μόλις, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ὁσφραντῶν διαφέρουσιν, ἃ τοὺς ἐπιληπτικούς ἐγείροντα καταπίπτοντας οὐκ ἀπαλλάττει τοῦ νοσήματος.

XXXVII.

‘Ο ‘Ρουτίλιος ἐκείνος ἐν ‘Ρώμῃ τῷ Μουσωνίῳ προσελθὼν ‘Μουσώνιε’ εἶπεν ‘ὁ Ζεὺς ὁ Σωτήρ, ὃν σὺ μιμῇ καὶ ζηλοῖς, οὐ
 20 δανείζεται.’ καὶ ὁ Μουσώνιος μειδιάσας εἶπεν ‘οὐδὲ δανείζει.’ ὁ γὰρ ‘Ρουτίλιος δανείζων αὐτὸς ὠνείδιζεν ἐκείνῳ δανειζομένῳ.

XXXVIII.

‘Ρούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Περὶ φιλίας.

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἔθετο ὁ θεός, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. ἐφ’ ἡμῖν μὲν τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ σπουδαιότατον, ᾧ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς

2-4 This touches the Stoic paradox that the wise man alone is rich. Cf. Cicero, *Paradoxa* VI.

XXXIV Musonius

The treasures of Croesus and Cinyras we shall condemn as the last degree of poverty. One man and one alone shall we consider rich, the man who has acquired the ability to want for nothing always and everywhere.

XXXV Musonius

Since the Fates have spun out the lot of death for all alike, he is blessed who dies not late but well.

XXXVI

And further, of the notable sayings of Musonius which come to my mind, this is one, Sulla, that those who want to be in health should spend their lives taking care of themselves. For unlike hellebore, reason should not be cast forth with the illness after it has effected a cure, but it should be allowed to remain in the soul to keep and guard the judgment. For the power of reason should not be compared to drugs but to health-giving foods, since it introduces a good and healthy frame of mind into those to whom it becomes habitual. On the other hand admonitions and warnings made when the emotions are at their greatest heat barely have any effect at all. They are not unlike those scents which revive people who have fallen in a fit but do not cure the disease.

XXXVII

The notorious Rutilius coming up to Musonius in Rome said, "Zeus the Saviour whom you imitate and emulate does not borrow money." And Musonius with a smile answered, "Neither does he lend." For Rutilius, while lending money himself, was reproaching Musonius for borrowing.

XXXVIII Rufus. From the remarks of Epictetus on friendship

Of the things that exist, God has put some in our control, others not in our control. In our control he has put the

8-17 Musonius carries on the Socratic idea of the philosopher as the physician.

εὐδαίμων ἐστί, τὴν χρῆσιν τῶν φαντασιῶν. τοῦτο γὰρ ὀρθῶς
 γιγνόμενον ἐλευθερία ἐστίν, εὖροια, εὐθυμία, εὐστάθεια, τοῦτο δὲ
 καὶ δίκη ἐστὶ καὶ νόμος καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ ξύμπασα ἀρετή. τὰ
 δ' ἄλλα πάντα οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐποιήσατο. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμᾶς συμψη-
 5 φους χρὴ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι καὶ ταύτῃ διελόντας τὰ πράγματα τῶν
 μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν πάντα τρόπον ἀντιποιεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν
 ἐπιτρέψαι τῷ κόσμῳ καί, εἴτε τῶν παίδων δέοιτο εἴτε τῆς πατρίδος
 εἴτε τοῦ σώματος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν, ἀσμένους παραχωρεῖν.

XXXIX.

Ῥούφου ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου Περὶ φιλίας.

- 10 Τὸ δὲ Λυκούργου τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου τίς ἡμῶν οὐ θαυμάζει;
 πηρωθεὶς γὰρ ὑπὸ τίνος τῶν πολιτῶν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὸν ἕτερον
 καὶ παραλαβὼν τὸν νεανίσκον παρὰ τοῦ δήμου, ἵνα τιμωρήσαιο
 ὅπως αὐτὸς βούλεται, τοῦτον μὲν ἀπέσχετο, παιδεύσας δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ
 ἀποφήνας ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν παρήγαγεν εἰς τὸ θέατρον. θαυμαζόντων
 15 δὲ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων 'τοῦτον μὲν τοι λαβὼν' ἔφη 'παρ' ὑμῶν
 ὕβριστήν καὶ βίαιον ἀποδίδωμι ὑμῖν ἐπιεικὴ καὶ δημοτικόν.'

XL.

Ῥούφου ἐκ τοῦ Ἐπικτήτου Περὶ φιλίας.

- 'Ἀλλὰ παντὸς μᾶλλον τῆς μὲν φύσεως ἐκείνου τὸ ἔργον, συνδῆσαι
 καὶ συναρμόσαι τὴν ὁρμὴν τῇ τοῦ προσήκοντος καὶ ὠφελίμου
 20 φαντασίᾳ.

XLI.

Τοῦ αὐτοῦ.

- Τὸ δὲ οἶεσθαι εὐκαταφρονήτους τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔσεσθαι, εἰ μὴ
 τοὺς πρῶτους ἐχθροὺς παντὶ τρόπῳ βλάψωμεν, σφόδρα ἀγεννῶν
 καὶ ἀνοήτων ἀνθρώπων. φαμὲν γὰρ τὸν εὐκαταφρόνητον νοεῖσθαι
 25 μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι βλάψαι· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον νοεῖται
 κατὰ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὠφελεῖν.

noblest and most excellent part by reason of which He is Himself happy, the power of using our impressions. For when this is correctly used, it means serenity, cheerfulness, constancy; it also means justice and law and self-control and virtue as a whole. But all other things He has not put in our control. Therefore we ought to become of like mind with God and, dividing things in like manner, we ought in every way to lay claim to the things that are in our control, but what is not in our control we ought to entrust to the universe and gladly yield to it whether it asks for our children, our country, our body, or anything whatsoever.

XXXIX Rufus. From Epictetus on friendship

Who of us does not marvel at the action of Lycurgus the Lacedaemonian? For when he had been blinded in one eye by one of his fellow-citizens and had received the young man at the hands of the people to punish as he saw fit, he did not choose to do this, but trained him instead and made a good man of him, and afterward escorted him to the public theatre. And when the Lacedaemonians regarded him with amazement, he said: "This man I received from you an insolent and violent creature; I return him to you a reasonable man and a good citizen."

XL Rufus. From Epictetus on friendship

But most of all the work of nature is this: to make desire and impulse to act fit closely with perception of that which is seemly and useful.

XLI The same

To share the common notion that we shall be despised by others if in every way we do not strive to harm the first enemies we meet is the mark of mean-minded and ignorant men. For we say that the despicable man is recognized among other things by his inability to harm his enemies, but actually he is much more easily recognized by his inability to help them.

XLII.

Ῥούφου ἐκ τῶν Ἐπικτήτου Περὶ φιλίας.

Ὅτι τοιαύτη ἡ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται καὶ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄλλως γίνεσθαι τὰ γινόμενα ἢ ὡς νῦν ἔχει καὶ ὅτι ταύτης τῆς τροπῆς καὶ τῆς μεταβολῆς οὐ μόνον οἱ ἄνθρωποι
 5 μετελήφασιν καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ θεία, καὶ νῆ Δι' αὐτὰ τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τρέπεται καὶ μεταβάλλει καὶ γῇ τε ὕδωρ γίνεται καὶ ὕδωρ ἀήρ, οὗτος δὲ πάλιν εἰς αἰθέρα μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς μεταβολῆς ἄνωθεν κάτω. ἐὰν πρὸς ταῦτά τις ἐπιχειρῇ ῥέπειν τὸν νοῦν καὶ πείθειν ἑαυτὸν ἐκόντα
 10 δέχεσθαι τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, πάννυ μετρίως καὶ μουσικῶς διαβιώσεται τὸν βίον.

XLIII.

Θρασέας εἰώθει λέγειν 'σήμερον ἀναιρεθήναι θέλω μᾶλλον ἢ αὔριον φυγαδευθῆναι.' τί οὖν αὐτῷ Ῥούφος εἶπεν; 'εἰ μὲν ὡς βαρύτερον ἐκλέγῃ, τίς ἡ μωρία τῆς ἐκλογῆς; εἰ δ' ὡς κουφότερον,
 15 τίς σοι δέδωκεν; οὐ θέλεις μελετᾶν ἀρκεῖσθαι τῷ δεδομένῳ';

XLIV.

Τί ἔτι ἀργοὶ καὶ ῥάθυμοι καὶ νωθοὶ ἐσμεν καὶ προφάσεις ζητοῦμεν, καθ' ἃς οὐ πονήσομεν οὐδ' ἀγρυπνήσομεν ἐξεργαζόμενοι τὸν αὐτῶν λόγον; — Ἄν οὖν ἐν τούτοις πλανηθῶ, μή τι τὸν πατέρα ἀπέκτεινα; — Ἀνδράποδον, ποῦ γὰρ ἐνθάδε πατήρ ἦν, ἔν' αὐτὸν
 20 ἀποκτείνῃς; τί οὖν ἐποίησας; ὁ μόνον ἦν κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀμάρτημα, τοῦτο ἡμάρτηκας. ἐπεὶ τοι τοῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐγὼ Ῥούφῳ εἶπον ἐπιτιμῶντί μοι ὅτι τὸ παραλειπόμενον ἐν ἐν συλλογισμῷ τινι οὐχ εὔρισκον. 'οὐχ οἷον μὲν' φημι ' <εἰ> τὸ Καπιτώλιον κατέκανυσα,' ὁ δ' 'ἀνδράποδον,' ἔφη, 'ἐνθάδε τὸ παραλειπόμενον Καπιτώλιόν
 25 ἔστιν.' ἢ ταῦτα μόνον ἀμαρτηματὰ ἔστι τὸ Καπιτώλιον ἐμπρῆσαι καὶ τὸν πατέρα ἀποκτείνειν, τὸ δ' εἰκῇ καὶ μάτην καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν χρῆσθαι ταῖς φαντασίαις ταῖς αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ παρακολουθεῖν λόγῳ μὴδ' ἀποδείξει μὴδὲ σοφίσματι μὴδ' ἀπλῶς βλέπειν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν ἐρωτήσῃ καὶ ἀποκρίσει, τούτων δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν
 30 ἀμάρτημα;

12 Thrasea Paetus, one of the most conspicuous of the Stoic statesmen, was finally condemned to death in 66 for his criticism of Nero.

13 Musonius was regularly called Rufus by his pupil Epictetus.

XLII Rufus. From the remarks of Epictetus on friendship

Of such a character the nature of the universe was and is and will be, and it is not possible for things that come into existence to come into existence differently from the way they now do. And in this process of change and transformation, not only human beings and other creatures of earth have had a part, but also the divine beings, and even the four elements are changed and transformed upwards and downwards; that is, earth becomes water and water air, and air is again transformed into ether; and there is the same process of transformation downwards. If a man resolves to focus his thoughts on these things and persuades himself willingly to accept the inevitable, he will lead a life well measured and in harmony with the universe.

XLIII

Thræsea was in the habit of saying, "I should rather be put to death today than be banished tomorrow." What then did Rufus say to him? "If you choose that as the heavier misfortune, what a foolish choice to make! But if as the lighter, who has given you the choice? Are you not willing to train yourself to be satisfied with what has been given you?"

XLIV

Why do we continue to be lazy and careless and sluggish and seek excuses for not working hard and sitting up late to perfect our mastery of logical argument? "Well, if I have made a mistake in this problem, I haven't been guilty of killing my own father, have I?" Stupid boy, shall I show you where in this instance there was a father to kill? The only possible error to make in this example you have made. Yet that was the very answer I once made to Rufus when he scolded me because I could not find the missing member in a certain syllogism. "It is not as bad," I said, "as if I had set fire to the Capitol." Whereupon he answered, "In this case, you foolish fellow, the missing member *is* the Capitol." Are these the only possible wrongs, burning the Capitol and killing one's father? But using one's impressions without purpose or profit and quite at random and failing to follow argument or demonstration or semblance of reason, and completely missing what is to one's advantage or disadvantage in question and answer—are none of these wrongs?

XLV.

οὕτως καὶ Ῥούφος πειράζων με εἰώθει λέγειν 'συμβήσεται σοι τοῦτο καὶ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου.' κάμου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκριναμένον ὅτι ἀνθρώπινα, 'τί οὖν' ἔφη 'ἐκείνον παρακαλῶ παρὰ σοῦ αὐτὰ λαβεῖν δυνάμενος;' τῷ γὰρ ὄντι, ὃ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τις ἔχει, 5 περισσὸς καὶ μάταιος παρ' ἄλλου λαμβάνων.

XLVI.

Τῶν νέων τοὺς μαλακοὺς οὐκ ἔστι προτρέψαι ῥάδιον· οὐδὲ γὰρ τυχὸν ἀγκίστρῳ λαβεῖν· οἱ δ' εὐφυνεῖς, κὰν ἀποτρέπῃς, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἔχονται τοῦ λόγου. διὸ καὶ ὁ Ῥούφος τὰ πολλὰ ἀπέτρεπεν τούτῳ δοκιμαστηρίῳ χρώμενος τῶν εὐφυνῶν καὶ ἀφυνῶν. ἔλεγε γὰρ ὅτι 10 'ὥς ὁ λίθος, κὰν ἀναβάλῃς, ἐνεχθήσεται κάτω ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ κατασκευὴν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ εὐφυνής, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἀποκρούεται τις αὐτόν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον νεύει ἐφ' ὃ πέφυκεν.'

XLVII.

'Ρούφῳ τις ἔλεγεν Γάλβα σφαγέντος ὅτι 'νῦν προνοία ὁ κόσμος διοικεῖται;' ὁ δὲ 'μὴ παρέργως ποτ' ἔφη 'ἀπὸ Γάλβα κατεσ- 15 κεύασα, ὅτι προνοία ὁ κόσμος διοικεῖται;'

XLVIII.

Εἶωθε λέγειν ὁ Ῥούφος 'εἰ εὐσχολεῖτε ἐπαινέσαι με, ἐγὼ δ' οὐδὲν λέγων.' τοιγαροῦν οὕτως ἔλεγεν, ὥσθ' ἕκαστον ἡμῶν καθήμενον οἶεσθαι, ὅτι τίς ποτε αὐτὸν διαβέβληκεν· οὕτως ἤπτετο τῶν γινομένων, οὕτω πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐτίθει τὰ ἐκάστου κακά.

3 Every editor of Musonius and of Epictetus has expressed his dissatisfaction with the text of this fragment, but none has suggested the solution. From the preceding context in Epictetus, the meaning is that a man must get from himself what he needs for his comfort or security, and not from another or with the help of another. Here Musonius, testing the young slave Epictetus to see how well he had learned the lesson, mentions the ill-treatment he would suffer from his master Epaphroditus. Professor Hendrickson conjectures that after ἀνθρώπινα something has been lost from the text, possibly <ποιοῖς ἂν περὶ μου παραιτούμενος> and that ἀνθρώπινα is used in the sense of ἀνθρωπίνως. Following this interpretation, Epictetus, by asking Musonius to intercede for him, shows that he has *not* learned the lesson.

XLV

And in the same way to make trial of me, Rufus used to say, "Such and such a thing will befall you at the hands of your master." In answer to him, I said that in such a case it would be kind of him <to intercede in my behalf.> "What!" he exclaimed, "Do you mean that I should intercede in your behalf when I can get the same result from you yourself?" For in truth what one can get from himself it is superfluous and foolish as well to get from someone else.

XLVI

It is not easy to produce an effect upon soft characters any more than it is to pick up a soft cheese with a hook, but young men of sound nature, even if you turn them away, hold to philosophy all the more. For that reason Rufus frequently discouraged pupils, using this as a means of testing the superior and inferior ones. For he used to say, "Just as a stone, even if you throw it upwards, will fall downwards because of its nature, so the superior man, the more one repels him, the more he inclines toward his own natural direction."

XLVII

On the assassination of Galba someone said to Rufus, "Can you now hold that the world is ruled by divine Providence?" To which he replied, "Did I ever for a moment build my argument, that the world is ruled by a divine Providence, upon Galba?"

XLVIII

Rufus used to say, "If you have time to waste praising me, I am conscious that what I say is worth nothing." (So far from applause on our part,) he spoke in such a way that each of us sitting there felt that someone had gone to him and told him our faults, so accurately he touched upon our true characters, so effectively he placed each one's faults before his eyes.

13-15 Great hopes were entertained of Galba by the conservative Romans and his accession may well have been looked upon as an intervention of divine Providence (*capax imperii nisi imperasset*). It was probably Galba who recalled Musonius from exile.

XLIX.

* * * Musonium philosophum solitum accepimus. ‘Cum philosophus’ inquit ‘hortatur, monet, suadet, obiurgat aliudve quid disciplinarum disserit, tum, qui audiunt, si de summo et soluto pectore obvias vulgatasque laudes effutiunt, 5 si clamitant etiam, si gestiunt, si vocum eius festivitatis, si modulis verborum, si quibusdam quasi frequentamentis orationis moventur, exagitantur et gestiunt, tum scias et qui dicit et qui audiunt frustra esse, neque illi philosophum loqui, sed tibicinem canere. animus’ inquit ‘audientis philosophum, 10 <dum> quae dicuntur utilia ac salubria sunt et errorum atque vitiorum medicinas ferunt, laxamentum atque otium prolixè profuseque laudandi non habet. quisquis ille est, qui audit, nisi ille est plane deperditus, inter ipsam philosophi orationem et perhorrescat necesse est et pudeat tacitus et paeniteat et 15 gaudeat et admiretur, varios adeo vultus disparilesque sensus gerat, proinde ut eum conscientiamque eius adfecerit utrumque animi partium, aut sincerarum aut aegrarum, philosophi pertractatio.’

Praeterea dicebat magnam laudem non abesse ab admiratione, admirationem autem, quae maxima est, non verba 20 parere, sed silentium. ‘Idcirco’ inquit ‘poetarum sapientissimus auditores illos Ulixi labores suos inlustrissime narrantis, ubi loquendi finis factus, non exultare nec strepere nec vociferari facit, sed consiluisse universos dicit quasi attonitos 25 et obstupidos delenimentis aurium ad origines usque vocis permanantibus:

ὡς φάτο· τοὶ δ’ ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ,
κηληθμῶ δ’ ἔσχοντο κατὰ μέγαρα σκιάοντα.

L.

‘Musonius’ inquit (Herodes) ‘aeruscanti cuiquam id genus 30 et philosophum sese ostentanti dari iussit mille nummum, et cum plerique dicerent nebulonem esse hominem malum et

XLIX

We have it on good authority that Musonius the philosopher <in his discourses was accustomed to deprecate and repress applause on the part of his auditors.> "When a philosopher," he said, "is exhorting, persuading, rebuking, or discussing some aspect of philosophy, if the audience pour forth trite and commonplace words of praise in their enthusiasm and unrestraint, if they even shout, if they gesticulate, if they are moved and aroused, and swayed by the charm of his words, by the rhythm of his phrases, and by certain rhetorical repetitions, then you may know that both the speaker and his audience are wasting their time, and that they are not hearing a philosopher speaking but a fluteplayer performing. The mind," he said, "of a man who is listening to a philosopher, if the things which are said are useful and helpful and furnish remedies for faults and errors, has no leisure and time for profuse and extravagant praise. The hearer, whoever he may be, unless he has completely lost his moral sense, in listening to the philosopher's words must shudder and feel secretly ashamed and repentant, and again experience joy and wonder and even have varying facial expressions and changes of feeling as the philosopher's speech affects him and touches his recognition of that part of his soul which is sound and that which is sick.

Moreover, he used to say that great applause and admiration are to be sure not unrelated, but that the greatest admiration yields silence rather than words. For that reason he said the wisest of poets does not have those who listened to Ulysses relating the wonderful tale of his hardships leap up and shout and cry out their approval when he finished speaking, but he says that all kept silent as if struck dumb and senseless because the pleasure they had in hearing him affected their power of speech.

"Thus he spoke; but they all were hushed and silent
And were held spellbound throughout the shadowy halls."

L

"Musonius," Herodes said, "ordered a thousand sesterces to be given to a beggar of this sort who was pretending to be a philosopher, and when several people told him that

29 This incident occurs in a discussion of Herodes Atticus' generous treatment of a sham philosopher who was begging for money.

malitiosum et nulla re bona dignum, tum Musonium subridentem dixisse aiunt: ἄξιος οὖν ἐστὶν ἀργυρίου.'

LI.

Adulescentuli cum etiam tum in scholis essemus, ἐνθυμημάτων hoc Graecum quod adposui, dictum esse a Musonio philosopho audiebamus et, quoniam vere atque luculente dictum verbisque est brevibus et rotundis vinctum, perquam libenter meminera-
 5 mus: Ἄν τι πράξῃς καλὸν μετὰ πόνου, ὁ μὲν πόνος οἴχεται, τὸ δὲ καλὸν μένει· ἄν τι ποιήσῃς αἰσχροῦ μετὰ ἡδονῆς, τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ οἴχεται, τὸ δὲ αἰσχρὸν μένει.

10 Postea istam ipsam sententiam in Catonis oratione, quam dixit Numantiae apud equites, positam legimus. quae etsi laxioribus paulo longioribusque verbis comprehensa est praequam illud Graecum, quod diximus, quoniam tamen prior tempore antiquiorque est, venerabilior videri debet. verba ex
 15 oratione haec sunt: 'Cogitate cum animis vestris: si quid vos per laborem recte feceritis, labor ille a vobis cito recedet, bene factum a vobis, dum vivitis, non abscedet; sed si qua per voluptatem nequiter feceritis, voluptas cito abibit, nequiter factum illud apud vos semper manebit.'

LII.

20 'remittere' inquit Musonius 'animum quasi amittere est.'

LIII.

προτρέπων μὲ τις θαρρῆσαι Μουσωνίου διῆκει λόγον· 'ἐκεῖνος, ἔφη, βουλούμενός τινα ἀναστῆσαι κάμνοντα καὶ ἀπειρηκότα οὕτωςί
 πως εἶπεν καθαπτόμενος· τί μένεις; ποῖ βλέπεις; ἢ μέχρι ἂν αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς παραστάς σοι φωνὴν ἀφίῃ; ἔκκοψον τὸ τεθνηκὸς τῆς ψυχῆς,
 25 καὶ γνώσῃ τὸν θεόν.' τοιαῦτ' ἔφη τὸν Μουσωνιὸν εἰπεῖν.

3 Aulus Gellius who relates this tale was born at least a quarter of a century after Musonius' death.

the rascal was a bad and vicious fellow, deserving of nothing good, Musonius, they say, answered with a smile, 'Well then he deserves money.'

LI

When I was still a boy at school, I heard that this Greek saying, which I here set down, was uttered by Musonius the philosopher, and because the sentiment is true and striking as well as neatly and concisely rounded out, I was very happy to commit it to memory. "If one accomplishes some good though with toil, the toil passes, but the good remains; if one does something dishonorable with pleasure, the pleasure passes, but the dishonor remains."

Afterwards I read that same sentiment in a speech of Cato's which was delivered at Numantia to the knights. Although it is expressed a little less compactly and concisely as compared with the Greek which I have quoted, yet because it is earlier and more ancient, it may well seem more impressive. The words from his speech are the following: "Consider this in your hearts: if you accomplish some good attended with toil, the toil will quickly leave you; but if you do some evil attended with pleasure, the pleasure will quickly pass away, but the bad deed will remain with you always."

LII "To relax (remittere) the mind," said Musonius, "is to lose (amittere) it."

LIII

Someone who was urging me to take heart quoted a saying of Musonius. "Musonius," said he, "wishing to rouse a man who was depressed and weary of life, touched him and asked, 'What are you waiting for, why stand you idly gazing? Until God in person shall come and stand by you and utter human speech? Cut off the dead part of your soul and you will recognize the presence of God.' Such," he said, "were the words of Musonius."

SOURCES OF THE TEXT

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II.	"	"	II, 9, 8 (" " II, pp. 183 f.)
III.	"	"	II, 31, 126 (" " II, pp. 244-247)
IV.	"	"	II, 31, 123 (" " II, pp. 235-239)
V.	"	"	II, 15, 46 (" " II, pp. 193-194)
VI.	"	"	III, 29, 78 (" " III, pp. 648-651)
VII.	"	"	III, 29, 75 (" " III, pp. 643-646)
VIII.	"	<i>Florilegium</i>	46, 67 (Meineke, II, pp. 271-276)
IX.	"	<i>Anthologium</i>	III, 40, 9 (Wachsmuth & Hense, III, pp. 748-757)
X.	"	"	III, 19, 16 (" " III, pp. 534-537)
XI.	"	<i>Florilegium</i>	56, 18 (Meineke, II, pp. 336-340)
XII.	"	<i>Anthologium</i>	III, 6, 23 (Wachsmuth & Hense, III, pp. 286-289)
XIII.A.	"	<i>Florilegium</i>	69, 23 (Meineke, III, pp. 26-27)
XIII.B.	"	"	70, 14 (" III, pp. 32-33)
XIV.	"	"	67, 20 (" III, pp. 3-7)
XV.	(77, 1-79, 13) Stobaeus, <i>Florilegium</i> 75, 15 (Meineke, III, pp. 74-75)		
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XVI.	Stobaeus, <i>Florilegium</i>	79, 51	(Meineke, III, pp. 90-94)
XVII.	"	"	117, 8 (" IV, pp. 87-90)
XVIII.A.	"	<i>Anthologium</i>	III, 17, 42 (Wachsmuth & Hense, III, pp. 503-507)
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XIX.	"	"	III, 1, 209 (" " III, pp. 173-176)
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FRAGMENTS

XXII.	Stobaeus	<i>Anthologium</i>	III, 1, 48 (Wachsmuth & Hense, III, p. 19)
XXIII.	"	"	III, 2, 31 (" " III, p. 185)
XXIV.	"	"	III, 5, 21 (" " III, p. 263)
XXV.	"	"	III, 6, 21 (" " III, p. 285)
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XXVII.	"	"	III, 7, 22 (" " III, p. 314)
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XXXV.	"	"	118, 26 (" IV, p. 98)

- XXXVI. Plutarch, *De cohibenda ira* 453D, E (*Moralia ed.* W. C. Helmbold, VI, pp. 96-98)
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- XXXVIII. Epictetus, *Fragment* 4 (169)
- XXXIX. " " 5 (67)
- XL. " " 6 (69)
- XLI. " " 7 (70)
- XLII. " " 8 (134)
- XLIII. " *Discourses* I, 1, 26
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- XLV. " " I, 9, 29-31
- XLVI. " " III, 6, 9-10
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- XLVIII. " " III, 23, 29
- XLIX. Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* V, 1
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